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Travis Howell: Surrounding the Founder: Examining the Hidden Figures of Entrepreneurship1 
(Under the direction of Chris Bingham) 
Founders, as the initial architects of their organizations, receive a great deal of interest 
and attention in entrepreneurship research. Yet, there is still much we do not know regarding the 
constellation of other people surrounding the founder and supporting them throughout the 
entrepreneurial process. This dissertation includes three essays focused on addressing this 
neglected area of research, and examines various “hidden figures” which are rarely observed in 
entrepreneurial data and who seldom receive the same recognition as founders, but who still play 
a fundamental role in venture success. In the first essay, I uncover and introduce the concept of 
co-creators, or individuals and entities who hold no ownership stake in the business but still 
make a distinctive contribution in the earliest stages of founding a new business. The second 
essay examines the role of a second-in-command, or an individual who the founder hires later in 
the firm’s life cycle to help manage the increasingly complex business. The third and final essay 
explores coworking communities, an increasingly popular phenomenon in which communities of 
founders interact with, learn from, and help one another. As a whole, these essays contribute by 
highlighting how the immediate context around founders can play a major role in determining 
venture success.  
                                                 
1 This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, the Strategy Research Foundation, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Past literature gives much attention to founders. This attention is well-deserved, as 
founders are the initial architects of their organizations and make many decisions that affect the 
procedures, policies, and culture of the organization throughout the duration of its lifetime 
(Simsek et al., 2015; Baron et al., 1999; Hsu and Lim, 2013; Beckman and Burton, 2008). 
Founder identities and decisions also define the core of the firm, including what markets to 
serve, what customer needs to address, and what capabilities and resources to deploy (Abell, 
1980; Fauchart and Gruber, 2011). Thus, a better understanding of founders leads to a better 
understanding of organizations. As such, the founder role is one of the most studied topics in 
entrepreneurship, strategy, and organization theory (Klotz et al., 2014; Lazar et al., 2019; Knight 
et al., 2020).  
Yet, founding a new venture generally cannot be done alone. Often there is a 
constellation of other people either directly or peripherally involved in helping founders 
throughout the entrepreneurial process. However, past studies pay less attention to these actors 
surrounding the founder and playing supporting roles. This dissertation aims to address this 
neglected area of research, and examines various “hidden figures,” or individuals and entities 
who rarely appear in entrepreneurial data and seldom receive the same recognition, credit, or 
glory as founders, but who still play an outsize role in early venture success. For example, in the 
first essay, I introduce the concept of co-creators, or individuals and entities who hold no 
ownership stake in the venture but still make a distinctive contribution in the earliest stages of 
founding a new business. The second essay examines the role of a second-in-command, or an 
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individual who the founder hires later in the firm’s life cycle to help manage the increasingly 
complex business. The third and final essay explores coworking communities, an increasingly 
popular phenomenon in which communities of founders interact with, learn from, and help one 
another. Overall, these three essays shed light on the immediate context surrounding the founder, 
examining the group of people involved in helping the founder succeed. I discuss each of these 
essays in more detail below (see Figure 1 for summary).  
Essay 1 
Though about half of all new ventures are founded by solo founders (Wasserman, 2012), 
the entrepreneurship literature has increasingly focused on founding teams (Klotz et al., 2014). 
This is perhaps not surprising, as teams provide a fertile ground for the study of the social 
processes that are of widespread interest both in management and in the social sciences more 
broadly (Aldrich and Martinez, 2003; Foo et al., 2006). As a result, founding teams are often of 
more scholarly theoretical interest than solo founders.  
In addition, there are many theoretical and practical reasons for believing that founding 
teams are preferable to individual founders. Co-founders help accomplish the “enormous job of 
starting a new firm” (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990: 510) by helping write code, craft 
strategy, chase leads, pitch investors, and support operations. Moreover, co-founders can share 
emotional drain, encourage and support, and complement deficiencies in a founding team in a 
way that may help ventures overcome their resource constraints faster and better. Given these 
benefits, many argue that the selection of co-founders is the singular most important decision in 
starting a new venture (Wasserman, 2012). As a result, much of the research in entrepreneurship 
to date has focused on founding teams, with a particular focus on how their initial inputs and 
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conditions (such as team demographics, composition, and prior experience) affect firm 
performance (Klotz et al., 2014).  
However, while past literature pays much attention to the benefits of founding teams, it 
pays comparatively less attention to their shortcomings. The practitioner work that does exist 
suggests that co-founder challenges are a central cause for startup failure, and that up to 65% of 
startup failures are due at least in part to conflicts among the co-founders (Wasserman, 2012). In 
particular, co-founders often face role dilemmas (e.g., overlapping roles vs division of labor) as 
well as reward dilemmas (division of equity and control) that could exacerbate rather than 
mitigate the liabilities of newness and increase the chances of the venture imploding (Ensley and 
Pearce, 2001; Higashide and Birley, 2002; Vanaelst et al., 2006). Overall, cofounders bring 
many problems in addition to bringing resources. 
Given that cofounders provide both advantages and disadvantages to a new venture, it is 
possible that solo founders can perform as well as co-founders under certain conditions. 
Although solo founders do not benefit from the human, social, and financial capital provided by 
cofounders, they do benefit from avoiding conflicts among cofounders, which may contribute to 
higher performance. Further, it may well be that some solo founders could address liabilities of 
newness through their existing resources or networks and so be less likely to need or want co-
founders. The literature, however, is silent on this tradeoff. Rather, the number of founders is 
overlooked as the literature largely refers to founders as a collective, assuming away differences 
between single or co-founded firms. Such an omission is problematic because it obscures 
understanding of what form they take, how they combine together, or which are more unique or 
problematic for particular founder types. 
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The first essay addresses this gap by exploring the question of “under what conditions 
can solo-founded ventures perform as well as co-founded ventures?” Using data on 70 early-
stage technology ventures (both solo-founded and co-founded), I build theory around how solo 
founders can mobilize resources in unique ways to overcome their resource constraints, and that 
in some ways, these strategies may even be preferable to bringing on cofounders. To do so, I use 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an increasingly popular technique that bridges the 
divide between qualitative and quantitative research. This approach reveals synergistic 
relationships among variables, and allows the researcher to assess equifinality (i.e., multiple 
paths to the same outcome). Collectively, this study contributes to the literature by revealing that 
successful solo founders are not actually solo. Although they do not have co-founders in the 
traditional sense, solo founders rely on various co-creators as substitutes. I describe how these 
co-creators play vital roles in new ventures, and that without them, the founder either would 
likely have had to find a co-founder or would not have succeeded at all.  
Essay 2 
While the first essay examines founders at the early stages of the founding process, the 
second essay examines founders later in their firms’ life cycles. Although there is an extensive 
literature on the Upper Echelons of organizations, the focus of these studies is generally on 
Fortune 500 firms and “professional” managers. Founders, however, differ from their non-
founder counterparts across several key dimensions (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996: 107-108). 
Yet, most of the literature that examines founders does so in relatively small, private, and family 
run firms (Klotz et al., 2014). Comparatively little research goes beyond these types of firms, 
leaving many open questions as to how founders might govern in larger, more mature firms. The 
lack of research on this topic is problematic, as founder CEOs currently govern or have governed 
5 
 
many of the largest and most important firms in the world (Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple, 
Microsoft, etc.). The founders of these firms often go from leading small, entrepreneurial 
ventures to leading large, multi-billion dollar firms within a span of a few years, and they often 
act, think, and behave very differently from their more “professional” counterparts. This essay 
takes important steps in understanding how these differences manifest in the structure of their 
organizations. 
Specifically, this essay examines whether founders are more likely to have and benefit 
from a “second-in-command.”2 Prior research suggests that although founders possess the 
entrepreneurial skills required to lead a new venture, they are often ill equipped to handle the 
challenges associated with leading a larger, more complex organization (Boeker and Karichalil, 
2002). Even more challenges arise as firms transition from private to public, including 
intensified regulation and scrutiny of the decisions made by top management. These challenges 
are often too much for a founder to handle, and thus founders are often encouraged to hire a 
second-in-command to compensate for their own managerial deficiencies.  
Surprisingly, however, little is known about the prevalence of a second-in-command 
leadership structure for founder-led firms, or its influence on firm performance (if any). In this 
essay, I address these important gaps in the literature by exploring three key questions: First, are 
founders more likely to have a second-in-command relative to other CEOs? And second, do 
founders benefit more from having a second-in-command relative to other CEOs? Using a 
sample of more than 2,000 firms that went public from 1997-2013, I find evidence that founder 
                                                 
2 One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon is Sheryl Sandberg, the Chief Operating Officer of 
Facebook, who has played a key supporting role to founder Mark Zuckerberg in building the social media giant. 
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CEOs are more likely to have a second-in-command relative to professional CEOs, and that they 
benefit more from having a second-in-command. 
Essay 3 
Whereas the first essay focuses on the various co-creators supporting solo founders and 
the second essay examines how a second-in-command can support founder CEOs, the third and 
final essay explores coworking communities that support founders in coworking spaces. 
Coworking spaces are membership-based workspaces in which diverse groups of nontraditional 
workers (startup companies, small businesses, remote workers, freelancers, and independent 
contractors) work together in a shared, communal space (Spreitzer et al., 2015a:28). Mostly 
unheard of ten years ago, the global number of coworking spaces has grown dramatically in 
recent years. For example, the annual Global Coworking Survey (Deskmag, 2019) estimated that 
only about 160 coworking spaces existed in 2008, whereas in 2017 there were more than 13,800. 
As entrepreneurs (especially millennials) have been flocking to these spaces in droves, investors 
have also poured money into building these spaces. Overall, the rise of coworking is one of the 
most prevalent trends in recent entrepreneurial activity (Kreamer, 2012).  
Although numerous entrepreneurial news sources have addressed coworking and 
attempted to advise founders as to whether coworking is right for them, these sources are often 
limited to anecdotal evidence, meaning more data and research is needed to advise entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, understanding the impact of coworking is necessary as it has important policy 
implications. Because the coworking industry as we know it is relatively new, it has not yet gone 
through a full economic cycle. Once a recession or other shock occurs, the coworking industry 
will likely experience consolidation (Klepper, 1996). When that happens, many coworking 
spaces are currently funded either fully or partially by local governments, universities, and 
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corporations, and these stakeholders will be forced to decide whether these spaces are worthy of 
continual funding.  
Overall, more data and analysis is required to understand whether coworking “works” for 
entrepreneurs. By collecting a large amount of both publicly available as well as proprietary data, 
this essay builds a foundation for research on coworking, the conditions under which it may 
improve entrepreneurial outcomes, and the various research streams it can enrich. I suggest that 
the most unique and influential aspect of coworking is not the space itself, but rather the 
community within the space. It is the community that often initially attracts entrepreneurs to the 
space, as it is the community that helps founders solve problems, give feedback and new ideas, 
or just simply provide friends and social support when times get tough. In short, this essay 
provides an initial overview of the coworking phenomenon, which is providing unprecedented 
ways for entrepreneurs to form communities with each other and thus interact with, learn from, 
and mimic their peers.  
Overall Contributions 
Recently, researchers are focusing increasingly more on the infrastructure and context 
around founders. For example, several studies have examined the idea of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, showing how founders survive and thrive in some regions more than others (Spigel 
and Harrison, 2017; Spigel, 2017; Feld, 2012). While these studies validate that the context 
around the founder matters, these studies generally take a more macro view and focus on overall 
rates of founding and survival by region. Less attention is paid to the immediate context around 
the founder. In this dissertation, I shed light on this context that is often glossed over, taken for 
granted, or ignored. By bringing this context from the background to the foreground, this 
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dissertation advances knowledge around how founders succeed – not on their own, but with the 
help of others around them.   
Specifically, the three essays included in my dissertation increase our understanding of 
the actors playing supporting roles in entrepreneurship. This again diverges from prior literature, 
as most prior studies tend to privilege founders, and thus pay less attention to other important 
contributors. My data and analysis, however, suggest that there is often a constellation of people 
surrounding the founder and co-creating the venture along with them. These hidden figures (i.e., 
co-creators, second-in-commands, and members of coworking communities) seldom receive the 
same recognition, credit, or glory as founders for creating the organization, despite playing an 
outsize role in venture success. Yet, they may very well represent much of the “X factor” in 
entrepreneurship (Saxton et al., 2016), accounting for much of the unexplained differences 
between successful and unsuccessful ventures.  
One reason these hidden figures are understudied in prior literature is precisely because 
they are “hidden;” in other words, they are rarely observed in entrepreneurial data. Thus, another 
contribution of these studies is the considerable amount of data collected for each essay. In 
addition to the large amount of data collected, I also study these hidden figures using a 
combination of empirical techniques (including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods) 
and in a variety of contexts. This combination of detailed data, mixed methods, and various 
contexts produces knowledge that would not otherwise be possible and provides a rounded view 
of who helps founders build and nurture their organizations.  
I structure the remainder of this dissertation as follows: First, I present each of the three 
full essays in order. I then offer some conclusions and discuss overarching insights from the 
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CHAPTER 2: CO-CREATORS VS. CO-FOUNDERS 
HOW SOLO-FOUNDERS CAN PERFORM AS WELL AS CO-FOUNDERS 
ABSTRACT 
Research and practice suggest that co-founded ventures should generally outperform 
solo-founded ventures. Yet, little work has explored the conditions under which solo-founded 
ventures might perform as well as co-founded ventures. Using in-depth qualitative data on 70 
entrepreneurial ventures, I address this gap. Our findings reveal how successful solo-founders 
strategically use co-creators rather than co-founders to overcome liabilities, retain control, and 
mobilize resources in unique and unexpected ways. Collectively, our findings add fresh 




As the original architects of their organizations, founders have a disproportionate and 
often long-lasting influence on their firms’ structure, strategy, and capabilities (Nelson, 2003; 
Beckman and Burton, 2008; Beckman, 2006; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). One of the 
most crucial decisions a founder makes is whether to remain solo or use co-founders. This is a 
common and reoccurring question among prospective entrepreneurs, with many entrepreneurial 
blogs, news articles, and online community threads devoted to this topic, attempting to advise 
entrepreneurs on whether they need co-founders or should remain solo (e.g., Inc, 2014; 
TechCrunch, 2016; Forbes, 2016).  
Yet, surprisingly, extant literature generally does not distinguish between ventures 
founded by a single founder and co-founded ventures. Rather, prior research largely refers to 
founders as a collective (Klotz et al., 2014), with the number of founders often being a control 
variable in the analysis (Ferguson et al., 2016; Ensley et al., 2002). Or, in many cases, authors 
are interested only in teams and thus solo founders are dropped from the empirical analysis 
altogether (Lazar et al., 2019; Beckman et al., 2007).  
While prior research generally does not make the explicit distinction between solo- and 
co-founded ventures, there does exist a body of empirical evidence suggesting that larger 
founding teams outperform smaller founding teams on average (e.g., Chandler et al., 2005; 
Brinckmann & Hoegl, 2011; Jin et al., 2017; Agarwal et al., 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Feeser 
& Willard, 1990). The general logic is that more founders equals more resources (human, social, 
and financial capital) that should help the venture succeed. This is also consistent with several of 
the most prominent examples seen in practice, in that more “unicorns” – i.e., extremely high 
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performing new ventures such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, Intel, YouTube, 
Skype, Yahoo, Yelp- were started by co-founders than by solo founders.  
Given these strong theoretical and anecdotal reasons for expecting co-founders to 
outperform solo founders, the notion that entrepreneurs need co-founders is becoming 
institutionalized in entrepreneurship. For example, many investors have explicit policies against 
funding solo founders. Venture capital firms, angel groups, and other investors often bet on the 
“jockey” (i.e., the founding team) rather than on the “horse” (i.e., the actual idea), and thus 
having a complementary founding team in place is important for investors (Bernstein et al., 
2017; Kaplan et al., 2009; Lazar et al., 2019). Similarly, many accelerators and incubators rarely 
accept solo founders, believing it is too difficult to go solo (Cohen et al., 2019a). For example, 
Techstars (one of the largest and most prestigious accelerators) states on their website that “while 
we don’t screen applications just because they have a single founder, it does make things more 
difficult. We look for great, balanced teams who have a full range of skills. We strongly advise 
you to seek co-founders who balance your skillset.” These requirements by investors, 
accelerators, and others fuel demand for co-founders. Indeed, online “matchmaking” services 
now exist which pair co-founders by skill, personality, and entrepreneurial pursuits. As attention 
on co-founders increases in practice, the academic literature also reveals an increasing focus on 
teams rather than individuals, as noted in several recent review articles (see Lazar et al., 2019; 
Klotz et al., 2014; Knight et al., 2020). Overall, the current conventional wisdom both in 
research and in practice is that entrepreneurs need co-founders. 
Yet, little work actually examines the counterfactual – i.e., the conditions under which 
solo-founded ventures might perform as well as co-founded ventures. This is especially 
problematic given recent work which suggests that although co-founders can provide resources, 
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they can also be a central cause for new venture failure. Wasserman (2012), for example, finds 
that up to 65% of startup failures may be tied to conflicts among co-founders. In particular, co-
founders often face role dilemmas (e.g., overlapping roles vs division of labor) and/or reward 
dilemmas (division of equity and control) that can exacerbate rather than mitigate liabilities of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hellman & Wasserman, 2016). Thus, on the one hand, co-
founders provide resources that entrepreneurs desperately need, especially in the earliest days of 
a new venture. On the other hand, co-founder challenges can also be the primary source of 
failure. As such, it may be that solo founding is not only possible, but may even be preferable 
under certain conditions. As support, organizations such as Amazon, Dell, eBay, ServiceNow, 
FireEye, Tumblr, Mint, and RetailMeNot are all highly successful solo-founded ventures.  
Overall, the distinction between solo-founded and co-founded ventures is both important 
and underexplored. I help address this gap by exploring the question of “Under what conditions 
do solo-founded ventures perform as well as co-founded ventures?” Given the lack of prior 
literature on this topic, I use in-depth qualitative evidence from 70 new ventures to explore the 
underlying mechanisms both solo and co-founded ventures use to overcome initial liabilities and 
achieve success. Specifically, I employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a 
configurational method that is uniquely designed to assess equifinality (i.e., the possibility that 
there are several unique paths to achieve the same outcome - Fiss, 2007). Given my research 
question, I am inherently interested in equifinality, as co-founding and solo-founding might lead 
to the same outcome under the right set of conditions. Collectively, my results reveal how solo-
founded ventures use a nuanced set of co-creators rather than co-founders to mobilize resources 
in unique and unexpected ways. In particular, I introduce the concept of benefactors – outside 
parties who alleviate a major resource constraint for the entrepreneurs with no expectation of 
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compensation or reciprocation – and show how solo founders rely on them and other co-creators 
to overcome their unique liabilities. Together, these results combine to suggest that co-founders 
are not always required (as dictated by conventional wisdom), but rather that solo founders can 
find substitutes that provide many or all of the same benefits, while at the same time avoiding 
some or all of the costs. As a whole, my findings have important implications for the 
entrepreneurship and strategy literatures. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
New ventures often face severe resource constraints relative to more established and 
resource-rich incumbents, producing what Stinchcombe (1965) classically titled the ‘liabilities of 
newness.’ Prior literature suggests that if new ventures hope to survive, they must rapidly acquire 
or develop the resources enjoyed by incumbents in the same industry (Freeman et al., 1983; 
Mens et al., 2011; Clough et al., 2019). This is especially difficult at the earliest stages of a new 
venture, as the entrepreneur may have a rough version of an idea for a business but not enough 
legitimacy or proof of concept to attract investors (Singh et al., 1986). Thus, entrepreneurs must 
find alternative ways of mobilizing the human, social, and financial capital necessary for 
survival. One of the most common ways in which entrepreneurs do so early on is by partnering 
with co-founders (Wasserman, 2012),3 who are willing to provide resources (i.e., human, social, 
and financial capital) in exchange for equity and voting rights of the nascent business. 
                                                 
3There are conflicting estimates on the proportion of ventures that are solo vs. co-founded. For example, solo 
founders account for roughly half of all founders in the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) and the 
Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), whereas solo founders only account for roughly 10% and 16% of firms in Beckman 
(2006) and Wasserman (2012)’s respective datasets. These differences are likely due to the fact that the PSED and 
KFS are nationally representative and incorporate a wide variety of industries, whereas the Beckman (2006) and 




Given the importance of co-founders, many prior studies assess their impact on new 
ventures. Figure 2 provides a brief synthesis of this literature, detailing both the advantages of 
co-founders (i.e., what solo founders give up by not having co-founders), and also the 
disadvantages of co-founders (i.e., what solo founders avoid by not having co-founders). I 
discuss each of these in the subsections that follow.  
Advantages of Co-Founders 
Resources. Prior literature focuses primarily on the resources that co-founders provide 
(Chandler et al., 2005; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Brinckmann & Hoegl, 2011; Jin et al., 
2017; Agarwal et al., 2016). For example, co-founders can provide human capital to a venture by 
bringing needed skills, knowledge, or experience (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Gruber et al., 2012). 
They can also provide social capital via more connections to potential customers, hires, or 
investors (Aldrich & Kim, 2007; Vissa & Chacar, 2009; Birley, 1985). In addition, they can 
provide valuable financial capital by personally funding the business until founders can find 
investors (Cooper et al., 1994). In short, individual founders often do not have enough time, 
expertise, connections, or funding to start a new firm by themselves, and so co-founders are 
frequently used to fill in those gaps. 
Emotional/psychological support. In addition to providing resources, co-founders also 
provide other benefits in the form of emotional and psychological support. Founding a new 
venture is often an emotional roller coaster, with founders experiencing the highest of highs and 
the lowest of lows, sometimes within the same week or even in the same day. This can take a 
psychological toll on founders (Wasserman, 2012). This is especially true for solo founders, who 
must bear the burden of making difficult decisions and face the resulting consequences with no 
one else to blame or share responsibility (Aldrich et al., 2004). With co-founders, however, the 
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experience is different. Consistent with past research that provides evidence of bonding that 
occurs among people who experience a crisis together (McMillan & Chavis, 1986), co-founders 
are often uniquely able to support one another due to their shared experience. As Francis and 
Sandberg (2000:6) note, friendships within a founding team “may hold teams together and 
stimulate heroic efforts during difficult times.” Some entrepreneurs may seek co-founders for 
these reasons alone even if they add few actual resources to the venture (Wasserman, 2012). 
Disadvantages of Co-Founders 
Coordination/monitoring costs. Despite the many benefits teams appear to have over 
individuals, prior literature also identifies several costs. For example, the literature on project-
based teams finds that people tend to overestimate the efficiency gained from dividing work 
among team members, while underestimating the time required to integrate and coordinate that 
work (Staats et al., 2012). Orchestrating the sequence and timing of interdependent actions can 
be a burdensome task, and one that often requires a great deal of information exchange and 
mutual adjustment of action (Marks et al., 2001). In new venture teams, co-founders’ 
coordination efforts can cause delays in important decisions around product development, market 
penetration, and organizational design (Zheng, 2012). Solo founders do not experience these 
same coordination costs that arise in teams. 
Conflict. Though the coordination and monitoring costs of co-founders can result in 
inefficiencies, the costs resulting from intra-team conflict can be more damaging. There are 
several reasons why co-founders are highly likely to experience destructive relationship conflict4 
                                                 
4 The team literature typically distinguishes between task conflict (differences in ideas, opinions, and viewpoints 
about task content) and relationship conflict (tensions, annoyances, disagreements, and personal incompatibilities) 
(Bradley et al. 2012). A moderate amount of task conflict is thought to be beneficial in new ventures, as a thorough, 
constructive discussion among co-founders regarding how to mobilize or allocate resources should generally 
17 
 
at some point (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Amason & Sapienza, 1997). First, co-founders must 
negotiate and divide roles, responsibilities, equity, and voting rights among themselves, requiring 
them to have open conversations with each other regarding whose skillsets and contributions are 
more valuable to the venture (Jung, Vissa, & Pich, 2017; Wasserman, 2012). Second, the long-
term and high-stakes nature of co-founding relationships makes them different from other work-
type relationships and more prone to conflict. In fact, many entrepreneurs use the analogy of a 
marriage in describing their co-founding relationship, as they worry about how to properly raise 
their ‘baby’ (startup), plan for the future, fight over finances, and try to not lose motivation or 
commitment when times get tough. This can be difficult, as co-founders spend countless hours 
working together and making many important, long-term, and high-risk decisions, often under 
great levels of stress and uncertainty. As a result, they often do not have the time or mental 
energy to properly resolve their internal conflicts, allowing them to fester and accumulate until it 
reaches a tipping point where the team disbands or the venture fails (De Jong et al., 2013).  
Thus, on one hand co-founders can provide both resources (i.e., human, social, and 
financial capital) and emotional/psychological support that entrepreneurs desperately need early 
on in the life of a new venture. On the other hand, the coordination/monitoring costs and 
destructive team conflict can also be a primary source of failure. Thus, when taking a holistic 
view of the literature, it becomes less clear that co-founding is always a favorable strategy. 
Instead, it is likely the case that solo founders can perform as well as co-founders under the right 
conditions. In the analysis that follows, I explore these conditions under which it is possible to 
succeed as a solo founder, and when it is best to find co-founders.  
                                                 
promote higher-quality decisions (De Jong et al., 2013). Unfortunately, however, high amounts of task conflict tend 




 I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine my question of 
interest. QCA differs from conventional linear regression in both its objectives and its means 
(Misangyi et al., 2017). Linear regression isolates independent effects of individual variables, 
and thus assumes linearity, additive effects, single paths, and competing explanations among 
independent variables. QCA, in contrast, reveals synergistic relationships among variables that 
combine in complex ways to explain an outcome (Ragin, 2000; 2008; Fiss, 2007). It also allows 
for the modeling of equifinality – the principle that multiple alternative solutions can lead to a 
given outcome. This is particularly appropriate in my study, as founders may be able to 
overcome their liabilities in a variety of ways, implying there is not one path to success. Finally, 
because QCA is a logical, not statistical method, it is particularly useful for moderately sized 
samples. My sample meets the criteria generally used for QCA studies (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008), 
namely (1) variance in outcomes (high-performing vs. low-performing ventures), (2) variance 
and commonalities across venture characteristics, and (3) an intermediate-N design that allows 
the researchers to have an in-depth familiarity with the individual cases. Overall, a qualitative 
approach such as QCA has distinct advantages, as my data allow me to gain a deeper 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms by which solo and co-founded ventures overcome 
their unique liabilities and achieve success. In the sections that follow, I first describe my sample 
and data, followed by an explanation of my analytic approach. 
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Sample and Data 
I rely on data from ventures in three start-up facilities (one incubator, one coworking 
space, and one entrepreneurial support foundation5) based in the same metropolitan area in the 
United States. These facilities are distinct and separate organizations, yet they are all part of the 
same entrepreneurial ecosystem and the managers of each facility know each other and often 
coordinate activities and initiatives. I focus on the venture level of analysis and follow prior 
qualitative studies (Cohen et al., 2019b; Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2017) 
by using a “homogenous” sampling strategy to ensure that the ventures in my sample had certain 
theoretically relevant conditions. For example, the similar location of ventures ensured that they 
experienced many of the same liabilities in obtaining human and financial capital (e.g., founders 
often mentioned how the area lacked the venture funding and technical talent found in Silicon 
Valley). I further reduced extraneous factors by focusing on high growth technology and 
consumer product startups. This eliminated pure inventors, freelancers, or independent 
contractors who experience different liabilities and capital constraints as they focus only on the 
development of ideas or services to sell. With these criteria, I worked with the directors of each 
facility to identify both solo-founded and co-founded ventures affiliated with their organizations.  
The central unit of analysis is a new venture. My sample consists of 38 solo-founded 
ventures and 32 co-founded ventures, for a total of 70 ventures. Past research suggests that this 
number of cases is ideal for QCA (Ragin, 2000; 2008), as it is small enough to allow for an in-
depth familiarity of each case but large enough to allow a systematic investigation of the 
relationships that emerge from the data. Each observation consists of semi-structured interviews 
                                                 
5 The foundation is a non-profit organization that provides mentoring and grant money to early-stage entrepreneurs.  
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with the founder(s) of each new venture, supplemented and triangulated by rich archival data 
from various other sources, as discussed in more detail below. 
The interviews represent the primary data source (106 interviews in total). These 
interviews generally lasted 30-60 minutes, with an average of 45 minutes. I followed an 
interview guide, which I modified throughout data collection to address emerging themes. Each 
interview had three parts: (1) background information on the venture and founder, (2) company 
history, and (3) direct questions related to being a solo founder or co-founder. For the company 
history, I asked informants to walk me through a timeline of specific actions, events, and facts 
that focused on the early days of the company. For example, I asked: How did you come up with 
the idea? What have been the main milestones? What have been low points? What people or 
organizations have been especially crucial in your company’s development? Why did you decide 
to [solo-found or co-found]? From this initial narrative, I probed for further information related 
to the events and people who played the biggest roles. These follow up questions focused on 
specific liabilities and challenges that founders faced, and how they were able to overcome them. 
Together, these questions enabled rich accounts of the events that took place over time, and 
recounting these events chronologically helped reduce individual informant bias while allowing 
for comparability across informants (Huber & Power, 1985; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011).  
For solo founders, I asked additional questions specifically related to being a solo-
founder. For example, I probed as to why they started the company alone and whether they tried 
finding co-founders, what they viewed as the main advantages and disadvantages of being a solo 
founder, times they wished they had co-founders, and how they coped during those times. For 
co-founders, I asked questions such as whether they had considered going solo, what types of 
disagreements or challenges they had with their co-founders, and how they allocated roles, titles, 
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and equity. The use of both nondirective and directive questions at different points during the 
interview helps to ensure a higher level of accuracy and truthfulness of responses by reducing the 
effects of priming (where informants feel as though they need to answer a question in a certain 
way) (Bingham et al., 2019; Bingham & Kahl, 2014). I also added extra interviews and sent 
follow-up emails to fill gaps in the chronology and improve completeness.  
Further, I triangulated this retrospective data from my interviews with rich and real-time 
archival data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) from surveys and applications provided 
by the coworking space, incubator, and entrepreneurial support foundation. Each of these 
organizations performs an annual survey of their ventures to collect information on revenue, 
funding, job creation, and other metrics. I used data from these surveys to supplement 
information from interviews and obtain outcome data (Cohen et al., 2019b). The incubator and 
support foundation also required entrepreneurs to submit detailed applications to their 
organizations. These applications provided information on company history, key milestones, 
traction with customers, and other details. I also relied on company websites, media reports, 
press releases, social media, and internal documents to provide an additional check against the 
accuracy of responses received in the interviews. Overall, these added data sources supplement 
the interviews and provide a further check on the accuracy of the data, improving the reliability 
and credibility of my results (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
QCA Analysis: Calibration 
The first step in performing a QCA analysis is to calibrate set membership. The goal of 
calibration is to separate cases into meaningful groupings (Ragin, 2008). To do so, the researcher 
selects an outcome and then several explanatory conditions that explain variance in that outcome. 
Once the outcome and explanatory conditions are selected, the researcher assigns values ranging 
22 
 
between 0 (indicating the absence of a given condition) and 1 (indicating the presence of the 
condition) to each case for each condition. These conditions can be “crisp” (i.e., dichotomous) 
where all cases are identified as being “fully in” (coded 1) or “fully out” (coded 0). Alternatively, 
conditions can be “fuzzy”, where each case can be assigned values between 0 and 1 depending 
on degree of membership. I use both crisp and fuzzy coding in the analysis. The subsequent 
sections provide more details on the calibration of the outcome and explanatory conditions. 
Outcome 
Given my research question explores the conditions under which solo-founded ventures 
perform as well as co-founded ventures, the outcome for my analysis is venture performance. 
Following prior literature (Dencker & Gruber, 2015), I relied on financial performance – 
specifically, amount of annual revenue – as the outcome variable. Revenue may not always be a 
perfect measure of venture performance, as some ventures may experience success in another 
metric (e.g., a large user base, patent approval) with no corresponding revenue (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003). To examine whether this was the case, I examined multiple data sources 
(interviews, surveys, applications, company websites, etc.) and found that this did not occur for 
the ventures in my sample. In other words, none of the 70 ventures in my sample had 
experienced notable success along other metrics such as user acquisition without also receiving 
revenue. As such, I believe revenue is an appropriate way to classify successful and unsuccessful 
ventures in my sample, as it represents a relatively “clean” and meaningful measure of venture 
performance that signals success in meeting market demand (Dencker & Gruber, 2015). Further, 
it is also frequently used as a basis for valuation, as startups are often purchased using revenue 
multiples (Damodaran, 1999; Medium, 2018). As one interviewee said, “all that matters is 
revenue…that's the metric that's important.” 
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On average, the ventures in my sample had been operating for about four years and had 
varied amounts of success. Some ventures had been struggling with product development or 
finding customers, and thus either had no revenue or very little revenue (i.e., under $10,000). 
These ventures, which accounted for roughly 25 percent of the sample, were coded as (0) for the 
outcome. The remaining ventures had experienced more success, but to varying degrees. I code 
the outcome as (1) if the venture was earning at least $1 million in annual revenue. I selected $1 
million as the appropriate benchmark as the interviewees frequently mentioned it as a major 
milestone, and it is sometimes referred to in practice as the “magic number” that early-stage 
technology startups strive to reach (Inc, 2017; Forbes, 2015; CNN Money, 2011). I then coded 
the remaining firms as follows: (0.75) if between $500,000 and $1 million, (0.50)6 if between 
$100,000 and $500,000, and (0.25) if between $10,000 and $100,000.7  
Explanatory Conditions 
After calibrating the cases based on the outcome, the next step in QCA is to determine 
which factors lead to higher levels of the outcome and which lead to lower levels of the outcome. 
These factors are referred to as “explanatory conditions,” or conditions that explain variance in 
the outcome (similar to independent variables in statistical analysis). Unlike quantitative analysis 
                                                 
6 Following Ragin, Drass, and Davey (2006), we input values of 0.501 in the QCA software program. This is 
necessary as cases with condition values of 0.50 are automatically dropped during the analysis. 
7 These last three cutpoints were driven primarily by practical considerations, as some of the annual surveys did not 
collect exact amounts of annual revenue. Rather, fearing that founders would not be comfortable providing exact 
revenue amounts, the survey administrators provided ranges of revenue ($100,000 to $500,000, $500,000 to $1 
million, etc.) and asked founders to select the range that encompassed their annual revenue. As a robustness check, 
we re-performed the analysis using another coding structure for the outcome. Following prior QCA studies (Fiss, 
2011; Dwivedi et al., 2018) we coded all ventures as (0) if their revenue was below the median amount ($153,600 in 
my sample). We then coded all ventures in the upper quartile (i.e., ventures with more than $750,000 in revenue in 
this case) as (1), and set the crossover point was the mid-point between the two breakpoints, consistent with prior 
studies. For cases where we did not have data on the exact amount of revenue but did have information on the range 
of revenue (i.e., between $500,000 and $1 million), we made the simplifying assumption that their revenue was at 
the midpoint of this range. Results remained similar using this alternative coding structure, implying that the 
analysis was not overly sensitive to our coding of the outcome. 
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that calculates the marginal effect of each individual variable, QCA is a configurational approach 
that examines all possible combinations of variables. As such, each additional variable added to 
the QCA analysis increases the number of combinations exponentially (i.e., 2k where k equals 
the number of conditions). Due to these limitations, a large number of control variables is neither 
possible nor desirable when using QCA (Misangyi et al., 2017). Rather, scholars use both extant 
theory as well as in-depth knowledge of the cases at hand to determine which factors are most 
important and should be included in the model. Thus, like others (Crilly, 2011; Crilly et al., 
2012), I selected explanatory conditions for the sample using an inductive approach (i.e., 
deriving conditions from a mix of extant theory, empirical observation, and theory 
generation/elaboration) rather than a deductive approach (i.e., deriving conditions solely from 
extant theory) (see Misangyi et al., 2017). To do so, I analyzed each case carefully to gain a 
thorough understanding of which conditions might be associated with higher levels of the 
outcome and which were associated with lower levels.  
Given my research question seeks to understand the conditions under which solo-founded 
ventures perform as well as co-founded ventures, my analysis focused on comparing these two 
groups. First, I compared them in terms of the unique liabilities of newness they faced. I focused 
explicitly on the themes recurrent among interviews with solo founders that were absent among 
interviews with co-founders, and vice versa. After obtaining a general understanding of the 
unique challenges for each group, I then performed a within-comparison of each group. In other 
words, I compared successful solo founders to unsuccessful solo founders and successful co-
founders to unsuccessful co-founders, focusing specifically on the strategies used to mobilize 
resources. This excluded strategies such as forming a board of directors, as both the successful 
and unsuccessful founders in the sample employed these strategies. After comparing the 
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successful solo founders with the unsuccessful ones, I then compared the successful solo 
founders with the successful co-founders to assess whether these were strategies common to all 
successful ventures regardless of founding type or whether they were strategies unique to one 
founding type. This inductive analysis resulted in eight conditions that appear to explain the 
performance differences between solo- and co-founded ventures. I describe my calibration of 
each condition below.  
Co-founders. The first explanatory condition is whether the venture was founded by a 
solo founder or a team of co-founders. I code this condition as (1) if the venture was co-founded, 
and (0) if it was solo-founded. 
Alliances. An alliance is typically defined as “any independently initiated inter-firm link 
that involves exchange, sharing, or co-development” (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002:748). This 
encompasses arrangements such as joint ventures, marketing agreements, or R&D/production 
agreements. Forming alliances is a strategy that entrepreneurial firms can use to mobilize 
resources (Moghaddam et al., 2016), though empirical findings are mixed regarding its effects on 
performance for new ventures. Some results suggest the effect is negative as new ventures may 
be unfairly exploited in alliance relationships (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Gomes-Casseres, 1997), 
whereas others suggest the effect is positive as alliances provide access to the partners’ skills, 
knowledge, and resources, while still preserving control and flexibility (Harrison et al., 2001; 
Moghaddam et al., 2016). Many of the successful solo founders in the sample opted to form 
alliances with other organizations rather than partner with co-founders. I code this condition as 
(1) if the data revealed that the venture had an alliance partner, and (0) otherwise. 
Employees. Some of the founders chose to hire employees from the outset of their 
venture rather than bring on co-founders. Although some similarities exist between co-founders 
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and early employees, I include this as a separate condition as both extant research and my 
interview evidence suggests major differences exist between the two groups. One important 
difference is the structure of compensation, as co-founders generally receive a substantial portion 
of equity and voting rights. In contrast, employees generally have a more “traditional” 
compensation structure that is comprised of salary and benefits (though sometimes accompanied 
by a small portion of equity). In addition to these structural differences, however, there are also 
important differences in the nature of the individuals. For example, in a survey of over 4,000 
individuals, Roach & Sauermann (2015) find that founders differ substantially from “joiners” 
(i.e., early startup employees) in terms of preferences for autonomy, levels of risk tolerance, and 
other attributes. Finally, and in addition to these fundamental differences in nature of co-
founders and employees, the relationship between a founder and co-founder differs from that 
between a founder and employee. For employees, the job is often just that; a job. Co-founders, 
however, spend much more time together “in the trenches” (as described by interviewees), 
working long hours and making difficult decisions. I code this condition as (1) if the founder 
hired employees at the beginning of the venture, and (0) otherwise.  
Benefactors. The concept of a benefactor is something that emerged from the interview 
data. By benefactor, I refer to an outside party who alleviates a major resource constraint for the 
entrepreneurs with no expectation of compensation or reciprocation. Benefactors are distinct 
from investors – while investors provide resources to a new venture with an expectation of a 
return on investment, benefactors provide resources simply as a favor to the entrepreneur. 
Though not discussed in prior literature, these benefactors seemed to play a key role in helping 
founders overcome their liabilities of newness (I provide more details and examples of 
benefactors when discussing results). To calibrate this condition, I first developed a list of 
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examples from my interviews where individuals provided human, social, or financial capital to 
an entrepreneur with no expectation of compensation or reciprocation. I then wrote summaries 
describing who they were and what they provided to the entrepreneur. I then sent these 
summaries to three entrepreneurship scholars who had previously been entrepreneurs and asked 
them to rate whether these potential benefactors alleviated a major resource constraint for the 
entrepreneur (measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 = "strongly 
disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree"). In cases where the average rating was 6 or above (i.e., 
reviewers agreed that the benefactor alleviated a major resource constraint), I code this condition 
as (1). I code the condition as (0) if the average score was 2 or below (i.e., reviewers disagreed 
that the benefactor alleviated a major resource constraint). In four cases, the average fell between 
2 and 6, indicating a level of ambiguity in whether the benefactor alleviated a major resource 
constraint. I allocate partial membership (0.5) to these ventures. 
Emotional support network. As discussed earlier, prior literature suggests that in 
addition to providing resources to a new venture, co-founders also provide emotional and 
psychological support (see Figure 2). The solo founders in my sample often struggled with a lack 
of emotional/psychological support during the ups and downs of starting a new venture. To 
compensate, they sometimes created an emotional support network, a concept that does not 
appear in prior literature but rather emerged from the interview data. By emotional support 
network, I refer to individuals who provide the entrepreneur with emotional and psychological 
support during the founding process. In my data, this most commonly consisted of (1) a spouse, 
(2) peer founders in a coworking community, or (3) mentors or advisors with whom the founder 
would meet on a regular basis. To calibrate this condition, we created a discrete ordinal “support 
index” that ranges from 0 to 3: 0 if the founder has none of these three types of supporters, and 
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adding one for each they do have, for a maximum value of 3 (for co-founded ventures, we 
calculate this index for each individual co-founder and then take an average). We then code this 
condition as (1) if the support index equals three, (0.66) if it equals 2, (0.33) if it equals 1, and 
(0) if it equals 0. 
Serial founder. Prior research finds that serial founders, or individuals with prior 
experience in founding new ventures, are more successful on average than other entrepreneurs 
(Delmar & Shane, 2006; Eesley & Roberts, 2012; Lafontaine & Shaw, 2016). The reasoning is 
that serial entrepreneurs have both valuable experience (in creating products, recruiting talent, 
raising funds, and structuring roles and incentives) as well as relationships (with investors, key 
industry players, etc.) that should increase the venture’s chances of success. Several of the 
successful solo founders in my sample were serial founders. I code this condition as (1) if the 
founder(s) had previously founded a venture that was acquired by another company, and (0) 
otherwise.  
Product expertise. In analyzing the interview data, it became clear there was a distinction 
between founders who possessed the human capital necessary to develop their product in-house 
and those who did not. The latter group was forced to hire outside parties to develop the product 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2005) and often experienced deep frustration with product development. 
Overall, they were subject to more challenges and liabilities of newness relative to founders who 
possessed the expertise to develop the product themselves (as we explain more in our results). 
We code this variable as (1) if the venture developed the initial product entirely in-house, (0.5) if 
the founders outsourced part of product creation to outside parties, and (0) if the founders 
outsourced all part of product creation to outside parties.  
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Conflict triggers. After comparing the successful and unsuccessful co-founders in my 
sample, it became clear that an important distinction was the level of conflict experienced within 
the founding team. Conflict is inherently difficult to measure8, and as such, I took a multi-stage 
approach to assess it. I first reviewed prior literature on founding teams as well as my interviews 
with co-founders to determine which factors have the most potential to trigger relationship 
conflict (i.e., destructive conflict) within a founding team. This excludes factors such as team 
functional heterogeneity, which past research suggests is associated with moderate amounts of 
task conflict that might actually benefit the venture (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman et al., 
2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). This review resulted in a list of seven key factors that 
prior literature and/or my interview data indicates are associated with the potential for 
destructive conflict. These include factors such as differential commitments to the venture, the 
lack of a clear leader, or lack of prior shared work experience (see Table 1 for a full summary). I 
then created a discrete ordinal “conflict index” that ranges from 0 to 7: 0 if the founding team 
exhibits none of the conflict triggers listed in Table 1, and adding one for each of the conflict 
triggers that the venture does exhibit, for a maximum value of 7. The average score for co-
founded ventures was 3.8, with a standard deviation of 1.6. To calibrate this measure for the 
QCA analysis, I follow prior research (Mellewigt et al. 2018) and code a case as (1) if the 
conflict index was greater than one standard deviation above the mean, and (0) if the conflict 
index was lower than one standard deviation below the mean, and used the mean as the crossover 
                                                 
8Team conflict is dynamic and endogenous with firm performance, in that conflict may cause bad performance but 
bad performance may also cause conflict. While this is a qualitative study and our purpose is not to identify 
causality, we still wish to address this point of endogeneity as much as possible in our coding of the conflict 
variable. Thus, rather than coding the amount of conflict that the team experienced over time, we count the number 
of conflict “triggers,” which are structural features of the team that represent input factors at the beginning of team 
formation (see Table 1). As such, the endogeneity of conflict and venture performance is less of a concern as our 
coding of this condition is driven by initial team structure (i.e., the number of conflict triggers), and thus not driven 
by subsequent bad performance. 
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point. I code this condition as (0) for all solo-founded ventures, as there are no additional 
founders with whom to experience conflict9  
QCA Analysis: Specifications 
After coding all conditions for each venture, the next step is to create a “truth table” that 
lists all possible combinations of the explanatory conditions (see Table 2). The purpose of this 
truth table is to identify configurations of conditions that are consistently associated with the 
outcome (Ragin, 2000; 2008). To streamline the analysis and focus only on the relevant 
combinations, I follow past research (Bell et al., 2014; Mellewigt et al., 2018; Dwivedi et al., 
2018) and delete all combinations that are not associated with at least one case in the sample. I 
also follow recent QCA research and set the consistency threshold (which measures the degree to 
which a combination of causal conditions is reliably associated with the outcome of interest) as 
0.80, the standard threshold for consistency scores (Ragin, 2008; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). 
Finally, I apply the truth table algorithm (Ragin, 2008), which simplifies the causal combinations 
and leads to a more parsimonious set of results. Like others (Gilbert & Campbell, 2015; 
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Crilly et al., 2012), I report both the intermediate and parsimonious 
solutions. 
RESULTS 
The analysis resulted in four different configurations associated with high performance. 
Table 3 displays these configurations, along with the configurations associated with low 
                                                 
9 For robustness, we excluded each of the seven items in the conflict index one at a time and re-performed the 




performance10.  Each column represents a distinct configuration, or a distinct path to the 
specified outcome. Using examples from my interviews, I explain below how each of these 
configurations can lead to high performance.  
Pathways Leading to High Performance 
Pathway to high performance #1. At a high-level, the first pathway to high performance 
is broadly consistent with prior literature, in that it shows how having co-founders is one way 
entrepreneurs overcome liabilities and mobilize the necessary resources to achieve high 
performance. I found much evidence of this in the data. In fact, many of the co-founders I 
interviewed did not believe it was wise or even possible to be successful as a solo founder and 
did not understand why anyone would ever try, saying “I don’t understand anybody who’s a 
single founder…you need to have the right kind of people there,” or “I think starting a business 
without a partner…is insane…I would just go nuts without having someone to bounce everything 
off of, and to decide critical decisions with.”  In general, the co-founders in my sample provided 
much of the resources and emotional/psychological support discussed in prior literature (see 
Figure 2).  
Although this configuration is broadly consistent with prior studies that find a positive 
relationship between the number of founders and firm performance, the results also suggest that 
this relationship is more bounded or nuanced than typically acknowledged in the literature. In 
particular, co-founded ventures only experienced high performance when conflict triggers were 
absent. For example, one venture included four co-founders, two of whom were from (and 
                                                 
10 Unlike statistical analysis, QCA is not symmetric, meaning that the researcher must not only analyze the 
configurations that lead to the presence of the outcome (i.e., high performance) but also the configurations that lead 
to the absence of the outcome (i.e., not high performance), as they may be different. In our case, however, the 
configurations that led to low performance exhibit fewer clear patterns and are approximately a mirror image of 
those configurations that led to high performance, and thus we do not discuss them separately. 
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worked in) the United States and the other two from (and worked in) Uganda. They never chose 
a clear leader and instead decided they wanted “to make decisions unanimously, collaboratively”. 
This sounded nice in theory, but ultimately triggered conflict and resentment when the venture 
faced important decisions. For example, when they were preparing a funding application, they 
had fundamental disagreements about what information to include. These disagreements were 
never resolved, and the founder who ultimately submitted the application on the day of the 
deadline had to do so without the full support of the team. In addition, the cultural and locational 
differences between the American and Ugandan founders also came into play. For example, 
there was a fifth individual in Uganda who was marginally involved in the business and who 
would sometimes provide advice and connections. The American founders simply considered 
him an advisor, but the Ugandan founders wanted to grant him the founder title along with equity 
and voting rights. As one of the American founders shared: 
“From a US perspective, he very much is stereotypical advisor role…But my teammates 
want to consider him a founder because the way they're seeing it in Uganda, they're like, 
‘Oh he's done so much for them. We need to respect him. We need him on our side to be 
successful with this thing.’ And so there's been a lot of debate about whether he should 
[receive equity and voting rights].” 
In another co-founded venture, one founder was working full-time to develop the product 
and gain access to customers, whereas the other two kept their full-time jobs and put in minimal 
effort in the evenings. The full-time founder began to resent her other co-founders for their lack 
of effort, which amplified conflict stemming from other sources such as decisions around which 
customers to target. This founder shared with me her frustration and hopelessness she had felt 
with her team, saying “it’s been an eye-opening experience…[it’s been] one of the hardest 
things.” Other founders I interviewed expressed similar feelings, describing how co-founders can 
sometimes cause more problems than they resolve. As one founder put it, “I think having more 
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people is great…but people are people. And people, sometimes, are in better moods than others. 
And some of them bring an additional component of complexity.”  
In addition, configuration 1 suggests that “product expertise” is another core condition in 
this configuration, implying that only ventures who have co-founders with product expertise are 
those who experienced high performance. This implies that co-founders are most useful when 
they have complementary skillsets and provide the venture with a full range of skills needed to 
manage the organization (Beckman et al., 2007; Foo et al., 2006). For example, one founder was 
building an internet company and described how although he had a background in design, he did 
not have the technology or sales experience required to build a successful internet venture. As a 
result, he sought out two co-founders (one with a computer science degree from Stanford and 
another with sales and marketing expertise), which “rounded out the skillsets and would allow us 
to build anything, sell anything…,” ultimately leading to a well-received product and a high-
performing venture. Other teams, however, were not quite as fortunate. For example, one venture 
had three co-founders attempting to build a new type of software. The problem, however, was 
that none of them knew anything about creating software. As one said “[None] of us have ever 
been in the technology realm. None of us have any technical experience whatsoever. We're 
growth and marketing people.” They cobbled together an early version of the product using 
outside contractors and hoped to find investment and then hire technical talent. But, investors 
understandably felt hesitant to invest in a startup in which the founders knew little about how to 
create their product. These founders struggled to make progress, and ultimately experienced sub-
par performance. Overall, when co-founders all possessed the same skillset, they experienced 
many of the same challenges as solo founders.  
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 As a whole, this first configuration is partially consistent with the conventional wisdom 
that co-founders add value (Beckman et al., 2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Wasserman, 2017). However, it also bounds this prior work by suggesting two other required 
conditions, namely: absence of conflict triggers, and the proper skillsets. In contrast, the next 
three configurations represent three unique paths founders can take to achieve high performance 
even without co-founders. 
Pathway to high performance #2. The founders in Configuration 2 are characterized by 
three conditions: alliance partners, an emotional support network, and low levels of conflict 
triggers. Notably, Table 3 shows that co-founders are not a necessary condition in this 
configuration. Instead, this condition is blank, indicating that co-founders were not necessary for 
these founders to achieve high performance.   
Although the solo founders in this configuration did not have co-founders, they did form 
alliances with other organizations to gain access to the human, social, and financial capital they 
needed. A few examples help illustrate this pathway. In one case, a founder started a new 
EdTech venture that developed software. Although this founder had a great deal of technological 
expertise and was able to develop the product himself, he lacked social capital in that he had no 
connections to school districts. He also lacked human capital in that he had little experience with 
sales. Rather than bring on a co-founder who had these connections and skills, this founder 
partnered with another venture that already sold a portfolio of products to school districts. Under 
their agreement, the other venture included the solo founder’s software in the portfolio of 
products that it offered school districts. When I asked why he did not partner with co-founders, 
he said, “there's other ways that you can tackle it… With the [alliance] I have, people are going 
out and selling…they're carrying out that function…it's just not as a partner in my business.”  
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In another example, a founder shared personal ties with a well-known YouTube celebrity. 
This celebrity offered to market the founder’s products on their website and social media 
channels in exchange for a portion of the revenue. The founder described how “they announced 
it on their show… [and when] I woke up at seven in the morning, everything was sold out.” The 
solo founder later co-branded the venture’s product with the celebrity, leading to a huge initial 
demand for the product, and bringing in enough cash flow that it allowed the founder to grow her 
venture without additional funding or partners. The celebrity also became more excited about the 
product after observing the initial enthusiasm of viewers, and as a result, asked his COO and 
100-person team to help the founder with improving and marketing the product (thereby 
providing additional human, social, and financial capital the founder needed to move forward). 
Thus, although this founder had no co-founders, this alliance provided her with all the necessary 
resources to grow and develop the business. 
Overall, alliance partners provided solo founders with many of the same resources that 
co-founders provide (see Figure 2), including human, social, and financial capital. Importantly, 
however, these alliance partners did not provide the same emotional/psychological benefits 
associated with co-founders. Because of this, having alliance partners was not sufficient. As 
indicated in Table 3, another important condition for entrepreneurs in this configuration is having 
emotional support network (i.e., individuals who provide the entrepreneur with 
emotional/psychological support during the founding process). As mentioned before, the 
individuals in the emotional support network were most commonly (1) a spouse, (2) members of 
a coworking community, or (3) mentors or advisors with whom the founder would meet 
frequently. The importance of an emotional support network was commonly brought up by 
founders during interviews, with interviewees saying, “to succeed… you really need a support 
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system”, or “I put together a community of people to support me because it’s hard to go it alone. 
Just psychologically.” Another founder shared the following regarding his spouse: 
“Having someone there, in my case my wife, someone who is supportive but also can be 
there when the times are really hard, I think is really important as well… it would be a 
lot harder for me personally, at least, if it was just like me on my own, in my personal 
life. But because my wife's there, where I can vent to her, I can talk strategy with her, I 
can tell her what I want to happen and get her feedback on things... That's a huge benefit 
and just a tremendous kind of anchor to me. I think it'd be a lot harder if I was just, at the 
end of the day, left alone with my thoughts. I'd probably drive myself crazy.” 
Others referenced receiving similar emotional support from their coworking community, 
saying  
“When I've been able to sit down and have conversations with other entrepreneurs… you 
could say it's a little bit like a therapy session, talking about all the ups and downs” or 
“For me, it's really the social support... having other people to vent to if you have a 
project that's really frustrating or a client that's giving you trouble, or I'm just mad for 
some reason.”  
Overall, the founders’ emotional support networks provided them with the emotional and 
psychological support they needed to deal with the inevitable highs and lows of starting and 
growing a new venture. This emotional support, combined with the resources of the alliance 
partners, allowed these solo founders to progress without co-founders.  
Finally, and importantly, the absence of conflict is also a core condition in this 
configuration. This is illustrated by one of the co-founded ventures in the sample. Although this 
venture had an alliance partner that provided substantial resources to help fund and guide the 
early development of the product, these benefits were counteracted by several conflict triggers 
among the five co-founders. Two of the co-founders were working full-time in another company 
and putting minimal effort in to the business. As one of the other co-founders described it, “they 
get pretty busy on their other work. So sometimes [the company] is definitely in the second seat.” 
These differential commitments, combined with a lack of prior shared working experience, 
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created rifts and inefficiencies among the co-founders and leading one founder to lament how 
“the revenue hasn’t come as quickly.” Thus, alliance partners could not provide enough 
resources that would allow co-founded ventures to counteract the effects of destructive team 
conflict. 
Pathway to high performance #3. The third configuration was the least common in my 
sample; yet, it still represented an important type of successful solo founder. Specifically, these 
consisted of serial founders with product expertise who were able to hire employees from the 
beginning.  
In one case, the founder had previously founded a successful company in the area of 
machine learning. This original company was acquired, leaving the founder a large payout from 
the sale. When he founded his second venture (the venture in my sample), he did not bring on co-
founders. Instead, he chose to use his accumulated wealth from the prior venture to hire skilled 
employees from the beginning. He first hired an accomplished and well-connected programmer, 
who the founder described as “a brilliant engineer, he's really, really good... People wanted him, 
he had opportunities.” He then hired several other employees to fill gaps in skillsets and 
connections to customers. Thus, using his own financial capital, this founder hired the human 
and social capital he needed to achieve high performance. 
In another example, a solo founder previously owned a small but thriving software 
development agency with about 15 employees. While developing software for clients, the 
founder had an idea for a software product of his own and decided to found a new venture (the 
venture in my sample). He explained that at any given time, about 25 percent of the employees 
from his original software development agency were “on the bench” and not assigned any 
projects. While these employees were idle, the founder instructed them to work on building the 
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product for his new venture. This continued until the product was completed, at which point the 
founder shut down the agency and transferred all employees to his new venture.  
Based on my interviews with these founders, it appears that these employees provided 
many of the same resources (i.e., human and social capital) as co-founders. At the same time, 
however, they were unable to provide the same level of emotional/psychological support. For 
example, one solo founder who had employees explained how she would occasionally learn of 
winning or losing a major client around midnight and want to call someone to talk it through. 
She explained that it was during these times that she wished she had a co-founder, saying “I have 
employees, and… I want to share that with [them], but there are lines that you can't cross with 
employee/employer relationships and I need to keep those lines.” This lack of 
emotional/psychological support is another reason that being a serial founder is an important 
condition in this configuration. In addition to accumulating more resources from prior ventures, 
serial founders also seemed to need and want less emotional/psychological support relative to 
first-time founders. This was largely a function of them having been through the ups and downs 
of the entrepreneurial process before, and also having more confidence they could get through it. 
As one founder shared with us, “I've had four companies. The first one had a partner; it was 
great. There was no way I could have done it on my own, you know?... [but recently], I don’t like 
to take partners…I just don’t need them.” Overall, relative to other solo founders, serial founders 
wanted and needed less emotional/psychological support.  
Importantly, however, not all founders who hired employees succeeded. As configuration 
2 suggests, having employees is not enough. “Product expertise” is also a core condition in this 
configuration, implying that founders with employees must also have product expertise in order 
to succeed. To illustrate, one founder lacked technical experience, but attempted to build an 
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online platform. At the outset of his venture, he secured a large amount of capital from his family 
and friends that allowed him to hire employees from the beginning. He hired an individual to 
develop the platform, but was ultimately terribly disappointed. The founder did not understand 
the technology well enough to supervise the employee, leaving the employee with little direction. 
The employee ultimately left out of frustration, and as the founder described, he “left us a little 
bit high and dry on the continued development of the platform…we elected to basically start all 
over” The founder discarded all of the employee’s prior work and hired contractors to build the 
next version of the product. Thus, the data suggest that founders must not only be able to hire 
employees, but also must possess the necessary expertise to monitor their work appropriately.  
Pathway to high performance #4. The final type of successful solo founder in my sample 
was perhaps the most unexpected. These founders did not have co-founders, alliance partners, or 
employees, but they did have benefactors. As noted earlier, the concept of a benefactor emerged 
from the interview data and I define it as an outside party who alleviates a major resource 
constraint for the entrepreneurs with no expectation of compensation or reciprocation. 
Benefactors helped the ventures in my sample in a variety of ways. In one example, the 
founder required a large amount of capital equipment to start his new venture. This founder 
lacked adequate resources to purchase the required equipment, and so considered bringing on a 
co-founder who could personally fund the initial purchase of the capital equipment. Instead, 
however, he had a friend who owned a small business with the necessary equipment. This friend 
graciously allowed the founder to use the equipment free of charge, thus eliminating the 
founder’s need to obtain financial capital. Further, he also allowed the founder to borrow his 
employees from time to time, thus providing the necessary human capital to perform tasks for 
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which the founder lacked the time or expertise to perform. This persisted until the founder 
secured enough revenue to hire his own employees and purchase his own equipment.  
Similarly, in a venture focused on developing new brewing technology, the founder had 
little experience and few resources. However, there were members of the local brewing 
community who freely shared knowledge and understanding. First, they taught her how brewing 
technology worked and guided her in setting up her own manufacturing facility (human capital). 
As the founder explained: “I learned from them on the equipment that I might need…and I would 
come back to them with like, ‘Oh, I tried this. And that filter you gave me is not fine enough. 
What other filter do you have? Oh, that's not gonna work for this reason. What about this?’ And 
so we would troubleshoot together the early, early days, and I learned so much from that 
process.” Second, they also allowed her to use their equipment and facilities for experimentation, 
thus removing the need to find financial capital to develop the product. Finally, they introduced 
her to potential vendors (social capital) and helped her understand “which contractors to hire, 
which ones not to hire, etc.” With all their assistance, the members of the local brewing 
community received no equity or payment – they simply took a liking to this entrepreneur and 
decided to help.  
As a teenager, another founder cared for the kids of a local and influential multi-
millionaire. She developed a good relationship with this person, and after graduating from 
college decided to start her own venture and went to this person for advice. Not only did he give 
her a substantial amount of advice on how to develop and market her product (human capital), he 
also gave her free office space (alleviating the need for financial capital) and connected her to 
her first large corporate customers as well as her first investors (social capital). He also later 
served as a reputable reference for future customers and investors. This founder described how 
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her friend would constantly ask, “What do you need? I'm gonna give you office space…And how 
else can I help you? Do you need people on your board? What do you need?” He helped build 
the company, and even picked out the name for the company. Again, he did this without taking 
any equity stake, receiving any payment, or ever being on the board of the company; he only 
wanted to help. As she put it, “He's always been my biggest cheerleader…[and] I’m thankful for 
that.”  
Overall, these benefactors relaxed several resource constraints that solo founders 
generally experience, thus helping them achieve high performance. But, they differed in that they 
expected no reciprocation or compensation for their services, meaning the entrepreneur was able 
to retain full control. 
Importantly, however, my findings show that having a benefactor is not a sufficient 
condition by itself. Similar to alliance partners and employees, benefactors provide many of the 
same resources as co-founders, but not the same emotional/psychological benefits. As such, 
having an emotional support network is also a core condition in this configuration. Or, as one 
founder with a benefactor put it, “to succeed… you really need a support system.”11 In addition, 
product expertise was once again a core condition, suggesting that founders with benefactors but 
no product expertise may still struggle. In one venture, for example, a benefactor gifted the 
founder with $50,000 (non-dilutive, no strings attached), and also provided him with several 
connections to important product testers and potential customers. The founder used the money to 
                                                 
11 There are some similarities between benefactors and the members of the emotional support network. For example, 
they both generally have a personal relationship with the entrepreneur, and neither of them require any 
compensation for their services. The key distinction is that a benefactor provides resources (i.e., human, social, 
financial capital) whereas a member of the support network provides emotional/psychological support. It is possible 
that a single individual can be both a benefactor and a member of the emotional support network, if they provide 
both types of services to the entrepreneur. However, in our data, most of the benefactors provided resources only, 




pay freelancers and contractors in an attempt to build the online platform from scratch, but he 
lacked the technical knowledge required to properly direct their efforts. As such, the 
coordinating and monitoring costs proved too high, with the founder describing the lack of 
technical expertise as being the main “bottleneck” and “biggest low point.” During the interview 
the founder contemplated what would have happened if he had brought on a co-founder from the 
beginning, and mused that “I think we would be further along… that’s always been the 
bottleneck, is getting the technical firepower.”  
Finally, and similar to the prior two configurations, the absence of conflict is also a core 
condition. This is illustrated by a few of the co-founded ventures in the sample who had 
benefactors, but who also experienced destructive relationship conflict. In one co-founded 
venture, for example, a benefactor built the entire online platform (the core of the business) for 
free. However, conflict stemming from different opinions on what customers to target plagued 
the founding team to such an extent that some co-founders started putting less effort into the 
business than others, thus further fueling the conflict. One founder confided in me the emotional 
toll this conflict had taken on him, ending the interview by joking, “thanks for the therapy 
session, how much do I owe you?” Thus, even benefactors could not provide enough resources 
that would allow co-founded ventures to counteract the effects of destructive team conflict. 
Implications: Co-Creators vs. Co-Founders 
As a whole, these findings suggest that solo founders can mobilize many of the same 
resources provided by co-founders, but in different ways. Some founders, for example, were able 
to fill their gaps in human, social, and financial capital by forming alliances with other 
organizations, allowing them to benefit from their partners’ expertise or connections while still 
remaining the sole founder of their company. Other founders opted to obtain the human and 
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social capital they needed by hiring employees. Yet other founders had benefactors, who came in 
a variety of forms but all provided the founders with some combination of human, social, and 
financial capital they needed to succeed, all without any expectation of reciprocation or 
compensation. Many of these founders also relied on an emotional support network, consisting 
of individuals who provided the entrepreneur with the emotional and psychological support they 
longed for during the emotionally-taxing process of founding a new venture. 
Although these employees, alliance partners, benefactors, and emotional support 
networks were not officially co-founders, they still acted as co-creators of these ventures. The 
concept of co-creators emerged from my interview data, and I define them as key providers of 
capital (human, social, or financial) or emotional/psychological support at the earliest stages of a 
venture. Throughout my interviews, solo founders stressed how these “co-creators” (i.e., 
employees, alliance partners, benefactors, and the emotional support network) all played vital 
roles in their ventures, and that without them, the founder would likely have either had to find a 
co-founder or would not have succeeded at all. For example, one founder who had employees 
but not co-founders said, “they weren't co-founders, but obviously have shaped the company 
from the very beginning and all the way through.” Another solo founder who had benefactors but 
no co-founders said, “They feel like my founders because they built the company with me… And 
that's I think where I've gotten away with not having a co-founder… So I have a lot of people… 
that have made this happen, it's not just me.” Another said, “I kind of have my support team of 
many co-founders, if you will...” In fact, many of the solo founders I interviewed were 
uncomfortable with the “solo founder” label, arguing that “even though I'm the one steering the 
ship, it certainly wasn't me alone and I don't ever want to appear that it was me alone,” or 
“certainly know that I didn't build it by myself, that's for darn sure.”  
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In short, the data suggest that successful solo founders are not actually solo. They may 
not have a traditional co-founder with equity and voting rights, but they still have others 
surrounding and helping them co-create the business. This diverges from prior literature in key 
ways, as most prior studies tend to privilege founders, and thus pay less attention to other 
important contributors. My analysis, however, suggests that there is often a constellation of 
people surrounding the founder and co-creating the venture along with them. These hidden 
figures, which are rarely observed in entrepreneurial data, seldom receive the same recognition, 
credit, or glory as founders for creating the venture, despite playing an outsize role in venture 
success. Yet, they may very well represent much of the “X factor” in entrepreneurship (Saxton et 
al., 2016), accounting for much of the unexplained differences between successful and 
unsuccessful ventures.  
Overall, these results suggest that co-founders are not always required as dictated by 
conventional wisdom. Solo founders can find substitutes that provide many or all of the same 
benefits, while at the same time avoiding some or all of the costs. In the discussion section, I 
expound on the concept of co-creators and address several residual questions.  
Supplemental Analysis: Necessary Conditions 
The analysis above suggests that there are four combinations of conditions that are 
sufficient to achieve high performance. However, when using QCA, it is also common to assess 
whether any given condition (or combination of conditions) is necessary to achieve the outcome 
(Ragin, 2000; Dwivedi et al., 2018). Given the foregoing analysis, an important question is 
whether the absence of conflict triggers is necessary, as it appeared as a condition in each of the 
four configurations leading to high performance. To analyze whether a specific condition is 
necessary, one must compare the observed consistency of a given condition with a pre-specified 
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benchmark consistency. Ragin (2000) suggests using a benchmark of 0.8 to examine conditions 
that are “almost always” necessary, and I use this as a benchmark in Table 4. As shown therein, 
the absence of conflict triggers was indeed a necessary condition, implying that the absence of 
conflict triggers is “almost always” necessary to achieve high performance.  
Interestingly, the analysis also shows that co-founders are not necessary conditions on 
their own. This is counter to the conventional wisdom that dictates that co-founders are 
necessary as they provide valuable resources as well as emotional/psychological support (see 
Figure 2). However, I also tested whether it was necessary to have co-founders or employees or 
alliances or benefactors (at least one of the four resource providers). The analysis reveals that it 
is indeed “almost always” necessary (using a benchmark of 0.8) to have one of these four 
resource providers present in order to succeed. This suggests that founders who do not source 
resources from co-founders or employees or alliance partners or benefactors (i.e., founders who 
are truly solo) are highly unlikely to succeed. 
In the final row of Table 4, I also test whether it is necessary for founders to have 
emotional/psychological support from either co-founders or an emotional support network, or to 
be a serial founder (as they may want or need this support less than others as discussed above). 
The analysis suggests that it is “almost always” necessary to have one of these conditions. This 
suggests that even if founders have access to resource providers (i.e., co-founders, alliance 
partners, employees, or benefactors), they must also receive emotional/psychological support 
from somewhere (either through co-founders or an emotional support network, or by being a 




New ventures generally face severe liabilities of newness due to the lack of human, 
social, and financial capital. One of the most common ways in which entrepreneurs overcome 
such liabilities is by partnering with co-founders (Wasserman, 2012). Indeed, studies find that on 
average, larger founding teams perform better than smaller founding teams (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). Although prior work is helpful, it is also generally silent on the conditions 
under which solo founders might be able to perform as well as co-founders. Using in-depth 
qualitative data on 70 entrepreneurial ventures, I address the question under what conditions do 
solo-founded ventures perform as well as co-founded ventures? My findings suggest that solo 
founders perform as well as co-founded ventures when they are not actually solo, or in other 
words, when they have co-creators supporting them. In the sections that follow, I offer 
additional insight into (1) how co-creators can act as substitutes for co-founders (and how they 
cannot), (2) who has access to co-creators, and (3) why founders choose co-creators vs. co-
founders.  
How Can Co-Creators Act as Substitutes for Co-Founders, and How Can they Not? 
As discussed above, co-creators can act as substitutes for co-founders in many ways. 
However, they are not always perfect substitutes. I thus return to the advantages and 
disadvantages of co-founders presented in Figure 2 and discuss how the benefits and costs of co-
creators may be similar to or different from co-founders (see Table 5 for summary). 
Resources. Co-creators such as employees, alliance partners, and benefactors can provide 
many of the same resources as co-founders. For example, they can provide human capital to a 
venture by bringing needed skills, knowledge, or experience, social capital via more connections 
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to potential customers, hires, or investors, and financial capital by helping fund the business until 
founders can find investors. Of course, each co-creator will be unique in its own right, as they 
will bring different combinations of human, social, and financial capital, depending on the type 
of co-creator and the type of firm. In general, however, co-creators can provide many of the 
same resources that co-founders provide. 
Emotional/psychological support. Though employees, alliance partners, and benefactors 
can provide many resources to ventures, they do not provide the same emotional or 
psychological benefits as co-founders. However, this is where the emotional support network can 
provide value. By listening, supporting, and sharing the emotional highs and lows with the 
founder, the emotional support network can often provide much of the emotional and 
psychological support that founders crave during the founding process. This is rarely a perfect 
substitute for co-founders, as co-founders jointly experience many of the same day-to-day 
challenges; yet, the emotional support network can often provide enough of the same 
emotional/psychological support to help founders cope. 
Coordination/monitoring costs. Co-creators may generate some of the same coordination 
and monitoring costs as co-founders. In fact, monitoring costs may be even higher for employees 
than they are for co-founders, as prior literature suggests that co-founders’ personal identity is 
often wrapped up in that of the venture, thus making them more intrinsically motivated to pursue 
the organizations’ best interests. As such they are expected to act less like “agents” and more like 
“stewards” (Wasserman, 2006), thus requiring less monitoring. Also, with alliance partners, 
coordination costs are likely to arise when communicating and coordinating across 
organizational boundaries (Gulati & Singh, 1998). With benefactors, however, these costs may 
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be nonexistent, as the nature of their relationship (freely giving resources with no expectation of 
reciprocation) requires no monitoring and little coordination.  
Conflict. Although co-creators generally cannot provide the same level of 
emotional/psychological support as co-founders, they also have the benefit of not creating the 
same level of conflict. Of course, founders can experience conflict with co-creators, as 
disagreements may arise with employees, alliance partners, and others. However, the likelihood 
and magnitude of this conflict is generally less severe, as solo founders do not enter into a similar 
marriage-type relationship described earlier. Thus, by using co-creators, solo founders are able to 
benefit from many of the same resources as co-founders, but without much of the conflict. And, 
in cases where conflict does happen to arise with co-creators, the ability to remove these 
individuals from the business is much easier than it is with co-founders. 
Overall, the pros and cons of co-founders versus co-creators will be specific to the 
characteristics of each co-founder or co-creator. In general, however, co-creators can provide 
many of the same resources as well as many of the same coordination and monitoring costs. At 
the same time, they generally provide less emotional/psychological support, but also generate 
less destructive conflict.  
Who Has Access to Co-Creators? 
To have access to co-creators, founders must personally possess certain types of capital. 
For example, hiring employees is typically only an option for founders who possess adequate 
amounts of financial capital to pay employee salaries. Similarly, only founders with adequate 
social capital are able to form relationships with alliance partners and benefactors. In addition, 
the results of Table 3 indicate that even when solo founders had access to co-creators, they only 
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succeeded when they had a specific type of human capital – product expertise. Solo-founding, 
then, may only be a viable option when the founders’ personal capital endowment includes an 
adequate amount of financial or social capital, as well as a specific type of human capital. 
I note that this may be easier for founders from privileged backgrounds with easy access 
to these types of capital. However, my data suggest that co-creators are not just for the privileged 
few, but are something all could have with creativity, thought, and hard work. Indeed, the 
founders with co-creators in my sample came from a variety of backgrounds. For example, the 
founder who formed an alliance with a YouTube celebrity started her company with only $1,300 
in her bank account, and lived in a modest home in the country. Fortunately for her, the YouTube 
celebrity (whose primary residence was in another state) purchased a second home in the same 
neighborhood. She recognized this as an opportunity, and was creative and bold enough to 
approach him with an interesting idea and offer to collaborate. Other founders came from 
similarly humble backgrounds, and had to work very hard to develop relationships with alliance 
partners and benefactors. One solo founder, who had little savings and few connections, wished 
to form an alliance with a prestigious private school, as they were “an extremely exceptional 
school, and the resources they have are pretty phenomenal… they lock arms with the best in 
class partners.” After being unable to gain attention from and set up a meeting with the school’s 
executives, she spent countless hours reaching out to parents and describing to them how her 
product would benefit their children. She continued doing this until one parent sent a letter to the 
head principal of her target school, which led to a meeting with school executives, the head of 
school, the CFO, the head of marketing, and other senior school executives who then listened to 
her impassioned pitch and ultimately agreed to partner with her. Similarly, another founder 
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formed a key alliance with a utility company, but had to make many contact attempts and pitches 
and provide great evidence of proof of concept before the company agreed to form an alliance.  
Overall, founders need to possess or create the right human, social, and financial capital 
if they hope to find and effectively use co-creators. Though this may be easier for individuals 
with greater initial capital endowments (as are many other tasks in entrepreneurship), gaining 
access to co-creators is likely possible for most entrepreneurs with enough creativity, thought, 
and effort. 
Why Do Founders Choose Co-Creators vs. Co-Founders? 
Co-creators are not unique to solo founders. Teams of co-founders can (and did, in my 
sample) rely on co-creators as well. Thus, if a founder has access to co-creators, why do some 
decide to go solo, and why do some still partner with co-founders? Once the concept of co-
creators started emerging in my interviews, I began asking entrepreneurs this question, which led 
to a convergent set of preferences and motivations (see Table 6).  
For those who chose to go solo, there were three general motivations. The first was to 
avoid co-founder conflict. Many of the founders I interviewed were aware of the potential 
challenges stemming from co-founder conflict and wished to avoid them. For example, one 
founder said, “I've heard such horror stories about having bad co-founders. I am really leery 
about [it]…” Second, founders often went solo to maintain equity and control. When there are 
multiple founders in a new venture, they must split equity and decision rights among themselves. 
With co-creators, however, there is no obligation to grant equity or voting power of the venture, 
meaning the founder is able to retain more or all of it. For example, one solo founder said, “I 
would say that my personality... I tend to just want to do things my own way. I really just want to 
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have my own business [and be] a solo founder making the decisions...” Third, some founders 
simply wished to grow or develop personally. They welcomed the challenge of being a solo 
founder, as it helped them fulfill their own goals for personal development, and not just the 
development of the venture. For example, one solo founder was highly experienced in software 
development but had little experience being “the boss” and managing a business. Although he 
could have found a business-savvy cofounder to fill that gap, he had no interest in doing so 
because he wanted to learn those skills himself.  He said, "I think that I have a lot of different 
skills besides software development and I want to be using them, and I think having my own 
business allows me to do that."  
 Other founders, however, still chose to partner with co-founders, even if they had access 
to co-creators. When I asked these founders why they chose to do so, the answers were almost 
always related to the emotional/psychological benefits of co-founders. For example, some chose 
co-founders because they preferred working with others. These founders preferred operating 
with a more collaborative style, in which most or all ideas and decisions were articulated and 
discussed among two or more people. Some founders couldn’t imagine doing it any other way, 
with one saying, “I think starting a business without a partner…is insane…I would just go nuts 
without having someone to bounce everything off of, and to decide critical decisions with.” 
Others brought on co-founders simply to cope with loneliness. Again, although co-creators can 
provide some of the same emotional and psychological support as co-founders, they are not 
always perfect substitutes, and many entrepreneurs in my sample sought out co-founders for that 
reason. For example, one co-founder who had previously solo-founded another venture said: 
“The first company I tried to start was solo. That was hard. It was really hard. The low points 
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are extra low, because you’re the only one who has to really deal with it. Going at it alone is 
really, really hard.”  
A Theoretical Model to Decide Between Going Solo or Finding Co-Founders 
The question this study set out to address is: Under what conditions do solo-founded 
ventures perform as well as co-founded ventures? While my study suggests that solo founders 
perform as well as co-founders when they have co-creators it also suggests that there are times 
when it is best to remain a solo founder and other times when it is best to search for co-founders, 
depending on a few important factors (see Figure 3 for a comprehensive summary).  
First, the entrepreneur should assess whether they have access to co-creators. To do so, 
the entrepreneur must evaluate his or her own personal capital endowment. Specifically, the 
entrepreneur must evaluate whether they have or are able to build or obtain adequate financial 
capital to hire employees, adequate social capital to form relationships with alliance partners or 
benefactors, and a specific type of human capital (i.e., product expertise). If so, then co-creators 
may be an option. 
If the founder is able to gain access to co-creators, the question then becomes about 
preferences (see Table 6). Specifically, if the founder prefers working closely with others and 
coping with the loneliness of founding a new venture, the entrepreneur should partner with co-
founders. If, however, the entrepreneur instead prefers avoiding potential co-founder conflict, 
maintaining equity and control of the venture, and having opportunities to grow and develop 
personally, then the entrepreneur should solo-found and mobilize resources through co-creators 
rather than co-founders.   
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However, if the entrepreneur is unable to gain access to co-creators, the next issue to 
consider is whether the founder has access to compatible co-founders. In other words, the 
entrepreneur should assess the set of prospective co-founders and determine whether they meet 
the criteria found in Table 3. Namely, whether they possess complementary skillsets, and 
whether there is a high potential for conflict. Though it may be particularly difficult to predict 
the likelihood of conflict, one way entrepreneurs may do this is by considering the conflict 
triggers in Table 1 (used for the conflict index) as indicators of whether conflict is likely to 
occur. Overall, if prospective co-founders meet these three criteria, then the founder should co-
found with those individuals. 
If, however, the founder does not have access to co-creators and is also unable to find co-
founders who meet these criteria, it may be advisable to wait to found the venture until one or the 
other changes. This may not be the answer that an eager entrepreneur wishes to hear, but it is 
likely preferable to founding as a truly “solo” founder or founding with unhelpful or even 
detrimental co-founders. 
Contributions to Entrepreneurship 
Challenging the conventional wisdom that co-founders are necessary. This study 
challenges the conventional wisdom, found both in research and in practice, that co-founders are 
necessary for venture success. While my findings suggest that solo founders mobilize many of 
the same resources through co-creators instead of co-founders they also reveal that co-creators 
come in several forms. For example, some founders in the sample had access to sufficient 
financial capital at the outset of their venture, and were thus able to hire employees to fill the 
gaps in their human and social capital. Other founders formed alliances with other organizations, 
thus filling their gaps in human, social, and financial capital through formal partnerships. Yet 
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other founders had benefactors, who provided founders with some combination of human, social, 
and financial capital they needed to succeed, all without any expectation of reciprocation or 
compensation. Many of these founders also relied on an emotional support network, consisting 
of individuals who provided the entrepreneur with the emotional and psychological support they 
longed for during the emotionally taxing process of founding a new venture. These various co-
creators built the business alongside the founders, providing the necessary resources and 
emotional support the founders needed to survive and thrive. Future research should continue to 
examine whether and when certain co-creators are more beneficial than others.  
 Shedding light on key (non-founder) contributors. In the Panel Survey for 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics (a nationally representative survey of founders), respondents were 
asked to provide information on any key non-owners and helpers who made a “distinctive 
contribution” to the founding of the business (Burton et al., 2009). Approximately 62 percent of 
respondents reported at least one key contributor, with many reporting more than one. The 
authors of the survey conclude that while “previous research has tended to privilege one set of 
stakeholders: ‘founders’”, more attention should be paid to other contributors who have been 
“relatively ignored” (Burton et al., 2009:115). As one of the first empirical attempts to do so, this 
study contributes by providing more details on the constellation of people involved in starting a 
new venture, or those hidden figures who are sometimes forgotten or downplayed yet who play 
an outsize role in entrepreneurial success. While they are rarely observed in entrepreneurial data 
and seldom receive the same recognition, credit, or glory as founders for creating the 
organization, these co-creators may very well account for much of the unexplained differences 
between successful and unsuccessful ventures (Saxton et al., 2016). For example, prior research 
discusses concepts such as entrepreneurial bricolage, in which entrepreneurs make do with the 
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resources at hand and essentially create “something from nothing” (Baker & Nelson, 2005). My 
results, however, suggest that in some cases this “nothing” may actually represent resources 
provided by co-creators.  
In particular, this study adds to the literature by introducing the concept of benefactors. 
Past studies examine related concepts, such as mentors and advisors, who often help 
entrepreneurs with their strategic decision making by vetting ideas and offering an outside 
perspective (Ozgen & Baron, 2007; Saxton et al., 2016; Burton et al., 2009). However, my 
conceptualization of benefactors is broader and more encompassing, and includes all outside 
parties who relax some resource constraint for the entrepreneur with no expectation of 
compensation. Thus, mentors and advisors are a type of benefactor (ones who often provide free 
advice or connections to entrepreneurs), but there are many other potential types of benefactors. 
For example, benefactors can also come in the form of friends, family members, acquaintances, 
or anyone else who freely gives of their time, expertise, and resources to entrepreneurs. Future 
work should more fully explore this phenomenon and examine its influence on venture 
outcomes.  
Contributions to Strategy 
Spotlights alternative ways of mobilizing resources. This study spotlights an alternative 
way of mobilizing resources (human, social, and financial capital) early in a venture’s life. Given 
its importance to the survival chances of new ventures, the resource mobilization process is a 
central and defining feature of research in strategy and entrepreneurship (Clough et al., 2019). 
Yet, the majority of prior studies focus on how entrepreneurs acquire financial resources 
(particularly venture capital), which Clough et al. (2019) note is likely due to the easier 
availability of secondary data. This is problematic, as it places a disproportionate focus on later 
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stages of growth (i.e., later rounds of financing, rather than the earliest days of a new venture) 
and on a small fraction of the universe of all new ventures (i.e., those who receive venture capital 
– see Aldrich & Ruef, 2018). There is thus limited coverage on strategies for mobilizing other 
types of resources (i.e., human and social capital) as well as limited coverage for how founders 
mobilize resources in the earliest stages of a venture’s life cycle (despite this being the time in 
which it is most difficult to mobilize resources). This leaves many open questions as to how new 
founders actually search for and acquire resources necessary for survival. This study contributes 
by suggesting that one way in which founders may mobilize these key resources (human, social, 
and financial capital) early on is through co-creators. Future work should continue to parse out 
and attempt to better understand how and when founders have access to and can effectively use 
these co-creators.  
Suggests that the “Rich vs. King” dilemma may not be as dichotomous as previously 
thought. Finally, this study contributes by suggesting that the “Rich vs. King” dilemma may not 
as dichotomous as previously thought. The Rich vs. King view suggests that it becomes 
increasingly difficult for founders to retain control as a firm grows, as founders often must give 
up control in order to gain access to resources (Wasserman, 2017). Thus, entrepreneurs face a 
dilemma, in that they can either choose to give up large amounts of control in order to grow their 
firms (in hopes of becoming “rich”) or sacrifice firm growth in order to retain control (and thus 
remain “king”). This study, in contrast, finds evidence of strategies founders use to retain control 
while still gaining access to the resources needed to grow. Specifically, by mobilizing resources 
via co-creators rather than co-founders, entrepreneurs may be able to achieve relatively the same 
value for their venture, but without having to share control and equity with other partners. In 
other words, this study suggests that founders may be able to be both rich and king under the 
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right conditions. One notable illustration is Jeff Bezos, whose decision to solo-found Amazon is 
at least partially the reason that he is both the richest man in the world and also still remains the 
“king” of Amazon with full voting control. Had he shared equity and control with co-founders 
early on, things would likely be different. Future work should explore this distinction between 
venture performance and founder performance to further my understanding of this tradeoff 
between value creation and value appropriation in founding teams.  
CONCLUSION 
The choice of whether to partner with co-founders or remain solo is one of the first and 
most important decisions an entrepreneur must make. Yet, while past empirical research finds 
that larger founding teams outperform smaller teams on average, the existing literature is not 
clear regarding the conditions under which solo founders might be able to perform as well as or 
even better than co-founders. Using in-depth qualitative data on 70 new ventures, I address this 
gap. My findings reveal that instead of using co-founders, successful solo founders use co-
creators (e.g., employees, alliances, benefactors, and emotional support networks). These co-
creators provide many of the same benefits as co-founders (i.e., human, social, and financial 
capital), but without many of the downsides (i.e., team conflict, giving up control/equity). 
Overall, while prior research regularly extols the benefits associated with co-founded ventures, 
these results help uncover how solo founded ventures may perform as well as or even better. 
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CHAPTER 3: SECOND-IN-COMMAND  
DO FOUNDERS NEED A No. 2? 
ABSTRACT 
To compensate for their professional limitations, founders that hold the CEO position in 
large firms are often encouraged to hire a “second-in-command” (i.e., a COO or President). 
Surprisingly, however, little is known about the prevalence of a second-in-command in founder-
led firms, or its influence on firm performance (if any). Using novel methods and a sample of 
over 2,000 IPO firms, I address these gaps. I find that founder-led firms are more likely to have a 
second-in-command relative to firms without founder CEOs. In contrast to firms without founder 
CEOs, whose performance is adversely affected by the presence of a second-in-command, I find 
that founder-led firms perform better when a second-in-command is present. Collectively, my 




In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg founded Facebook in his Harvard dormitory. Though 
Zuckerberg was able to guide the company through product development early on, its rapid 
growth brought new challenges associated with making the firm profitable, expanding overseas, 
and developing an advertising network. In 2008, realizing that his company had to “grow up at 
internet speed,” Zuckerberg hired Sheryl Sandberg as Chief Operating Officer to help 
accomplish these monumental tasks (Wall Street Journal 2008). Since then, the company has 
grown from 66 million users (and $272 million in revenue) to more than 2.4 billion users (and 
$55 billion in revenue), meaning Facebook now boasts more members than any single nation, 
language, or religion (The Guardian 2018). Following this phenomenal success, the 
Zuckerberg/Sandberg partnership has been dubbed the “power duo” and has become part of 
Silicon Valley legend (CNN Business, 2019), with other founders of high growth firms being 
encouraged to find their own “Sheryl” (FastCompany, 2014).  
Surprisingly, very few studies examine the “second-in-command” leadership structure. 
The studies that do exist indicate that firms with a second-in-command are generally structured 
so that the CEO focuses on external and strategic activities, whereas the second-in-command is 
given the title of Chief Operating Officer (COO), President, or both and tasked with overseeing 
internal business functions (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Zhang, 2006; Marcel, 2009; Vafeas & 
Vlittis, 2012). In terms of how this impacts firm performance, these few prior studies find mixed 
results. In particular, Marcel (2009) finds a positive relation between the presence of a second-in-
command and firm performance, arguing that the management of a contemporary firm is a 
complex task that is too much for one person to handle (Heenan & Bennis, 1999; Drucker, 
1954). Others, however, find evidence that the second-in-command structure has a strong 
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negative relation with firm performance (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004), arguing that this relation 
arises because the second-in-command reduces unity of command within the firm, creating 
confusion about “who’s in charge” (Zhang, 2006; Krause et al., 2015).  
These prior studies have helped shed light on the second-in-command phenomenon. 
However, they do not consider how founder CEOs might use and benefit from a second-in-
command differently from other top executives. Yet, this distinction is important both 
theoretically and practically. From a theoretical perspective, founders generally act, think, and 
behave differently from other managers (Busenitz & Barney 1997; Nelson 2003). Whereas 
professional CEOs have decades of training and possess substantial managerial experience from 
working their way up organizational charts, founders with “a single, powerful business idea are 
thrown into CEO positions by default and not by training, and it happens very, very quickly” 
(Fortune 2015). As such, it is possible that founders may benefit from a different organizational 
structure relative to other top executives. 
It is also important from a practical standpoint to understand whether founder-led firms 
benefit from hiring a second-in-command. This is particularly so in light of recent evidence that 
reveals increased competition among venture capitalists has led to founders being able to retain 
control of their firms for longer periods of time (Blank, 2017). This finding, together with prior 
research that indicates founders generally lack the competencies to lead companies through later 
stages of growth (Kor, 2003; Hambrick & Crozier 1985; Pollock et al. 2009), highlights the need 
for research that examines how large organizations with founder CEOs can best structure their 
top management teams to compensate for the founder’s managerial limitations. Despite many 
large and high-profile founder-led companies having used a second-in-command leadership 
structure (e.g., Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, Dell, AirBnB), no prior studies examine 
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the prevalence of a second-in-command for founder-led firms or whether it differentially affects 
firm performance.  
In this study, I fill an important gap in the existing literature by examining two key 
questions: First, are founders more likely to have a second-in-command relative to other CEOs? 
And second, do founders benefit more from having a second-in-command relative to other 
CEOs? Because founder leadership is not randomized, I face an empirical challenge that large 
companies with founder leadership differ from other firms across key dimensions. To address 
this endogeneity, I use entropy balancing – a novel multivariate matching approach that 
reweights the control group observations (i.e., firms without Founder CEOs) such that the first, 
second, and possibly higher moments of the covariate distributions match those of the treatment 
group (i.e., firms with Founder CEOs) (Hainmueller, 2012). By achieving covariate balance 
between the two groups, this technique reduces model dependency for the subsequent estimation 
of treatment effects and is increasingly being across disciplines by researchers seeking to draw 
causal inference when restricted to using observational data (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller, & 
Hangartner 2016; Stanton & Thomas 2016; Shroff, Verdi, & Yost 2017; Jacob et al. 2019). 
Although this method (and other similar synthetic control methods) is not perfect in assessing 
causality, Athey and Imbens (2017) suggest that such techniques are “arguably the most 
important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years.”  
Using this multivariate matching technique with a detailed sample of over 2,000 
industrial firms that performed initial public offerings from 1997 to 2013, I find that large firms 
with founder CEOs are much more likely to have a second-in-command relative to other large 
firms. I also find evidence suggesting that the founder-led firms benefit more from having a 
second-in-command, and that this relation is more pronounced for firms with founder CEOs who 
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lack operational experience and who hold more power within the firm. Collectively, my results 
contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by highlighting a common but under-studied top 
management team structure of founder-led firms, and examining whether this practice may be 
perceived as a “best practice” (i.e., when it may be more or less helpful). My findings also 
contribute to the upper echelons literature by shedding needed light on both the antecedents of 
team structure and the contingent performance effects of a second-in-command.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A “second-in-command” leadership structure is a commonplace idea that is ages old and 
exists across a variety of contexts (e.g., country presidents and vice presidents, generals and 
chiefs of staff, and university presidents and provosts). In corporations, however, the COO 
position is a relatively recent organizational development (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). When 
present, prior research indicates that the COO generally takes responsibility for “internal” 
activities such as monitoring subordinates, implementing strategies, handling disturbances, and 
allocating resources. This allows the CEO to then focus primarily on “external” activities and 
longer-term issues such as securing and satisfying external resource providers, transmitting 
information to outsiders, scanning the environment, and crafting a long-term vision and strategy. 
In other words, while CEOs keep their “head up” to navigate the firm’s future trajectory, the 
second-in-command keeps his or her “head down” to focus on today’s most crucial operational 
details (Bennett and Miles, 2006). While some CEOs may divide tasks somewhat differently 
with their second-in-command, prior research suggests that this division of responsibilities is 
generally applicable (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Marcel, 2009; Bass & Stogdill, 1990).  
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The Implications of a Second-in-Command 
The division of external vs. internal responsibilities between CEO and second-in-
command can result in both advantages and disadvantages, according to prior research (Marcel, 
2009; Levinson, 1993; Bennett & Miles, 2006). In the sub-sections that follow, I discuss a 
primary advantage (i.e., reducing CEO overload) and disadvantage (i.e., decreasing unity of 
command) of the second-in-command structure. I also summarize these arguments in Table 7.  
Reducing CEO overload. In their seminal thesis, Hambrick and Mason (1984) indicate 
that the organization is a reflection of its top managers. Although upper echelon theory 
acknowledges the CEO as the key decision maker, it also acknowledges that CEOs face costs of 
processing information and are thus boundedly rational. Such bounded rationality leads CEOs to 
possess only partial information that is often inaccurate, resulting in flawed mental maps (Simon, 
1947, 1955; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Blankespoor, deHaan, & 
Marinovic, 2020). Cognitive biases as well as limited cognitive resources also affect CEO 
choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). With these limitations in 
mind, proponents of the second-in-command structure argue that it is becoming increasingly 
necessary, as running a contemporary firm is considered an ever more complex task that is too 
much for one person to handle (Heenan & Bennis, 1999; Drucker, 1954). Thus, the second-in-
command structure can improve firm performance by preventing the CEO from being “spread 
too thin” and thus doing all aspects of the job poorly (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). Consistent 
with this logic, Marcel (2009) provides evidence from a sample of 153 industrial firms that the 
presence of a COO is positively related to firm performance.  
Reducing unity of command. On the other hand, however, critics of the second-in-
command structure argue that it has the potential to decrease “unity of command,” a long-held 
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principle that an organization should be led by only one individual at a time (Krause et al., 2015; 
Fayol, 1949; Barnard, 1968; Simon, 1997; Gulick & Urwish, 1937). Fayol (1949) describes this 
principle in his treatise on general and industrial management and advocates that for any task 
whatsoever, an employee should receive orders from only one superior. Should this be violated, 
the firm risks becoming a “two-headed monster” where “authority is undermined, discipline is in 
jeopardy, order disturbed, and stability threatened”. Thus, when a CEO and second-in-command 
divide responsibilities, confusion may arise about who is actually in charge, potentially 
complicating and restricting the flow of information.12 This may not be a problem if the second-
in-command is in sync with the CEO, or as Levinson (1993) puts it, is content with being the 
“piano accompanist to a violin soloist” and accept the fact that his or her primary responsibility 
is to make the CEO look good. However, past studies suggest that many second-in-commands 
have ambitions to eventually become first-in-command, thus representing a contender to the 
CEO’s power (Zhang, 2006; Levinson, 1993). This is why, Levinson (1993:71) argues, that the 
CEO/COO relationship is perhaps “the most difficult of all organizational working relationships 
because more than any others, it is a balancing act on the threshold of power.” Because reduced 
unity of command can introduce fragmentation into a firm, critics of the second-in-command 
structure argue that this organizational form will negatively affect firm performance. Consistent 
with this logic, Hambrick and Cannella (2004) study 405 instances of a second-in-command and 
find evidence of a strong negative relation with firm performance. 
                                                 
12For example, Jack Welch – the renowned and long-serving CEO of General Electric – refused to ever have a 
second-in-command as it would add an unneeded “layer of advocacy” (Murray, 2000). 
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Why Founders are Different 
Past research suggests that founders differ from professional CEOs both in terms of their 
individual capabilities, as well as their power within the firm (Nelson, 2003; Jayaraman et al., 
2000; Wasserman, 2003 & 2017). In the sections that follow, I discuss why these inherent 
differences may moderate the advantages (i.e., reducing CEO overload) and disadvantages (i.e., 
reducing unity of command) of the second-in-command structure. 
Founder capabilities. Past research suggests that founders generally possess a different 
skillset from professional CEOs. Specifically, founders are often characterized as extreme types 
– “driven, independent, rebellious builders” (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985: 44) who have the exact 
skills, capabilities, and passion for discovering new opportunities, crafting a vision, developing 
new products, and creating a new venture (Cardon et al., 2009; Kirzner, 1985; Shane 2000). 
However, as a firm grows, the importance of the founder’s original role in establishing firm 
viability is reduced and the administrative challenge of managing a large, complex firm increases 
dramatically (Jayaraman et al., 2000). These challenges include streamlining operations, 
lowering costs, and managing an increasing number of employees, products, services, functions, 
geographies and customers. Further, when a firm makes the transition from private to public, a 
firm’s manager must deal with even more changes as ownership becomes increasingly dispersed 
and the level of scrutiny on top management increases (He, 2008). Founders often do not have 
the interest or skill set to focus on these crucial managerial tasks (Willard et al., 1992; Pollock et 
al. 2009; Kor, 2003; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985).  
These founder-related findings are consistent with other research that suggests CEOs lose 
their value to the firm over time (Henderson et al., 2006). For example, Chen and Hambrick 
(2012) study the CEOs of S&P 1500 companies and find that performance improves when firms 
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replace CEOs who are less suited to the conditions at hand and replace them with CEOs who are 
better suited to those conditions, concluding that “an executive who is well suited to lead a firm 
during one period may be ill-suited for the next period” (Chen & Hambrick, 2012:227). This 
progression through a firm’s life cycle leads to the founder’s control dilemma (Wasserman 
2017), a scenario in which the firm’s future performance is connected with the founder’s 
willingness to cede control of some portion of the firm’s decision rights. Considering the 
distinctive capabilities and managerial limitations of founders, a second-in-command leadership 
structure appears to be well-suited for founder-led firms as it would allow the founder to delegate 
operational duties to someone better suited to these tasks while being able to also maintain their 
position as the firm’s top executive. 
There are many examples of this in practice. One is when Steve Jobs hired second-in-
command Tim Cook, an experienced executive coming from a successful career at Compaq, who 
nicely complemented the skills of Steve Jobs. Whereas Cook’s expertise centered on operations 
and logistics, Jobs “at his core was a product person” (CNBC 2019a) and was a visionary who 
possessed deep talent in accomplishing the seemingly impossible. Jobs delegated to Cook “all of 
the company’s worldwide sales and operations” (Apple, 2005), allowing both individuals to thus 
focus on their core strengths. A more recent example is Airbnb, where the company’s founders, 
Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia, had backgrounds in design but had no prior managerial or 
business experience (in fact, they were so untutored in these areas that they thought people 
referring to “angel” investors believed in celestial beings – The Economist 2017). As the 
company continued to grow and prepare for an IPO, the founders hired Belinda Johnson as COO 
to streamline operations, steer the firm through regulatory opposition, and handle an existential 
crisis around discriminatory behavior on its platform. 
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Founder power/authority. In addition to possessing different capabilities, past research 
also provides several reasons to suggest that founders possess more power and authority in their 
firms relative to professional CEOs. First, founder-led firms often have corporate governance 
structures (e.g., dual-class shares, CEO/Chairman duality, etc.) that allow the founder-CEO to 
exert increased control in the boardroom and within the firm (Nelson 2003; Gao & Jain 2009; 
Hendricks et al., 2019). Recent evidence suggests that founders are increasingly able to retain 
formal control of their firms, even as they grow larger, as a result of the increased competition 
among venture capital firms (Blank, 2017). Second, past research suggests that founders are 
often associated with charismatic and transformational leadership styles that makes employees 
and outsiders (e.g., partners or investors) more strongly commit to them and their initiatives 
relative to other managers (Dobrev & Barnett, 2005; Kark et al., 2003).13 Third, there is 
substantial real authority inherent in the role of the founder (Weber, 1968), which links the 
founder’s individual identity with that of the firm and allows the founder to speak for the firm 
and exert substantial influence over firm behavior (Fahlenbrach 2009).  
As a result of this inherent power and authority, issues related to unity of command (i.e., 
confusions related to who’s “in charge”) are likely to be less problematic for founder CEOs, as 
those working in and with the firm will be more likely to recognize and accept their authority. 
This implies that firms with founder leadership may also avoid much of the destructive infighting 
often associated with the second-in-command structure (Zhang, 2006; Bennett & Miles, 2006; 
                                                 
13 Tim Cook’s decision to leave Compaq and join Apple provides a notable example of how a founder’s visionary 
leadership may attract employee loyalty. Cook noted that although a purely rational consideration of the costs and 
benefits lined up in Compaq’s favor and that the people he knew best advised him to stay, he joined Apple in 1998 
because “Steve created the whole industry” and that “working with a Silicon Valley legend like Jobs would be the 
privilege of a lifetime” (CNBC 2019b). This loyalty to Jobs was apparently felt by more than Cook, as one tribute to 
Jobs noted that “his instincts have been so unerringly good — and his charisma so powerful — that Apple employees 
were willing to follow him wherever he led” (New York Times 2011). 
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Levinson, 1993). Consistent with this, when Mort Topfer came in as the second-in-command at 
Dell, he had “no aspirations of becoming the chief executive officer at Dell” (Bennett & Miles, 
2006), and was instead there to help and mentor the then 29-year old Michael Dell. Similarly, 
when Joseph Galli took the COO position at Amazon, he recognized that “given Mr. Bezos’s 
relative youth and role as company founder, succeeding him isn’t a big possibility” (Murray, 
2000). Overall, while prior research raises concerns that a second-in-command may reduce unity 
of command, this risk should be moderated in founder-led firms due to the real authority held by 
founder CEOs.  
In summary, I argue that a second-in-command will be more beneficial for large firms 
with founder CEOs relative to other firms for two main reasons (see Table 7 for summary). First, 
because founders often lack the managerial capabilities to lead a large, complex firm, I expect 
that reducing CEO overload and delegating internal functions to a second-in-command will be 
more beneficial in founder-led firms. Second, I also argue that the unique power and authority 
that founders hold within their firms is such that a second-in-command is less likely to result in 
problems related to unity of command. Based on these arguments, I form the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms with Founder CEOs are more likely to have a second-in-
command relative to firms without Founder CEOs. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relation between a second-in-command team structure and firm 
performance will be more positive for founder-led firms.  
METHODS 
For the context of my analysis, I rely on IPO firms. This setting provides many 
advantages for my study. First, organizational complexity increases dramatically at IPO. 
Although firms likely manage many complex operating tasks prior to going public, these tasks 
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increase substantially at IPO as the firm’s top executives are faced with a more dispersed 
shareholder base, equity analysts, credit rating agencies, and increased regulatory compliance. 
Second, the registration statement that firms are required to file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) when seeking to go public allows me to identify whether a firm has a 
second-in-command. Although this information is available for all public firms, and not just IPO 
firms, my use of IPO firms reduces concerns related to selection bias that arise when using 
samples of seasoned publicly traded firms (Cadman, Klasa, & Matsunaga, 2010). Lastly, by 
focusing on IPO firms, as opposed to privately held firms, I do not face concerns about selective 
reporting of firm performance or firm survival. Rather, for each firm in my sample, I am able to 
obtain objective information about their post-IPO performance via CRSP and Compustat. 
I rely on Jay Ritter’s IPO data set to attain a list of firms that completed an original initial 
public offering from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2013 in the United States. Following prior 
studies, I exclude financial firms, partnerships, spin-offs, carve-outs, reverse LBOs, ADRs, and 
unit offers. I also exclude minor offerings (i.e., filings less than $10 million and offers that are 
priced under $5 per share). I then obtain financial information for each firm using CRSP and 
Compustat. I use each IPO firm’s registration statement filed with the SEC to identify and gather 
data on the structure and composition of each firm’s TMT. There are 2,098 firms that meet the 
data requirements to be included in my study. 
Variables 
Firm performance: I operationalize firm performance using the firm’s buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR). This measure mimics a passive investment strategy in which an 
investor buys a stock and holds it over a certain period of time (Chatterjee et al., 2003; Loughran 
& Vijh, 1997). In other words, this measure directly captures the shareholder value created by 
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top management over the period of interest. I measure BHAR from the closing price on the day of 
the IPO through the earlier of three years from IPO or the firm’s delisting. The extended horizon 
is important as it allows sufficient time for companies to experience the payoffs related to 
investing the IPO proceeds. To compute this variable, I follow prior research and calculate each 
firm’s gross stock returns over the three years subsequent to the firm’s IPO and then subtract out 
the returns earned from holding the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. In the 
event of delisting, I include the firm’s delisting return (per CRSP).  
Second-in-command is a binary variable equal to one if the firm has a “second-in-
command”, and zero otherwise. To determine whether a firm has a second-in-command, I gather 
information on the specific positions included in each firm’s top management team from their 
final registration statement filed with the SEC. Following prior research on second-in-commands 
(Hambrick & Cannella 2004; Zhang 2006; Marcel, 2009; Krause et al. 2013), I code this variable 
as one if the registration statement indicates that the top management team includes a Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) or a non-CEO executive who holds the title of “President.” Past 
research indicates that the roles and responsibilities of these positions are similar and that the 
second-in-command often holds both titles (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Zhang, 2006; Marcel, 
2009). Table 8 includes the descriptive statistics for this, and all other variables included in my 
study. As shown therein, I find that 41% of my sample firms have a second-in-command. 
Founder is a binary variable indicating whether the firm has a founder CEO at time of 
IPO. To determine which firms in my sample have founder CEOs, I follow a multi-stage process. 
As a first step, I search in each firm’s registration statement for sentences that include terms such 
as “founder”, “founded”, or “founding.” When these words are included in the statement, I read 
the information carefully to determine whether this indicated that the firm’s CEO was a founder. 
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Next, I analyzed the biographical summaries of each CEO to determine whether an alternative 
phrase was used (e.g., “started the company”) that could indicate the individual was one of the 
firm’s original founders. Finally, in some cases the registration statement did not explicitly state 
that the CEO was a founder, but the CEO’s tenure began at time of founding. In these cases, I 
conducted an online search to verify whether the person was a founder. Table 8 reveals a 0.13 
correlation between Founder and Second-in-Command, providing initial univariate evidence in 
support of my first hypothesis that predicts founder-led firms are more likely to have a second-
in-command. I perform a more robust multivariate examination of this relation in Section 4. 
CEO_Ops is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO has operational experience. To 
create this variable, I rely on the description of each CEO’s background included in the IPO 
registration statement. Following prior research, I code this condition as one for all CEOs who 
have an MBA degree, as past research suggests this acts as a proxy for basic business and 
managerial knowledge (Graham et al., 2015). In addition, if the description includes terms such 
as “operations,” or “operating” then I read the information to determine whether the CEO had 
previously held the position of Chief Operating Officer, Vice President of Operations, or some 
related position indicating extensive prior experience managing a firm’s operations. Thus, for 
these CEOs, I also code this variable as one. For all other CEOs, I code this condition as zero. 
Consistent with Founder CEOs being less likely than other CEOs to have an operations-related 
functional background, Table 8 reveals a strong negative correlation (i.e., –0.23) between 
Founder and CEO_Ops. 
CEO_Power is an index variable that measures the influence the CEO has in the 
organization, with higher values indicating a more powerful CEO and thus less confusion around 
unity of command. To create this index variable, I first assign each CEO a score of zero. I then 
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identify several indicators that past literature has identified as contributing to CEO power 
(Krause et al., 2015), including chair title (with the chair position conferring additional power), 
firm ownership (with greater ownership indicating greater power), and individual age (with 
higher age indicating greater perceived power). Thus, if the CEO holds the Chair position then I 
add one to the CEO_Power index. I also add one if the CEO’s ownerships stake in the business 
is greater than any other team member’s ownership. Finally, I add one if the CEO is the oldest 
top management team member. Thus, possible values for this variable range from 0 to 3, with 
higher values representing a more powerful CEO. Consistent with Founder CEOs having more 
power relative to other CEOs, Table 8 reveals a strong positive correlation (i.e., 0.29) between 
Founder and CEO_Power. 
Control variables. I reference prior literature related to post-IPO stock performance to 
select variables for inclusion in my multivariate analysis (e.g., Gao et al., 2013; Brav & Gompers 
1997). In doing so, I rely on commonly applied definitions. Specifically, I use MVE, which 
represents the natural log of a firm’s market value of equity plus one, and BTM, which represents 
the firm’s book-to-market ratio at IPO. I also control for each firm’s position within its life cycle. 
In particular, I define R&D_Intensity as the ratio of each firm’s research and development 
expenses to its book value of assets, and Startup as a binary variable equal to one if the firm’s 
total revenues for the year preceding the IPO were under $50 million (Gao et al., 2013). I control 
for a firm’s prior operating performance by including ROA (the firm’s return on assets over the 
twelve months prior to the initial public offering), and AbsROA (the absolute value of ROA). I 
also control for each firm’s capital structure by including Leverage, defined as the ratio of total 
liabilities to assets.  
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I also create variables that reflect various aspects of a firm’s corporate governance 
structure. Doing so is important as particular governance structures may restrict the level of 
control that the CEO can wield in the firm. In particular, I include VC, which is a binary variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm has venture capital funding prior to its initial public 
offering. I also control for Dual_Class_Shr, a binary variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm has two or more different classes of common shares at IPO, and Board_Size, a count of the 
number of external board members. Lastly, I also control for CEO_New, and follow prior 
literature (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004) by creating a binary variable that takes the value of one 
if the CEO’s tenure was less than three years at IPO.  
Research Design - Entropy Balancing 
The objective of this paper is to examine two questions: First, are founders more likely to 
have a second-in-command relative to other CEOs? And second, do founders benefit more from 
having a second-in-command relative to other CEOs? To answer these questions in an idealized 
experimental setting, I would prefer two randomly selected groups of firms that are identical in 
every respect except that one group has a founder CEO (treatment group) while the other group 
does not (control group). Because I am unable to construct such a randomized experiment, I 
address the endogeneity associated with founder leadership via entropy balancing (Hainmueller 
2012), a multivariate matching approach that is increasingly being used by researchers seeking to 
draw causal inference when restricted to using observational data (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller, & 
Hangartner 2016; Stanton & Thomas 2016; Shroff, Verdi, & Yost 2017; Jacob et al. 2019).  
The first stage of entropy balancing solves a constrained optimization problem to identify 
a continuous weight for each control group observation while simultaneously seeking to keep the 
sample as close as possible to equally-weighted (Hainmueller 2012). These continuous weights 
74 
 
adjust exactly to account for inequalities in the first, second, and possibly higher moments of the 
covariate distributions. By using continuous weights, as opposed to discrete weights, entropy 
balancing overcomes many of the criticisms of propensity score matching. For example, 
propensity score matching, while likely being the most commonly used multivariate matching 
technique, is frequently criticized because minor changes in the first stage of matching can 
substantially influence sample composition and the resulting inferences (King & Nielsen 2016; 
Shipman, Swanquist, & Whited 2017; Smith & Todd 2005), a problem overcome by using 
continuous weights as opposed to discrete. Furthermore, Zhao and Percival (2019) show that 
entropy balancing is “doubly robust”, in the sense that if either the first-stage model used to 
determine the continuous weights or the second-stage model used to estimate the average 
treatment effect is correctly specified then entropy balancing provides a consistent estimator of 
the average treatment effect. Although entropy balancing (and other similar synthetic control 
methods) is not a perfect way to estimate causality, Athey and Imbens (2017) suggest that these 
techniques are “arguably the most important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the 
last 15 years.” 
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for firms with and without founder CEOs 
separately, with t-tests for differences in means. These tests reveal that firm characteristics differ 
substantially across the two groups. For example, firms with founder leadership tend to have 
lower revenues (Startup) and are less profitable (ROA). In addition, Table 9 also reveals that the 
characteristics of founder CEOs tend to differ from the characteristics of other CEOs. For 
example, and consistent with the arguments used to form my hypotheses, I find that founders 
generally have less operations-related functional backgrounds (CEO_Ops) and wield increased 
control within their organization, as measured by CEO_Power.  
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To mitigate concerns related to these differences between the firms with and without 
Founder CEOs, I use entropy balancing to re-weight each control group observation. As shown 
in Table 9, after applying the continuous weights determined by the first stage of the entropy 
balancing process, I find that the mean value for each observable variable for founder-led firms 
is exactly equal to the mean value for the weighted sample of non-founder firms. Further, the 
standard deviation and skewness of these distributions show insignificant differences between 
the treatment and control group. By achieving covariate balance between the two groups, this 
multivariate matching technique reduces model dependency for the subsequent estimation of 
treatment effects.  
RESULTS  
Testing Whether Founders are More Likely to Have a Second-in-Command (H1) 
Hypothesis 1 examines whether founder CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to have a 
second-in-command. I examine this hypothesis by estimating the following OLS model: 
Second_in_Command = β0 + β1 Founder + β2-14 Controls+ Fixed Effects + εi  (1) 
where Second-in-Command equals one if the firm has a COO or President on its top management 
team, and zero otherwise. My variable of interest, Founder, equals one if the IPO firm has a 
founder-CEO, and zero otherwise. I also include all of the control variables previously 
motivated. The model also includes time (calendar year) and industry (Fama-French 12-industry 
classifications) fixed effects. Finally, in this and all other specifications, I cluster-robust standard 
errors by both industry (Fama-French 48-industry classifications) and time (calendar quarter-
year) (Petersen 2009).  
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 The results of estimating Equation 1 are presented in Table 10.14 Column 1 reveals the 
baseline results of estimating Equation (1), before including the continuous weights from entropy 
balancing. Hypothesis 1 predicts that founders will be more likely to have a second-in-command. 
In support of this prediction, I find that the relationship between Founder and 
Second_in_Command is positive (i.e., β1 = 0.1268, p-value = 0.000). Consistent with Hambrick 
and Cannella (2004), my results also reveal that several control variables have statistically 
significant relations with the presence of a second-in-command. For example, the coefficient for 
CEO_Ops is -0.0449 (p=0.014), revealing that firms with CEOs that do not have an operations-
related functional background are more likely to have a second-in-command. Also, 
R&D_Intensity has a coefficient of -0.2817 (p=0.000), suggesting that research-intensive (and 
thus less operationally-intensive) firms are less likely to have a second-in-command. Lastly, 
consistent with firm size and complexity increasing the need for a second-in-command, I find 
that the coefficient for MVE is also positive (i.e., 0.0288, p-value = 0.005).  
 Column 2 re-estimates Equation 1 after using the continuous weights obtained from the 
entropy balancing process. Similar to the results tabulated in Column 1, I find that the relation 
between Founder and Second_in_Command is positive (i.e., β1 = 0.0914, p-value = 0.001). This 
finding is not only statistically significant, but also indicates a substantial real effect. In 
particular, considering the unconditional mean for Second-in-Command is only 41 percent (Table 
8), the estimated coefficient for Founder in Column 2 suggests that founder leadership is 
associated with a 22.2 percent increase (i.e., 9.1% / 41%) in the probability that a firm will have 
                                                 
14 I use a linear probability model to estimate Equation (1). Although Probit models are frequently used when the 
dependent variable is binary, the inclusion of fixed effects in Equation (1) introduces concerns that the Probit model 
will provide biased or inconsistent coefficients (Greene 2004). Nonetheless, untabulated findings in which I use a 
Probit model yield the same inferences as those based on tabulated findings.  
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a second-in-command. Overall, Column 2 provides compelling support for my hypothesis that 
founder-CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to have a second-in-command. 
Testing Whether Founders Benefit More from Having a Second-in-Command (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether a second-in-command has a more positive relation to 
firm performance for founder-led firms than it does for firms without a founder CEO. To do so, I 
first partition firms into two groups based on whether they do or do not have a founder CEO. I 
then estimate the following OLS model for each partition of firms: 
BHAR = β0 + β1 Second_in_Command + β2-14 Controls+ Fixed Effects + εi  (2) 
where all variables are as previously described. My variable of interest for Hypothesis 2 is 
Second_in_Command. Similar to my prior analysis, I include each of the previously motivated 
control variables in Equation (2), and continue to include time and industry fixed effects and 
cluster-robust standard errors by both industry and time. 
I used entropy balancing to achieve covariate balance between firms with and without 
founder leadership when examining H1. However, because I partition my firms by founder 
classification when examining H2, I do not need to conduct entropy balancing to account for the 
differences between firms with and without founder leadership because there are no differences 
in founder classification within each of the two partitions. However, my results for H1 suggest 
that having a second-in-command is also endogenous. Thus, before I estimate Equation 2, I first 
examine the similarity of firms with and without a second-in-command within each partition of 
firms. Panel A of Table 11 provides descriptive statistics and accompanying t-tests that examine 
the differences in mean values between founder-led firms with a second-in-command and 
founder-led firms without a second-in-command. As shown therein, there are large differences 
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among the two partitions of firms (i.e., the p-values for tests of CEO_Power, Startup, MVE, 
ROA, Abs(ROA), R&D_Intensity, Leverage, VC, and Dual_Class_Shares are all below at least 
0.10). Thus, I again use entropy balancing to reduce this covariate imbalance between the 
treatment group (i.e., founder-led firms with a second-in-command) and the control group (i.e., 
founder-led firms without a second-in-command). As before, by applying the continuous weights 
determined by the entropy balancing process to the group of 440 control firms, the mean value 
for each variable is now the same for the treatment and control groups. Panel A of Table 11 also 
reveals increased similarity in the standard deviation and skewness for each variable. I also 
follow this process for the partition of firms without founder leadership, documenting the 
descriptive statistics both prior to and after entropy balancing in Panel B of Table 11. 
Column 1 of Table 12 presents the results of estimating Equation 2 for the sample of 
founder-led firms, using the continuous weights determined from the entropy balancing process 
(Panel A of Table 11). As revealed therein, Column 1 reports that the performance of founder-
led firms is higher when a second-in-command is present (i.e., Β = 0.1380, p-value = 0.077). I 
then test whether this also holds true for the subset of non-founder-led firms, again using 
continuous weights as determined from the entropy balancing process (Panel B of Table 11). 
Column 2 of Table 12 presents these results, revealing that the performance of non-founder-led 
firms is lower when a second-in-command is present (i.e., Β = -0.2715, p-value = 0.001). 
Overall, the results of Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and suggest 
that while the performance of non-founder-led firms is harmed by the presence of a second-in-
command (consistent with prior literature – Hambrick & Cannella, 2004), the performance of 
founder-led firms is higher when a second-in-command is present.  
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 To ease the interpretation of the Table 12 findings, Figure 4 depicts the results. The Y-
axis represents firm performance (i.e., BHAR) and the X-axis represents the presence or absence 
of a second-in-command. The lines then represent the marginal effect of a second-in-command 
on firm performance by founder CEO classification. The solid line represents the results for 
founder-led firms, as documented in Column 1 of Table 12, whereas the dashed line represents 
the results for non-founder-led firms as documented in Column 2 of Table 12. Support for 
Hypothesis 2 is shown by the stark difference in the slopes of these two lines. These findings 
thus suggest that founder leadership acts as an important boundary condition to prior research 
that finds a negative relation between a second-in-command and firm performance.  
Supplemental Analysis: Testing the Mechanisms 
My hypotheses suggest that founders will benefit more from a second-in-command for 
two main reasons (see Table 7). First, because founders often lack the operational and 
managerial capabilities needed to run a large, complex firm, I expect that delegating internal 
functions to a second-in-command is especially crucial in founder-led firms. I also argue that the 
unique power and authority that founders hold within their firms is such that a second-in-
command is less likely to result in problems related to unity of command. Although the results 
from Table 12 are consistent with this general logic, I now seek to understand whether either of 
the two proposed mechanisms help explain the Table 12 findings. 
To do so, I exploit variation within my group of firms with founder CEOs. While I argue 
above that founders possess fewer operational and managerial capabilities relative to 
professional CEOs on average, this is not always the case. Founders come from a variety of 
backgrounds (Klotz et al., 2014; Beckman, 2006; Amason et al., 2006), and some may come 
from a strong background in operations or management. These founders will be more likely to  
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possess the capabilities needed to lead a company through its later stages of growth, and as such, 
the value added by a second-in-command should be reduced. Thus, I explore this relation by 
altering Equation 2 to include an interaction between Second_in_Command and CEO_ Ops.  
Column 1 of Table 13 provides the results of estimating this equation for the partition of 
founder-led firms. As shown therein, the interaction between Second_in_Command and 
CEO_Ops is positive and significant (i.e., Β = -0.3366, p-value = 0.009). This finding provides 
empirical evidence to support my proposed mechanism that a second-in-command is less 
beneficial in founder-led firms when the founder has an operations-based functional background. 
To examine the second mechanism (i.e., founder power), I further exploit variation within 
founders. In particular, past research suggests that although founders hold more control over 
their firms relative to professional CEOs on average, there is substantial variation among 
founder-led firms in regards to the amount of control the founder CEO actually holds 
(Wasserman 2017). In particular, some founders are highly resistant to give up any control over 
their organization, describing such a decision as akin to “giving up part of ‘their baby’” (Lim et 
al., 2013). However, other founders exhibit an increased willingness to cede a portion of their 
organizational control to better attract key resources from co-founders, key hires, partners, and 
investors. If founders’ unique power and authority helps mitigate problems around unity of 
command then the positive effect of a second-in-command on performance should be 
particularly high for the sub-set of founders who retain more power in their organizations.  
To test this, I alter Equation 2 to include an interaction between Second_in_Command 
and CEO_Power. Column 2 of Table 13 provides the results of estimating this equation for the 
partition of founder-led firms. As shown therein, the interaction between Second_in_Command 
and CEO_Power is positive and significant (i.e., Β = 0.2743, p-value = 0.041). This finding 
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suggests that a second-in-command is more beneficial in founder-led firms when the founder 
CEO holds more power, thus removing confusion about who is really “in charge”.  
DISCUSSION 
As a firm grows and becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
founders to manage the organization. In many high-profile founder-led firms (e.g., Facebook, 
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, etc.), the founders have hired a “second-in-command” with expertise 
that complements their own, perhaps in an effort to compensate for their own managerial 
limitations. Surprisingly, however, little is known regarding the prevalence of the second-in-
command team structure in founder-led firms, or whether it influences firm performance. My 
study provides insight into these questions.  
My results indicate that founders that hold the CEO position in large firms are much 
more likely to work with a second-in-command relative to non-founder CEOs. Furthermore, I 
find that, relative to firms without founder leadership, the performance of founder-led firms 
benefit more from having a second-in-command. Specifically, I find that although the 
performance of non-founder firms appears to be adversely affected by a second-in-command 
(consistent with prior findings – Hambrick & Cannella, 2004), the performance of large firms 
with founder CEOs is higher when a second-in-command is present. Furthermore, I also identify 
two important boundary conditions, namely: CEO functional background and CEO power, which 
moderate the extent of this relation for founder-led firms. Together, my results contribute to the 
existing literature by highlighting stark and significant differences in how founders and non-
founders structure and benefit from their top management teams. More generally, my study adds 
new contributions to the entrepreneurship and upper echelons literatures. 
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Contributions to the Entrepreneurship Literature  
First, my study contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial growth. The issue of 
managing firm growth is deeply embedded in the literature on entrepreneurship (DeSantola & 
Gulati 2017). Due to their smaller size, new ventures can experience growth rates that far surpass 
mature firms, meaning the need for changes and adjustments happens rapidly and continuously. 
Because of this, past research often suggests that founders must relinquish their original vision 
for the company and cede control to more experienced managers. My study, however, suggests 
that founders may be able to find some middle ground – or in other words, they may be able to 
structure the firm’s top management team in a way that allows them to strike a balance between 
both stability and change. Overall, this study contributes and extends existing research on 
entrepreneurial growth by showing specific ways in which entrepreneurs resolve the challenge of 
balancing stability and change – namely, by relying on a second-in-command.  
In addition, this study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by revealing 
additional strategies founders use to retain control as their firms grow. The “Rich vs. King” view 
in entrepreneurship suggests that it becomes increasingly difficult for founders to retain control 
as a firm grows (Wasserman, 2017). Thus, entrepreneurs of high-growth firms face a dilemma, in 
that they can either choose to cede control of their organization in hopes of becoming “rich” or 
retain substantial control of the firm’s decision rights (“king”), but at the expense of firm growth. 
Recently, however, more studies have documented various ways in which founders can be both 
rich and king. For example, there has been a recent trend of founders retaining decision-making 
authority through unusual equity or voting structures such as dual class shares (Blank 2017; 
Fattoum-Guedri et al. 2018), which allow the founder to give up large portions of equity while 
still retaining control of the firm’s voting rights. This study provides evidence of another 
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potential strategy: hiring a second-in-command. Results suggest that hiring a second-in-
command may be one way that founders can continue to retain control of their organizations (by 
maintaining the CEO position) while still getting the managerial expertise required to grow their 
companies (by hiring a second-in-command). Overall, these insights suggest that founders may 
pursue internal strategies of retaining control that complement (or potentially substitute) other 
strategies that founders use to retain control over external stakeholders (e.g., dual-class shares).  
Contributions to the Upper Echelons Literature 
The influence of the “organizational elite” on firm performance is of fundamental 
importance to strategic management. In order to truly understand why organizations do the 
things they do or perform the way they do, one must study their most powerful actors (i.e., their 
top executives) (Hambrick 2007). I make an important contribution to the upper echelons 
literature by exploring the antecedents of team structure. Much of the TMT literature has studied 
the consequences of TMT structure in depth (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders 2004 and 
Certo et al., 2006 for reviews). However, very few studies have addressed the factors influencing 
TMT structure. Noting this deficiency, Pettigrew (1992:176) argued that an unanswered question 
in the literature is “why do teams look the way they do?” Later, Hambrick (2007) acknowledged 
this same deficiency in the literature and argued that by treating elements of TMT structure as 
dependent variables I would open up new avenues for thinking about intraorganizational power 
struggles and how executives’ characteristics influence organizational outcomes. I answer these 
calls by exploring how one important characteristic – the founder status of a firm – has a 
significant influence on the structure of the TMT (specifically, the presence of a second-in-
command). By so doing, I offer empirical evidence of why some TMTs are structured differently 
than others.  
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Second, I offer evidence of a key contingency factor for the second-in-command/firm 
performance relation. Other than a few notable exceptions (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; 
Zhang, 2006; Marcel, 2009), the second-in-command phenomenon has been relatively 
understudied in the upper echelons literature. The few studies that do exist provide mixed results 
as to the effect of a second-in-command on firm performance. Hambrick and Cannella (2004), 
for example, employed contingency theory and performed over 30 different interactions to 
examine whether a second-in-command might be more favorable under certain conditions. 
However, they found no combination of conditions in which the second-in-command approach 
was positively associated with firm performance. I thus extend these findings and contribute to 
this body of research by showing how one key condition – the founder status of the CEO – 
moderates the relation between a second-in-command and firm performance. Future research 
should continue to explore whether other mechanisms are at play as well. 
Finally, my study contributes to the literature on the “CEO-TMT interface” (Ma & Seidl 
2018; Peterson et al. 2003; Carmeli et al. 2011). Although a great number of studies have 
addressed top management teams, the majority of these studies focus either on a single executive 
(e.g., the CEO) or the TMT as a whole, in which the CEO is simply included as a member of the 
group and his or her characteristics are averaged with the overall group (Jackson 1992). Yet, 
comparatively little research has been done on the interaction between the top executive and his 
or her team, and specifically on how the top executive chooses to structure, manage, and lead 
their team (Peterson et al. 2003; Hambrick 1994). My study helps fill this gap and contributes to 
the literature by analyzing how the unique preferences and biases of founder CEOs might shape 




Founders encounter significant challenges as their firms mature and increase in 
complexity. As a result, founders that hold the CEO position in large firms are often encouraged 
to hire a second-in-command with expertise that complements their own. Surprisingly, however, 
no research examines the prevalence or implications of the second-in-command role in founder-
led firms. Using a sample of over 2,000 IPO firms, I address this gap and find that founder-led 
firms are more likely to hire a second-in-command relative to other large firms. Further, and in 
stark contrast to firms without founder CEOs that perform worse when a second-in-command is 
present, I find that large firms with founder leadership perform better when a second-in-
command is present. However, I also identify two important boundary conditions, namely: CEO 
functional background and CEO power, which moderate the extent of this relation. Taken 
together, my findings provide new empirical evidence that founders both structure and benefit 





CHAPTER 4: COWORKING COMMUNITIES 
WORKING ALONE, TOGETHER 
ABSTRACT 
In the past decade, coworking spaces have emerged as a new and promising phenomenon 
within entrepreneurship. Due to its prevalence, popularity, and potential for disruptive change, 
coworking is increasingly relevant to theory, practice, and policy in entrepreneurship, yet its 
implications are largely unstudied given the rapid rise of the phenomenon. Overall, more 
research is needed to inform owners, policy makers, and entrepreneurs regarding the effects of 
coworking. This study takes an exploratory empirical approach with the goal of shedding light 
on the current landscape of coworking. By so doing, I provide an initial foundation for research 
on the coworking movement, the conditions under which it may improve entrepreneurial 




In the past decade, a relatively new and promising phenomenon has emerged within 
entrepreneurship. I refer to coworking spaces, or membership-based workspaces in which diverse 
groups of individuals and teams assemble to work on their independent projects in a shared, 
communal space. The typical users of coworking spaces include entrepreneurs, freelancers, 
remote workers, and other independent or nontraditional workers. These individuals are often not 
able to afford their own office space, and thus coworking spaces offer a solution. In addition to 
the space itself, coworking offers a community of other entrepreneurs, all working separately on 
their own ventures, but working together in the same space.  
Though coworking holds considerable promise, the concept is still relatively new. Mostly 
unheard of ten years ago, the global number of coworking spaces has grown dramatically in 
recent years. For example, the Global Coworking Survey (Deskmag, 2019) estimated that only 
about 160 coworking spaces existed worldwide in 2008, whereas in 2018 there were close to 
19,000 (see Figure 5). As entrepreneurs (especially millennials) continue to embrace coworking, 
investors have taken notice. For example, from 2017-2018 SoftBank invested more than $7 
billion in WeWork, the world’s leading coworking provider, making it the most valuable startup 
in the United States. Many of the world’s largest landlords are also beginning to invest heavily in 
coworking spaces as they have been one of the “few bright spots in the office-market during the 
economic recovery,” making them “one of the few sources of demand” (Wall Street Journal, 
2018a). As coworking has become more popular, a growing number of entrepreneurial websites, 
blogs, magazines, and other news sources have addressed the recent trends in coworking and 
discussed what it might mean for entrepreneurship and the future of work. Overall, many 
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consider the rise of coworking to be one of the most prevalent trends in recent entrepreneurial 
activity (Kreamer, 2012).  
Due to its prevalence, popularity, and potential for disruptive change, coworking is 
increasingly relevant to theory, practice, and policy in entrepreneurship, yet its implications are 
largely unstudied given the rapid rise of the phenomenon. Although some work addresses the 
implications of accelerators and incubators (Cohen, Bingham, and Hallen, 2018; Hallen, Cohen, 
and Bingham, 2018), coworking spaces are different in fundamental ways, and thus require 
separate attention. Additional research is required to inform practice, which is increasingly 
embracing coworking. Numerous entrepreneurial news sources have addressed coworking, 
attempting to advise entrepreneurs as to whether coworking is right for them, and if so, which 
space is best. However, these sources are often limited to anecdotal evidence, meaning little data 
is available to advise entrepreneurs.  
Furthermore, in addition to informing entrepreneurs, additional research on coworking is 
necessary to inform policymakers. Because the coworking industry as we know it is relatively 
new, it has not yet gone through a full economic cycle. Once a recession or other shock occurs15, 
the coworking industry will likely experience consolidation (Klepper, 1996). Many coworking 
spaces are currently funded either fully or partially by local governments, universities, and 
corporations, and these stakeholders will be forced to decide whether these spaces are worthy of 
continual funding.  
                                                 
15 One recent example is the case of the COVID-19 virus, which forced many coworking spaces to close their doors 
as various national and local governments issued “stay-at-home” orders. While the fallout from this virus is still 
evolving, it will likely have a large impact on the coworking industry. 
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Overall, more data and analysis are needed to inform owners, policy makers, 
entrepreneurs, and researchers regarding the effects of coworking. Given the urgency of studying 
the coworking phenomenon now, I follow the example of past studies examining early-stage 
entrepreneurial phenomenon such as crowdfunding (Mollick, 2014), accelerators (Cohen et al., 
2019a), and the maker movement (Browder, Aldrich, and Bradley, 2019) by mapping the current 
landscape of coworking spaces and describing how it may affect new venture creation. By so 
doing, I provide an initial foundation for studying the coworking movement, the conditions 
under which it may improve entrepreneurial outcomes, and the various research streams it can 
enrich.  
PAST RESEARCH ON COWORKING 
Despite the explosive growth in the number of coworking spaces, very little academic 
research addresses the phenomenon. To date, Gretchen Spreitzer and colleagues (Spreitzer et al., 
2015a; Spreitzer et al., 2015b; Garrett, Spreitzer, and Bacevice, 2017) are the only ones to 
directly address coworking in the management literature. Two of these studies are published in 
practitioner journals and focus on gauging the job satisfaction of freelancers in coworking spaces 
(Spreitzer et al., 2015a) and advising large corporations if coworking is right for them (Spreitzer 
et al., 2015b). For example, Spreitzer et al., 2015a find that freelancers can thrive in coworking 
spaces, as they see their work as meaningful, have more job control, and feel part of a 
community. Spreitzer et al., 2015b, in contrast, focus on how large corporations can benefit from 
coworking, finding that when they send employees to work in coworking spaces, it can help the 
employees tap into new ideas, reduce real estate costs, and improve employee job satisfaction. 
Although these studies validate the coworking phenomenon and provide valuable advice to 
practitioners, they are based on limited data. Their third study (Garrett et al., 2017) explores the 
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formation process of a small coworking space in the Midwestern United States. Once again, 
however, the research is based on limited evidence (19 interviews) and the authors readily 
acknowledge the limited scope of their study and express hope that future studies will explore 
“the growing trend of coworking” (Garrett et al., 2017:839).  
Though few studies examine the coworking phenomenon directly, some management 
studies examine it indirectly by collecting data on entrepreneurs within coworking spaces (e.g., 
Kim and Lim, 2019). These studies use coworking spaces for their sample selection, and the 
research question does not focus on the coworking space itself or its implications for 
entrepreneurs. A handful of conceptual studies in other fields explore coworking (Spinuzzi, 
2012; Bouncken and Reuschl, 2018; Parrino, 2015). Similarly, however, these studies are 
typically limited to anecdotes or conjectures, and often end by calling for more empirical 
research on the coworking phenomenon. Overall, while these studies once again validate 
coworking as an increasingly important phenomenon, we lack a broader and more high-level 
exploration of the coworking movement and its implications.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Given the lack of prior research and data on coworking, this study takes an exploratory 
empirical approach. The goal of such an approach is to shed light on the ways in which 
coworking spaces operate relative to other common entrepreneurial organizations (e.g., 
accelerators, incubators, etc.), as well as developing initial evidence about the nature of 
coworking and its role in entrepreneurship research. An exploratory method such as this is 
appropriate for an evolving topic in the evolving field of entrepreneurship (Mollick, 2014; 
Aldrich and Baker, 2000; Busenitz et al., 2003; Cornelius, 2006), as this initial data and theory 
can serve as a useful foundation for future empirical testing and theory-building (Eisenhardt, 
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1989). Thus, rather than forming and testing formal hypotheses, the remainder of the paper 
examines the main implications of coworking from the perspective of entrepreneurship, and its 
links to existing research and theory. Other recent papers that follow similar approaches include 
Mollick (2014) who studies the crowdfunding phenomenon, Cohen et al. (2019a) who study the 
accelerator phenomenon, and Browder et al. (2019) who study the maker space phenomenon.   
Given the nascent nature of the phenomenon, I perform a mixed methods analysis by 
relying on data from two sources. The first is a large-scale, publicly available dataset of 
coworking spaces throughout the globe compiled by the coworking magazine Deskmag. The 
second is a hand-collected dataset, including both quantitative and qualitative information from a 
large coworking space in the eastern United States. I describe both of these below. 
Deskmag Data 
Deskmag is a Berlin-based coworking magazine that publishes articles and information 
about the state of coworking, its people, and its spaces. Deskmag is generally considered the 
leading source of information on the global state of coworking (Wall Street Journal, 2018b; New 
York Times, 2014). Each year the organization performs the Global Coworking Survey, the 
purpose of which is to describe the state of coworking spaces themselves, their users, and their 
managers. The first survey, conducted in December 2010, received responses from 661 
individuals in 24 countries. The number of participants grew in future years, and the 2019 Global 
Coworking Survey included 2,668 respondents. Respondents include a mix of coworking space 
managers or operators (55% of respondents for 2019), coworking space members (39%), and 
future or planned coworking spaces (6%). The respondents also come from a wide variety of 
countries. For example, in the 2019 Global Coworking Survey, 32% of respondents came from 
North America, 30% from Europe, 19% from Asia, 12% from South America, 4% from Africa, 
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and 3% from Oceania (Deskmag, 2018). Respondents are anonymous, and Deskmag uses a 
variety of techniques to ensure no bots or fake participants are included in the final statistics.  
The annual survey includes questions about a wide variety of topics, including design 
features, owners and sponsors, member demographics, monthly fees, costs, profitability, key 
challenges and opportunities, expectations for the future, and other key metrics. Deskmag 
publishes several reports each year that include the descriptive statistics and insights from these 
surveys. Coworking managers and operators throughout the globe rely on these reports to 
benchmark themselves against other spaces and to form their own strategies. Overall, due to the 
newness of the coworking phenomenon, the number of survey respondents, and other technical 
issues, it is impossible to pinpoint exactly how representative the Global Coworking Survey is. 
However, though the survey is far from perfect, the Global Coworking Survey is currently the 
most advanced effort to understand the state of coworking and can provide key insights in terms 
of global trends and relationships.  
In addition to the Global Coworking Survey, Deskmag collects, publishes, and curates a 
large amount of information about coworking on its online platform. This includes information 
on upcoming coworking conferences and events, as well as coworking news, blogs, and other 
online publications related to coworking. These online materials contain a rich overview of the 
history and timeline of coworking. In my study, I rely on this information in addition to the 
statistics provided from the Global Coworking Survey.  
Coworking Central Dataset 
To supplement the Deskmag data, I also performed a deep dive analysis in one large 
coworking space that I refer to as Coworking Central (pseudonym). Located in the eastern 
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United States, Coworking Central began operations in 2010 and rents space across four floors of 
a downtown office building. Each floor consists of a mix of common areas (wide, open spaces 
with couches, chairs and tables) as well as small private offices. Tenants can pay a small monthly 
fee for the right to work anywhere in the common areas, and for a higher monthly fee members 
can rent one of the small private offices (usually holding between 2-10 people) that are 
designated only for them and their team. Each floor also has conference rooms that groups can 
schedule for meetings, and small call rooms that individuals can schedule to make phone or 
video calls. In terms of other amenities, a Coworking Central membership comes with free 
coffee, WiFi, facilities maintenance, security, and a stocked snack bar. In terms of décor and 
ambiance, Coworking Central attempts to resemble a “Silicon Valley” startup culture, and thus 
designs their space with many stereotypical startup features including ping-pong tables, arcade 
machines, beanbag chairs, Star Wars and Super Mario décor, and a giant slide that connects the 
first and second floors of the building. All of this is meant to contrast sharply with corporate 
offices, and thus appeal more to entrepreneurs and other nontraditional workers who often value 
a more creative and individualistic environment.  
 From 2017 to 2019, I worked with the managers of Coworking Central to collect data 
from a variety of sources: 
Surveys: For each of these three years I administered an annual survey to all 800+ 
individuals working in the space. The survey focused on questions related to coworking. 
Specifically, why the individuals had chosen to work at the space, what aspects of the space were 
most important to them, what percentage of their customers, employees, and investors they found 
through connections with the space, how actively involved they are in the coworking 
community, the number of hours they spend at the space per week, and other related items. I also 
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collected basic demographic information on the individuals and teams working in the space (age, 
race, gender, experience, titles, etc.) as well as basic performance information on their companies 
(age, stage of development, revenue, funding, employees, etc.).  
For the first survey (in 2017), there were 884 individuals working in the space and I 
received responses from 336 individuals, for a response rate of 38%. The number of individuals 
working in the space decreased in 2018 to 781 and I received responses from 233 of those 
individuals for a response rate of 30%. In the third annual survey (2019), the number of 
individuals once again decreased to 612, and I received responses from 178 of them for a 
response rate of 29%. In terms of companies, there were 247 companies working in the space in 
2017 and I received company-level information on 133 of them, for a response rate of 54%. In 
2018, there were 224 companies in the space, and I received company-level information on 109 
of them for a response rate of 49%. In 2019, there were 157 companies in the space, and I 
received company-level information on 76 of them for a response rate of 48%. Table 14 
summarizes this information, and Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for the respondents.  
Interviews. In addition to the surveys, I performed over 60 semi-structured interviews 
with individual founders working at the space. These interviews generally lasted 30-60 minutes, 
for an average of 45 minutes. I followed an interview guide, which I modified throughout data 
collection to address emerging themes. In these interviews, I first asked the entrepreneurs to 
describe their venture and give a brief history. I then asked why they had initially chosen to work 
at the space, where they had worked before coming to the coworking space, what would make 
them leave the community, what they viewed as the primary advantages of working there, and 
what they viewed as the downsides of working in a coworking space as opposed to elsewhere. 
As is common with interview data, a crucial aspect of this data collection was iteration. The 
95 
 
process involved consistent iteration between theory, data, and extant research. This iteration 
allowed me to delve deeper into emerging themes within my interviews and re-examine whether 
these themes fit with the new data I was collecting.  
Archival documents. Third, I relied on archival documents obtained from various 
sources. Mainly, I analyzed the conversations that occurred in roughly 2,000 emails on the 
coworking space’s listserv. These conversations primarily included entrepreneurs asking for 
advice, seeking connections, or setting up events and get-togethers. Analyzing these emails gave 
me a better understanding of how the community was interacting. In addition, I relied on 
documents obtained from the space’s website, local and national news articles written about the 
space, and internal reports from the coworking space’s management.  
Other. Fourth, I spent over 100 hours working on-site and attending events at the 
coworking space. Spending time in the space myself gave me a better idea of what it is like for 
these entrepreneurs to work there, and to a certain degree, it allowed me to experience what they 
experience.  
THE COWORKING MOVEMENT 
In the sections that follow, I rely on the data from both Deskmag as well as Coworking 
Central to illustrate the emergence of the coworking phenomenon and its key drivers. I then 
focus on design choice made by coworking spaces, as well as their sponsors and owners. 
Following these descriptions, I discuss how coworking spaces differ from other entrepreneurial 
support organizations (e.g., accelerators, incubators, etc.). Finally, I end with the key 
implications of coworking for founders and their new ventures.  
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Emergence and Growth of the Coworking Movement 
In the United States, Brad Neuberg is generally credited with introducing the formal 
concept of coworking in 2005 when he organized Spiral Muse in San Francisco (Deskmag, 
2013). I interviewed Brad in 2018, and asked him about the founding story. He explained how as 
a software developer, he craved “the community and structure of a job, but the freedom and 
independence of working for myself.” Therefore, as an experiment, he rented a small room and 
furnished it with a few simple desks and chairs. He then placed an ad on Craigslist and handed 
out flyers at coffee shops, encouraging people to show up and work on their own projects in the 
same space as him. As the space and the concept grew more popular, Brad teamed up with two 
other individuals to start a coworking conference and coworking Wiki (both still operational 
today), with the purpose of encouraging others to start their own spaces and share best practices. 
This sparked a coworking movement, with thousands of new spaces forming over the next 
several years (see Figure 5).   
Over time, the coworking movement became more structured and cohesive. In 2009, the 
Global Coworking Unconference Conference (GCUC) began holding coworking conferences 
throughout the globe in an effort to bring coworking space operators together to network and 
share ideas. Deskmag, the coworking magazine described earlier, began operations in 2010 and 
performed their first annual survey of coworking spaces in that year. WeWork also began 
operations in 2010, rapidly attracting venture capital investment and growing rapidly. WeWork 
quickly became the most well-known and valuable coworking company, raising public 
awareness of the coworking concept and prompting many new entrants to copy their strategy and 
style. At the end of 2018, it was estimated that 1.7 million people were working in coworking 
spaces worldwide (Deskmag, 2018).  
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Drivers of the Coworking Movement 
The coworking movement has largely been fueled by the overall changing nature of 
work. Though there are conflicting estimates on the extent of the change, most data sources 
agree that there has been a large shift from traditional work (i.e., standard full-time employment) 
to nontraditional work (i.e., work that is alternative, market mediated, vulnerable, contract, 
freelance, e-lance, contingent, disposable, or temporary – Ashford et al., 2007). The most 
authoritative source to date is Katz and Krueger (2016). The authors conducted a large national 
survey and found that independent workers represent more than 15 percent of the U.S. labor 
market, and that they account for somewhere between 80 and 100 percent of the net employment 
growth since 200516. This monumental shift is driving the demand for alternative workspace 
options, as nontraditional workers have no full-time employers or dedicated office space. 
Overall, this shift from traditional to nontraditional work is the result of many factors, which I 
elaborate on below (see Table 16 for more details): 
Technology: Though nonstandard work has historically been difficult to find, recent 
technological advances make it much easier. These include social media, online ads or job 
boards, sharing economy websites or apps, and online freelance marketplaces or platforms 
(Upwork, Freelancer, 99designs, etc.). These online platforms allow users to connect with a 
broad range of job opportunities with varying levels of specialization and experience. For 
example, this might include simple tasks such as delivering items from point A to point B, or 
                                                 
16 Other studies also provide evidence a huge surge in independent workers. For example, the Freelancing in 
America (2017) survey found that 57.3 million people did some type of independent work in 2017, and that the 
independent workforce grew at a rate three times faster than the U.S. workforce overall since 2014. Another report 
conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) found that independent workers make up 20 to 30 percent of the 
working age population in the U.S. and the EU-15, representing up to 162 million individuals (MGI, 2016). In 
another study, the U.S. General Social Survey estimated that the number of individuals employed in nonstandard 
work was as high as 40.4% in 2010 (Government Accountability Office, 2015). 
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they may include more complex tasks such as legal or tax services. Larger companies are also 
beginning to source labor from these online platforms. For example, the Oxford Internet Institute 
found that the number of projects that corporations were sourcing from these platforms increased 
26% from 2016 to 2017, with popular categories being software development, creative and 
design, and writing (Corporaal and Lehdonvirta, 2017). These technologies will continue to 
advance and develop, likely making it even easier to find opportunities for nonstandard work.  
Demographics: Compared to prior generations, prior research suggests that Millennials 
prefer more autonomy, career flexibility, casual and fun work environments, flexible hours, and 
“results-only” work policies in which they are free to choose how, when, and where to go about 
their work as long as they meet certain criteria (Alsop, 2008). All of these factors are driving 
more Millennials to nonstandard work – in fact, the Freelancing in America (2017) survey found 
that 47% of 18-34 year-olds do some form of nonstandard work at least part-time, compared to 
only 27% of people over 45. 
Nonwage benefits: Many people opt for standard employment for nonwage benefits, with 
health insurance being the most notable. However, in recent decades, the number of employers 
providing these benefits is steadily declining (Farber and Levy, 2000; Pierce, 2001). In addition, 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the United States made it even more costly for 
employers to offer benefits to standard workers, as well as making it easier for nonstandard 
workers to obtain access to health insurance. This creates incentives for firms to use more 
contractor work and outsourcing (Bidwell et al., 2013). 
Stigma: In the past, a negative stigma surrounded non-standard workers, viewing them as 
marginalized people in peripheral jobs (Ashford et al., 2007). In recent years, however, this 
stigma is beginning to dissipate as more “supertemps” (e.g., top managers and professionals such 
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as lawyers, CFOs, and consultants) enter nontraditional work (Miller and Miller, 2012). This has 
helped add legitimacy and even prestige to nonstandard work. This same sentiment is also 
evident in the Freelancing in America (2017) survey, in which 70.0% of respondents agreed that 
perceptions of nonstandard careers are becoming more positive. 
In summary, several macro-level changes in technology, demographics, non-wage 
benefits, and stigma are fueling the shift from traditional to nontraditional work. In the past, 
these nontraditional workers faced a lack of workspace options, usually being required to work at 
home, in a coffee shop, library, or other public space. However, as the nature of work changed 
rapidly with a large shift to nontraditional workers, coworking spaces have emerged as a direct 
response and alternative workspace for these individuals. If these current trends continue as 
expected (Kreamer, 2012; Spreitzer et al., 2015a), coworking may become even more needful 
and popular.  
Design Features of Coworking Spaces 
On the surface, all coworking spaces appear similar as they all bring together a diverse 
group of entrepreneurs and other nontraditional workers in a shared, communal space. However, 
this definition masks a wealth of variation within the coworking concept. As the coworking 
movement gained traction, variations on the coworking concept began to emerge. A variety of 
coworking spaces now exist that differ in the types of resources, atmosphere, and other important 
criteria. This means that the selection of a coworking space is not simply a matter of proximate 
location to the founder (or even overall reputation or quality of resources), but also one of fit 
between a founder’s needs and the opportunities made available by the space. In this section, I 
discuss various design features of coworking spaces and how they might affect entrepreneurs’ 
coworking experience (see Table 17 for summary).  
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Private offices vs. open space. As of 2018, the average coworking space had an average 
of 8,536 square feet of space, with a median of 4,940 square feet (Deskmag, 2018). Within that 
space, however, coworking spaces vary in their types of offerings. Most coworking spaces have 
large, open areas with desks, tables, chairs, and couches, where seating is “first come first serve.” 
However, some coworking spaces (approximately 47%, according to Deskmag, 2017) also have 
private offices available for rent. The ratio of open space to private office is a key design choice 
for coworking spaces, as it can affect the frequency of interaction among community members 
and determine what type of culture prevails in the space. On average, 40% of a given coworking 
space consists of open workspaces, 25% private offices, and the remaining space filled by 
lounge/coffee areas and meeting/event spaces (Deskmag, 2018).  
Rent/lease. Coworking spaces charge a monthly rent to tenants. The amount of rent 
depends on the type of offering, with private offices being more expensive than open coworking. 
Most leases are month-to-month, allowing tenants the flexibility to cancel at any time. Deskmag 
estimates that the monthly price is around $195 to work in the space without a dedicated desk, 
and $387 for a dedicated desk.  
Amenities. Coworking spaces generally offer a variety of amenities, which can include 
office furnishings (desks, tables, chairs, couches, etc.), access to conference rooms, WiFi, 
printing, exercise equipment, and free food and beverages. WeWork, for example, is known for 
its free-flowing alcohol in common rooms. Many coworking spaces offer 24/7 access (72%, 
according to the Deskmag, 2018 data), and some offer child care or are child-friendly (26%). 
Many coworking spaces offer events, ranging from professional networking opportunities to 
social interactions (game nights, watching sports, etc.). Many spaces also offer optional trainings 
101 
 
or workshops on topics that are of interest to their tenants, such as how to fundraise, how to 
acquire customers, how to find health insurance or deal with taxes, etc. 
Members. Coworking spaces differ both in terms of size (i.e., number of members) as 
well as the diversity of their members. In terms of size, the average coworking space has 82 
members, with the median being 45 members (Deskmag, 2018). The average size has grown 
over the years as evidenced by Figure 6, with larger spaces being built and existing spaces 
adding more space. In terms of the diversity of members, some coworking spaces allow anyone 
to work at their space as long as they are able to pay the rent, resulting in a mix of startup 
companies, small businesses, remote workers, freelancers, and independent contractors. Other 
coworking spaces choose to focus, perhaps on a particular group (e.g., startups or freelancers) or 
on a particular industry (e.g., media, software, FinTech, etc.). Approximately 81% of coworking 
spaces include individual members, 58% include companies with less than 10 employees, and 
approximately 10% include companies with more than 10 employees (Deskmag, 2018).  
Sponsors/partners. While approximately 82% of coworking spaces are for-profit 
businesses, only about 42% of all coworking spaces are actually profitable (Deskmag, 2018). 
Many coworking spaces do not collect enough rent to cover their expenses, and thus seek out 
funding from sponsorships by local governments, universities, and corporations. In addition, 
many coworking spaces collaborate with other organizations to coordinate events and initiatives. 
For example, many coworking spaces (66%, according to Deskmag, 2018) partner with local, 
purpose-driven organizations such as associations or meet-up groups. Many also partner with 
local service companies (45%), educational organizations (41%), other coworking spaces (36%), 
local government (35%), and real estate firms (23%). These partnerships help increase the value-
add of the coworking space by providing more offerings and interactions for members. 
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Given the substantial variation in sponsors, partners, and other stakeholders, it is perhaps 
not surprising that coworking spaces can vary in terms of design elements. These stakeholders 
establish these coworking spaces for a specific purpose, and should choose design elements of 
the coworking space that best meet that intended purpose. Similarly, founders should consider 
carefully these design elements before selecting a coworking space themselves. 
Differentiating Coworking from Other Entrepreneurial Support Organizations 
Although some relevant studies address the implications of accelerators, incubators, and 
maker spaces (Cohen, Bingham, and Hallen, 2018; Hallen, Cohen, and Bingham, 2018; Browder 
et al., 2019), coworking spaces are different in fundamental ways (see Table 18). One of the 
primary distinctions is the types of participants. Accelerators and incubators have formal 
application processes in which startup companies are selected based on their potential for growth 
(with accelerators typically having a more stringent application process than incubators). As 
such, accelerators and incubators tend to admit higher-quality startups that have ambitions to 
raise venture capital funding and go public. While these types of new ventures have been of great 
interest to entrepreneurship scholars, they represent only a tiny fraction of the total number of 
new ventures in a given year (Aldrich and Ruef, 2018). Coworking spaces, on the other hand, 
have no such selection process – anyone who can pay the rent is able to rent a space. As a result, 
coworking spaces are generally full of more “every day” entrepreneurs and have a much more 
diverse set of participants, including startups (of variable quality), small businesses, freelancers, 
independent workers, and remote workers from larger corporations. This is also different from 
the participants of maker spaces, who are generally individual inventors, hobbyists, or tinkerers. 
Thus, while people usually go to maker spaces for a few hours at a time to build a product or 
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experiment with different designs, people go to coworking spaces for office space in which to 
work on their full or part-time jobs.  
Other major differences include the amount of structure, the payment required, and 
resources provided. For example, accelerators are limited-duration programs, typically lasting 3-
6 months, in which cohorts of entrepreneurs are expected to attend trainings, meet with mentors, 
complete assignments, and meet certain milestones (Cohen et al., 2019a). Participants are 
typically required to give the accelerator an equity stake in their business, and in exchange, they 
receive a considerable amount of resources including seed capital, intensive mentoring/training, 
access to service providers, and office space in which to work while they are in the program. 
Incubators are also often limited-duration, though entrepreneurs typically spend more time in 
them (often 6-12 months). Although incubators do not offer formal programs, they generally 
have mentors, trainings, service providers, and space available on a fee-for-service basis. Maker 
spaces are different in that there is no structure; rather, the space offers a wide variety of 
hardware and software tools which members are free to use. These spaces are often free to a 
certain population (e.g., university-owned maker spaces are often free for faculty and students), 
but several for-profit maker spaces exist which charge a membership fee (Browder et al., 2019).  
Coworking spaces, however, are distinct. They are not limited-duration, in that tenants 
can stay for as long as they continue to pay the monthly rent. Also, other than the amenities 
discussed earlier (e.g., Internet, coffee, office furnishings, etc.), coworking spaces typically 
provide no hard resources such as seed capital or intensive mentoring. Instead, entrepreneurs rely 
on coworking spaces for (1) working space, but also (2) the community. The community aspect is 
perhaps what distinguishes coworking spaces the most from these other types of organizations. 
Although some work suggests that founders in accelerators and incubators benefit from their 
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relationships with the other founders in their cohort (Cohen et al., 2019b), this is typically a 
peripheral instead of primary motivation for applying to one of these programs. With coworking 
spaces, however, a primary motivation for joining is to work among a community of peers. If a 
founder only needed working space, many would be more inclined to simply work from home or 
from a coffee shop, library, or other public space. None of these spaces, however, provides the 
sense of community that exists in a coworking space. Overall, community represents the key 
aspect of coworking, and I discuss it in much more detail in the section below. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF COWORKING FOR FOUNDERS AND THEIR VENTURES 
 In this section, I now turn to the implications of coworking for entrepreneurs. Using the 
qualitative and quantitative data from Coworking Central, I lay a conceptual groundwork for 
how founders and their ventures might benefit (or not) from working in coworking spaces. As 
mentioned above, these data suggest that the benefits come not only from the coworking space 
itself, but also from the community within the space. In the two sections that follow, I first 
describe the benefits provided by the space, and I then describe the benefits provided by the 
community. 
Benefits of the Coworking Space 
Efficiency: Founders generally pay more per square foot at a coworking space than they 
would in a traditional office space. However, this is misleading because founders are buying 
more than space – they are also buying convenience. In a coworking space, a founder spends less 
time worrying about utilities, internet, security, furnishings, etc., and more time focused on 
building their company. For example, one founder said, "I don't have to worry about anything. 
It's just a monthly rent and everything is taken care of...I don't have to worry about maintenance 
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or worrying about when the Wi‐Fi goes out..." Given the many other challenges that 
entrepreneurs face when starting a new venture, coworking helps by taking care of many of the 
little problems so the founder can focus on other matters. In addition to the convenience factor, 
coworking spaces also give founders access to conference rooms, shared workspaces, free 
amenities, and other resources that otherwise they would not able to afford by themselves. As 
one founder put it, "It provides really nice access to things like…cool conference rooms, cool 
furniture, plants, coffee, etc.... Startups don't have a lot of money for these things. It's shared, but 
it makes it all accessible."  
Flexibility: Traditional office spaces typically require tenants to sign multi-year leases. 
Entrepreneurs are hesitant to do this because they do not know how quickly they will grow and 
need to move, or whether they will even be in business in a few months. As a result, 
conventional office space is often not an option. Coworking, however, provides a solution to this 
dilemma by offering month-to-month leases and flexible arrangements. As one founder put it, 
"Real estate is so frequently a constraint for entrepreneurs... coworking just about takes that off 
the table, because the commitment's so minimal..." Part of this flexibility is the modularity of the 
space. In other words, founders can start out by renting one or two desks, and then as they grow 
they can slowly add more desks or private offices. This can work in the opposite direction as 
well, in that if a company needs to shrink its headcount it can simply take away an office or desk. 
One founder said, "It's so modular and flexible…If you need more space, you add a new office. If 
you need to shrink, you get rid of one of your offices." Thus, although real estate is frequently a 
constraint, the modularity and flexibility of coworking spaces helps mitigate these issues. 
Legitimacy: The third benefit of the coworking space is that it can give entrepreneurs an 
extra degree of legitimacy. When founders work from home or out of a garage, one challenge is 
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that they have no place to host meetings with potential customers or investors. Oftentimes they 
are forced to take these meetings at a coffee shop or restaurant, but this is seldom ideal since the 
founder has no control over the environment, and the professional perception of the business is 
often decreased. Coworking provides a solution, as it allows founders to hold these meetings in a 
conference room in a professional setting. This can have a significant impact. For example, one 
founder said "I don't know where we'd be if we didn't work here... Honestly, it would have really 
constrained our growth potential because we couldn't have taken our client meetings at a home 
office or in a garage or at a coffee shop." In fact, a few of the founders I spoke with paid the 
monthly coworking fee for the sole purpose of using the conference rooms for client meetings.  
Overall, coworking spaces help overcome several issues related to real estate, which is 
frequently a constraint for entrepreneurs. The benefits include efficiency (by saving entrepreneurs 
time and money), flexibility (by allowing new ventures to grow or shrink on an as-needed basis), 
and legitimacy (by providing a professional setting where entrepreneurs can take clients, 
investors, or hires). These benefits, along with representative quotations from my interviews, are 
summarized in Table 19. 
Benefits of the Coworking Community 
Despite the many benefits of the space described above, my data suggest that the primary 
reason founders choose to work in a coworking space is not for the space itself, but rather for the 
community within the space17. The benefits that the community provides include (1) connections, 
                                                 
17 For example, in March 2020, Coworking Central’s state issued a “stay-at-home” order asking all citizens to stay at 
home for an extended period. When this happened, the operator of Coworking Central sent an email to all members 
saying, “While [Coworking Central] is certainly about space, it is even more about community and we know now, 
more than ever, we need to continue building that community even if it takes place online for the next few months.” 
Even though members were no longer able to use the space, many continued paying the coworking fee to have 
access to the community of other entrepreneurs.  
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(2) solutions, (3) energy/motivation, and (4) social support. These benefits are summarized in 
Table 20, and I provide more detail in the sub-sections below. 
Connections: Extant research suggests that entrepreneurs use both strong and weak ties 
to mobilize resources (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). Many of these studies also suggest that 
entrepreneurs tend to not search beyond their pre-existing networks (i.e., family, friends, former 
co-workers, etc.), meaning entrepreneurs are often constrained by their personal background 
(Clough et al., 2019; Ruef et al., 2003). However, when entrepreneurs join a coworking space, 
they automatically join a community of weak ties. Coworking spaces offer unprecedented 
opportunities for networking just by being in physical proximity to other startups, and through 
events and other formal activities offered. These interactions often lead to referrals for new 
clients, employees, investors, service providers, etc. For example, one founder said "You build a 
lot of connections, just people that you talk to when you're going to get coffee, things like that... a 
lot of those connections come to pay off over time where somebody knows an investor you want 
to meet with. They introduce you, or they talk to a potential customer about your product..." 
Many founders cited the ability to make connections as a key benefit of the coworking 
community. As one said, "I honestly feel that we probably would not be anywhere near as 
successful if it weren't for this place...We've had a lot of clients come from other people here 
through some sort of network effect." 
Solutions: Entrepreneurs, especially first-time entrepreneurs, often do not have the 
experience or knowledge to navigate the complexities of starting a new venture. As such, many 
entrepreneurs rely on help from other members of the community to solve problems and answer 
questions. For example, one founder said, "The community is big for entrepreneurs and I feel 
that you can reach out to anybody here, if you need to know something, learn something, and 
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that's huge when you're a startup." The community listserv was especially useful for this 
purpose, with founders constantly asking questions (e.g., “anyone have suggestions on writing a 
press release?” or “what do you use for payroll?”), and other founders responding with 
suggestions and solutions. As entrepreneurs developed relationships with other people in the 
community, they gained a better understanding of who had what knowledge or skillsets, and 
were able to take advantage accordingly. As one founder said, “For us to be able to go up a floor 
to solve a problem or down a floor to ask a question, is invaluable.” Overall, the coworking 
community can resolve many of the every-day practical challenges that entrepreneurs face when 
starting a new venture.  
Energy/motivation: Many of the entrepreneurs I interviewed mentioned the “buzz” or the 
“vibe” of the space as being an intangible yet important reason for working in the space. Being 
surrounded by other entrepreneurs is often energizing and motivating. For example, one founder 
said “You kind of see the same people all the time and see them progress. It pushes you too...We 
get energized by what's going on and the other community members.” The passion and intensity 
with which most entrepreneurs go about their work is usually contagious. One founder shared: 
“It's inspiring. It's nice to see so many people also so passionate about what they're doing. That's 
the common thread. It doesn't matter what it is they're doing, they're just passionate about it. 
And that feels good.” These feelings of energy and inspiration are generally a welcome change 
from working from home, where it is easy to feel isolated and disconnected from the rest of the 
world. This energy pushes entrepreneurs to work harder and gives them a sense of purpose.  
Social support: The entrepreneurial process can take a psychological toll on founders, as 
founding a new venture is an enormous task that requires countless hours of hard work, stress, 
isolation, ambiguity, and at times utter hopelessness. However, the friendships developed 
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between entrepreneurs in a coworking community can help alleviate some of these stresses. For 
example, one founder said, “When I’ve been able to sit down and have conversations with other 
entrepreneurs…you could say it’s a little bit like a therapy session, talking about all the ups and 
downs.” Another shared: “For me, it's really the social support... having other people to vent to if 
you have a project that's really frustrating or a client that's giving you trouble, or I'm just mad at 
my cofounder for some reason.” In addition, the community can help validate what the 
entrepreneur is doing. Many entrepreneurs have family and friends who do not understand why 
someone would work in a startup rather than having a high-paying and steady corporate job. This 
can make entrepreneurs doubt themselves. However, working alongside other like-minded 
entrepreneurs helps them feel validated, reminding them that they are doing something important 
and impactful. As one founder shared, "It's been helpful just psychologically to not feel like I'm 
off on my own doing some crazy thing, but that there are other people going through this... All 
my family and friends have stable jobs and are on a track. Those people are supportive but they 
also might think you're a little bit crazy. It's nice to be around the people who get it and they 
don't think you're crazy."  
Overall, most of my interviewees describe the community as invaluable. As one 
interviewee said, "There are so many advantages, honestly. I'm hesitating because I don't really 
know where to start. I think if you have an idea or you have a business in and around this area, 
in my opinion, this is the best place to start." As discussed above, these advantages include 
connections (to potential customers, hires, investors, etc.), solutions (ranging from important 
issues around product development to more mundane issues like setting up payroll), 
energy/motivation (emanating from the passion and purpose with which the community pursues 
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their projects), and social support (providing friendship and encouragement when times get 
tough). These benefits are only possible due to the concentration of entrepreneurs in one space. 
Intriguingly, my preliminary findings seem to suggest that entrepreneurs value the 
community more than the actual space itself. For example, one founder acknowledged the 
benefits of the space but shared “I think the big advantage is… this kind of community”… 
similarly, another briefly mentioned the benefits of the space but then said "The biggest value of 
[coworking], has been the friends you make along the way, would be the way to frame it. I've just 
been blown away by how giving the community is." A coworking community provides many 
benefits that have historically not been available to entrepreneurs, and they embraced it 
wholeheartedly. Founders expressed feelings such as "The benefits are innumerable. They've 
helped us immensely. We wouldn't be where we are right now without them,” or “You can make 
the most of your business here.” One founder put it more eloquently: 
"There's this idea that you are the average of the five people you spend the most time 
with. I think sometimes as a startup, it's almost similar, you're the average of the five 
startups you surround yourself with the most. And so I think the opportunity to be a part 
of a growing successful community… is that opportunity to surround yourself with other 
companies that are going after a lot of the same things. And so I can't imagine doing it 
another way." 
Potential Downsides of Coworking 
Though coworking offers several benefits, there are also potential downsides. I asked my 
interviewees what these might be (if any), and they offered several insights. Many of them were 
location-specific to Coworking Central (e.g., lack of parking options, office décor, the process 
for scheduling conference rooms, etc.), but interviewees also spoke at length about other 
concerns that would apply to most if not all coworking spaces. I discuss these below.  
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Distraction and loss of productivity. Coworking spaces can be crowded and noisy places. 
People will make calls, talk to each other, move around, and eat food within the working space. 
As a result, coworking spaces can be full of distractions and lead to a loss of productivity. One 
interviewee was considering moving out of coworking and into a private office for this reason 
and said, “The space isn't ideal for what we do. It can be very loud. It's not an ideal working 
space because of the traffic and noise.” This is consistent with past literature on open office 
designs, which suggests that employees in these spaces experience increased noise and 
distractions and decreased satisfaction and productivity (Oldham and Brass, 1979; Shalley, 
1995). In addition to the noise and other distractions occurring within the space, the community 
itself can also be distracting. As discussed above, many entrepreneurs rely on and benefit from 
other members of the community for connections, ideas/solutions, energy/motivation, and social 
support. However, these exchanges are often reciprocal, meaning that others within the 
community rely on the focal entrepreneur for the same things. As one entrepreneur put it, 
"sometimes you need to really, really focus on solving a problem, but then you might have 
somebody come to you with their own problem they want to talk to you about.” Another shared 
similar feelings, saying: 
“There’s almost too much social opportunity. People come in your office and just blah-
blah-blah. And I need to lock down and do some stuff. There have been days I’d come in 
and have a 40-minute conversation with someone, you get a couple, three of those in a 
day and you kinda kick the stuffing out of your productivity.”  
Similarly, although entrepreneurs can benefit from the events, trainings, and other 
amenities within the space, these can also become distracting if the entrepreneur engages in too 
many of them. As one founder put it, “You can get distracted pretty easily. There's a lot of folks 
that I've seen take advantage of every one of the happy hours and events and so forth. Those 
things are great, but maybe don't do all of them.” Overall, while the space and community 
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provide benefits, they are also full of distractions that can potentially decrease productivity and 
venture performance if the founder is not careful. 
Failing slow. When creating new ventures, many entrepreneurs follow the mantra “fail 
fast, fail cheap, and move on” (Saxenian, 1994). Similarly, past literature takes a relatively 
positive view of failure, suggesting that it is part of exploratory learning and is an integral part of 
the innovation and entrepreneurship process (Khanna et al., 2016). These studies suggest that 
failure provides valuable feedback, and can improve the chances of success for future 
entrepreneurial efforts (Eggers and Song, 2015). For example, IDEO, one of the most innovative 
and premier design firms in the world, follows the slogan: “fail often in order to succeed sooner.” 
Consistent with these notions, past studies find that high failure rates of firms actually goes hand-
in-hand with the economic growth of a society (Birch, 1979; Lee et al., 2007), and that many 
failed entrepreneurs eventually succeed and become the sources of entirely new industries 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988).  
In coworking spaces, however, it is possible (though further analysis is required) that 
entrepreneurs may encourage entrepreneurs to stick with their ventures longer than they would 
otherwise, and thus actually fail slower. Several of the entrepreneurs I spoke with indicated that 
this might be the case. They explained how the other members of the coworking community 
became their best friends, and how these friends encouraged each other not to give up and to 
keep persisting. On one hand, this can be beneficial as mentioned above, because it gives 
entrepreneurs the confidence and social support they need to persist and succeed. At the same 
time, however, this can actually cause entrepreneurs to drag their feet and take a longer time to 
abandon a failed venture. They do not want to leave and disappoint all of these friends, 
especially when their friends are telling them “don’t give up, you can make it if you just keep 
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going!” More data and more analysis is required to better understand the effects of coworking on 
time to failure, but this initial exploratory analysis suggests that in some cases it may prolong the 
inevitable. 
Who Benefits the Most? 
Having established the benefits and downsides of coworking, the natural follow-up 
question is whether some entrepreneurs benefit more than others. In this section, I discuss 
evidence from my survey data to provide insight into this question. These data provide a rich set 
of variables that allows me to document associations between individual characteristics and the 
sense of community they feel. However, these documented associations are simply that; given 
the lack of exogenous variation, I am unable to make causal claims with these data. A fruitful 
area for future research will be to further test and explore the causality behind the correlations 
presented here.  
I rely on four different measures of coworking members’ experience within the 
community. The first is Sense_of_Community, which is a three-item scale measuring the extent 
to which the respondent feels a part of the community. Second, I look at 
Engagement_in_Community, a three-item scale measuring the extent to which the respondent is 
actively engaged in interacting with the community. The third is Importance_of_Community, a 
three-item scale measuring how important a sense of community is to the respondent. The fourth 
variable, Investors_from_Community, measures the more tangible benefits gained from the 
community. Specifically, it is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 with higher numbers 
indicating that a higher percentage of the founder’s investors were introduced to them by 
members of the community. I discuss these and the various independent variables in more detail 
in Appendix A.  
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Table 21 presents an OLS regression of who feels the most sense of community in the 
space. The subsequent sections describe the primary insights. 
Teams vs. individuals. I first examine whether individuals (i.e., solopreneurs, freelancers, 
etc.) or startup teams benefit more from coworking spaces. The little work that does exist on 
coworking (Spreitzer et al., 2015a; 2015b; Garrett et al., 2017) suggests that coworking is most 
beneficial for individuals. The logic is that teams already have some sense of community from 
their other team members, and thus would not need to rely on the coworking community as much 
as individuals. Some of the individuals I interviewed expressed this same notion, saying, "I like 
the community. Definitely as a sole founder, if I am working alone somewhere, it's better to work 
around a lot of other companies and kind of feed off their energy." In fact, Garrett et al. (2017) 
studied one coworking space that resisted teams altogether and would only allow individuals to 
work in their space. Their fear was that sub-groups would form and that the teams would only 
associate with their fellow team members and not with others in the community, and they wanted 
to avoid that as much as possible.  
 However, the results of Table 21 suggest that teams are actually more involved in the 
community and feel more of a sense of community than individuals. My interviews suggest some 
insight into why this may be the case. For example, I interviewed one founding team that 
consisted of two brothers starting a software company. The first brother was more reserved and 
had a difficult time meeting others in the community by himself. The second brother, however, 
was very outgoing and loved meeting new people. The first brother described the second brother 
as being “halfway the Mayor… he knows a ton of people.” Thus, the second brother built many 
relationships with other people in the coworking space and then introduced these people to his 
brother. I interviewed another team with a similar dynamic. The team consisted of three 
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founders, two of whom were not always great at meeting new people. However, they described 
their third founder as having “connections out the wazoo… he knows everybody…” Once again, 
this founder would meet new people in the space on a regular basis, and then introduce them to 
his two other founders. As a result, this founder helped his two cofounders become more 
involved in and committed to the community, whereas if they had been working in the space 
individually they might not have interacted much at all with others. Thus, teams are likely to 
benefit more in coworking spaces because team members’ strong ties (Granovetter, 1977) with 
each other help them connect to one another’s weak ties. 
Experienced vs. inexperienced entrepreneurs. Prior research finds that entrepreneurs 
with prior startup experience are more successful on average compared to other entrepreneurs 
(Delmar and Shane, 2006; Eesley and Roberts, 2012; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016). There are 
several reasons for this. First, whether or not their ventures are successful, entrepreneurs can still 
benefit from founding a new venture by gaining valuable knowledge and experience (Shane and 
Khurana, 2003; Baron and Ensely, 2006). Specifically, entrepreneurs gain experience in creating 
products, recruiting talent, raising funds, and structuring roles and incentives, much of which can 
transfer to the new venture. In general, prior startup experience provides the entrepreneurs with a 
certain type of human capital that is difficult to replicate in other ways (Delmar and Shane, 
2006). Second, and in addition to gaining experience, entrepreneurs typically build valuable 
relationships (with investors, key industry players, etc.) through their prior startup experience 
that should increase their next venture’s chances of success. These relationships can help 
facilitate resource acquisition and provide legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders, and thus 
reduces the venture’s liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965).  
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Given the advantages of prior startup experience, novice entrepreneurs are often at a 
disadvantage and require more help and guidance, and may need to rely on the coworking 
community more. Consistent with this notion, the results of Table 21 suggest that entrepreneurs 
with no prior startup experience report greater involvement in the community and feel a greater 
sense of community. This is also consistent with the evidence from my interviews, in which 
many of the first-time founders expressed how essential the community was for them. For 
example, one founder came from a long career in coding software, but had never before founded 
his own company. After talking about the challenges associated with launching a new venture, he 
shared: 
"I've been really lucky in this community at [Coworking Central]. I've been able to find 
myself surrounded by people who literally want to help me. They'll throw themselves 
upon the gears to help you out. So all you have to do is insert yourself through a 
conversation or find a way to ask and there, you've got the help you need, it's right 
there." 
Overall, first-time entrepreneurs are more likely to need and want help from the 
community relative to experienced entrepreneurs who may already have much of the experience 
and relationships they need.  
 Minority vs. non-minority entrepreneurs. Past research suggests that racial minorities 
are underrepresented in entrepreneurship, as they face additional hurdles that non-minority 
founders do not experience. First, past studies suggest that minority entrepreneurs possess fewer 
average resources at time of founding relative to non-minorities. For example, Fairlie and Robb 
(2007) analyze data from the Characteristics of Business Owners survey and find that African 
American founders are much less likely than white founders to have had a self-employed family 
member prior to starting their business. They are also less likely to have worked in the family 
member’s business, leading to lower general and specific human capital at time of founding. In 
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addition to having fewer resources at time of founding, past studies suggest that it is also more 
difficult for minority entrepreneurs to obtain resources after founding, as many investors hold 
implicit or explicit biases against racial minorities making it harder to obtain both credit 
(Freeland and Keister, 2016) and investment (Younkin and Kuppuswamy, 2018).  
In light of this prior research, it is unclear whether minorities or non-minorities will 
benefit more from a coworking community. On one hand, minority entrepreneurs may 
experience some of this same discrimination within the coworking community, making it harder 
to form connections with other community members and take advantage of everything the space 
has to offer. On the other hand, however, it is possible that minority founders will engage more 
with the community as they may be less likely to have other founders within their informal 
networks, and thus may need and benefit more from the coworking community.  
The results of Table 21 support the latter view, and suggest that minority founders have a 
much different community experience than non-minorities. Specifically, minorities are more 
likely to be engaged in the community, to feel a sense of community, to place importance on the 
community, and to find a greater percentage of their investors from the community. One African-
American founder I interviewed discussed the challenges he had faced as a minority 
entrepreneur, sharing the following:  
“Having had a difficult time finding affordable financing…I don't come from a 
background with a ton of resources, and so to be able to experiment under this type of 
roof… is invaluable. You are able to vet your ideas if you have them. You are able to 
partner with different companies... You are able to take part in events…There are so 
many different ways to plug into the ecosystem, all under one roof.” 
Overall, minority founders appear to engage more in and benefit more from the 
coworking community. This is broadly consistent with other prior studies, which suggest that 
minorities tend to exhibit higher levels of collectivism (orientation toward the well-being of the 
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larger community), and thus place more of an emphasis on and spend more time within the 
community (Gaines et al., 1997). This is further reason to study the effects of coworking, and 
future research should continue to examine whether coworking communities can help address the 
troubling low rate of business ownership among disadvantaged groups (Fairlie and Robb, 2007). 
 Entrepreneurs with market vs. non-market logics. Past research broadly categorizes 
entrepreneurs as having either a market logic or nonmarket logic (Clough et al., 2019). A market 
logic refers to action guided by economic rationality and self-interest. Entrepreneurs with a 
market logic generally view the purpose of their startups through the lens of profit maximization, 
and focus more on financial metrics compared to other founders (Almondoz, 2014). Individuals 
with a nonmarket logic, in contrast, engage in action that is motivated by and oriented toward a 
higher goal than self-interest, such as family, religion, or community. (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). Entrepreneurs with a nonmarket logic are not likely to view their startups exclusively 
through a profit-maximization lens, and more likely to view it through the lens of their ongoing 
social relations and cultural context (Almondoz, 2014; Clough et al., 2019). Given these different 
priorities and motivations, entrepreneurs with a nonmarket logic will likely be more involved 
with and benefit more from the coworking community relative to those with a market logic.  
 The results of Table 21 support this assumption. Specifically, entrepreneurs with a market 
logic are less likely to be engaged in the community, to feel a sense of community, to place 
importance on community, and to find more of their investors through the community. My 
interviews further confirmed this. For example, one founder who operated under more of a 
market logic shared the following: 
“I work here because there’s nowhere else to work… We can’t get and we don’t want to 
get a 5-year lease somewhere else at this stage. That’s a lot of money. Coworking 
Central has favorable and flexible lease terms, and it’s just really convenient. It’s just a 
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good office. I haven’t really taken advantage of the fringe benefits. I’m not really social 
with the other companies here… I don’t really get involved in a lot of the other stuff…if 
another coworking space opens up across the street and has better lease terms and 
parking, then I will probably move over there. That’s the reality of it.” 
 This founder placed little importance on community, and was primarily in the coworking 
space for the space itself. This is in contrast to another founder who operated under more of a 
nonmarket logic and shared: 
“I have built a community here… and this felt good to be here…it’s where I want to be. 
We thought about moving the headquarters to [another city], because there's just so 
much more money there, but we decided for now that…this community is home… We 
could have an office at this point, but I don't want one, because I love getting to sit with 
people and not feel like it's just us. [Members of the community] have spent hours with 
me… their own time, that wasn’t during work hours… introduce me to anybody that I was 
asking to be introduced to… just that community, is huge.” 
Overall, while founders with a market logic may benefit from the efficiency and 
flexibility of the coworking space, they will be less likely to become involved and benefit from 
the coworking community. Founders with a nonmarket logic, in contrast, are likely to benefit 
from both.  
Founders vs. employees. As discussed previously, coworking spaces have a diverse 
group of people. Some of these individuals are founders creating their own ventures, whereas 
others are employees who are either working for those founders or working remotely for some 
other organization. These two types of people – founders vs. employees – are different in many 
ways (Roach and Sauermann, 2015). For employees, the job is often just that; a job. Founders, 
however, are often personally, financially, and emotionally invested in their ventures. Because of 
this, founding a new venture can be an emotional roller coaster, often taking a psychological toll 
on founders as discussed above (Wasserman, 2012). As such, it is likely that founders are more 
likely to seek out and rely on the community more than employees.  
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This is consistent with the evidence of Table 21, which suggests that founders are more 
likely to be engaged in the community, feel a sense of community, and place more importance on 
the community relative to employees. My interview evidence suggests that by simply bringing 
together a group of founders experiencing many of the same things, coworking spaces can offer a 
welcome relief. For example, one founder who had employees shared the following:  
“As a CEO founder… you’re on an island. Being in a place like Coworking Central, 
you’re not on an island anymore. Well, you’re on an island, with several other people 
around you. You can wave at each other, bump into each other, kind of be able to share 
that energy. That optimism. And then actually literal ideas, tactics. So one of the most 
valuable things for me is having some kind of cadence of meetings with other CEO 
founders that are approximately the same stage as my company, or maybe a step ahead. 
It’s just the most valuable interactions that I have. I have something where I’m getting 
groups of founders on a regular occasion. I have no specific ask or agenda when I show 
up there, but it just helps.”  
By simply listening, supporting, and sharing the emotional highs and lows with the 
founder, other founders in the coworking community can often provide much of the emotional 
and psychological support that founders crave during the founding process. Employees, who do 
not face the same challenges and pressures as founders, are likely to want and need the overall 
coworking community less.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Coworking spaces represent a novel type of workspace for entrepreneurs. Given the rapid 
rise of the phenomenon, the implications of coworking are largely unstudied. This paper offers 
some exploratory insights into what coworking is, how it works, and what implications it might 
have for entrepreneurship. One of the most fundamental aspects of coworking spaces, which sets 
it apart from other entrepreneurship support organizations (e.g., accelerators, incubators, maker 
spaces, etc.), is the community aspect. The community helps founders solve problems, give 
feedback and new ideas, or just simply provide friends and social support when times get tough. 
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Overall, the data suggest that coworking spaces are providing unprecedented ways for 
entrepreneurs to form communities with each other and thus interact with, learn from, and mimic 
their peers. 
I close this paper by proposing a research agenda to further our understanding of the 
implications of coworking for both research and practice. In addition to further research on 
coworking itself, coworking spaces offer researchers a host of opportunities to advance many 
theories in management, entrepreneurship, and organizations. I highlight several of these theories 
below, and discuss how coworking might provide a useful context in which to gather new 
insights.  
Social capital: Social capital theory is an important analytical lens for understanding 
strategic actions and outcomes in entrepreneurial firms (Aldrich and Kim, 2007; Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Scholars argue that founders’ networks can influence the 
identification of opportunities, facilitate innovation, confer status, and assist in the mobilization 
of resources. Past literature typically conceptualizes entrepreneurs as actors situated in social 
structures comprised of strong ties (e.g., family and friends), weak ties (e.g., casual 
acquaintances), and unfamiliar persons and strangers (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Granovetter, 
1977). Although prior literature typically assumes that the search for resources is restricted to the 
close social ties of the entrepreneur (Clough et al., 2019), recent research portrays entrepreneurs 
as more proactive actors who attempt to break out of their social structure constraints and pursue 
new connections through networking (Vissa, 2012; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). Coworking 
spaces provide a unique opportunity in which to do this. While prior research typically examines 
how entrepreneurs build ties with investors, partners, and other resource providers, there is little 
research on ties among entrepreneurs themselves. It is possible that coworking spaces can act as 
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a new source of social capital, in which a community of entrepreneurs interacts with and engages 
in helping each other succeed by providing referrals and introductions to key stakeholders 
(customers, investors, employees, etc.). Much more work is needed to understand how this type 
of social capital may interact with or substitute for other types of social capital in relation to new 
venture performance. 
Organizational design/boundaries. Theories of organizational design and boundaries are 
a central focus of research in strategy and organizations research. Past research often defines 
organizational boundaries as the demarcation between the organization and its environment 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005), and represent the social structure that constitutes an organization 
and influence how the organization processes information. Recently, however, more studies 
examine various socioeconomic changes that blur organization boundaries, including open 
innovation, crowdsourcing, and online communities (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony 
and Beckhy, 2008) as well as the rise of the sharing economy (Ashford et al., 2007). Coworking 
is a similar phenomenon, in which organizational boundaries are blurred. Entrepreneurs and 
other nontraditional workers often identify not only as members of their own organizations, but 
also as members of the coworking space and community in which they are nested (Garrett et al., 
2017). Even though they work separately on their individual ventures or projects, members of the 
coworking community develop a collective identity that ties them together. This may be 
especially true for “all-remote” organizations, a recent phenomenon in which an organization has 
no central office or headquarters, but rather allows its employees to work in coworking spaces 
wherever they reside throughout the globe (Rhymer, 2018). Overall, coworking spaces offer an 
interesting and potentially fruitful context to study new questions around organizational design 
and boundaries.  
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Spatial proximity and its impact on innovation, knowledge sharing, and spillovers. Past 
research suggests that location is a key parameter that firms can use to help increase their 
exposure to potential knowledge spillovers (Alcacer and Chung, 2007; Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Jaffe et al., 1993). Given that knowledge is inherently tacit and localized, the transfer of 
knowledge requires frequent interaction, something that is facilitated by proximity of location. 
Because of this, the topic of location strategies has been a focus of research in organizations. In 
entrepreneurial organizations specifically, past studies suggest that new ventures survive and 
thrive at higher rates in certain entrepreneurial clusters. These clusters have greater access to 
capital and technical talent, closer proximity to research universities and industry partners, and a 
greater number of specialized firms that focus on start-up needs (Feld, 2012). The knowledge 
and capabilities that build up in these clusters can help new ventures access cutting-edge 
technologies and nonpublic market information they need to succeed (Spigel and Harrison, 
2017). While this literature takes a more macro view and focuses on overall founding and 
survival rates by region, coworking spaces offer an interesting context in which to study more 
localized knowledge sharing and spillovers. Ventures in coworking spaces are physically located 
next to other ventures with whom they either collaborate or compete. More research is required 
to understand whether and how this co-location affects innovation, knowledge sharing, and 
knowledge spillovers among fellow entrepreneurial colleagues.  
In addition to providing new avenues of research for the theories above, coworking 
spaces can also act as a useful context in which to collect data for other entrepreneurship studies. 
The field of entrepreneurship research is disproportionately focused on “unicorns” and other 
high-growth, VC-backed startups (Aldrich and Ruef, 2018). Relatively fewer studies examine 
startups at the youngest stages of development. This is partially because data on early-stage 
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entrepreneurs is difficult to collect, as companies form and dissolve all the time before entering 
any database, thus making them invisible to researchers. Coworking spaces, however, offer an 
excellent location in which to find and collect data on these early-stage entrepreneurs. These 
spaces are typically full of more “every day” entrepreneurs and startups of variable quality, 
potentially offering a much-needed window into the startup process. Thus, future studies could 
benefit from going to coworking spaces for their sample selection, even if their research question 
does not focus on coworking itself.  
CONCLUSION 
Coworking spaces represent a novel type of workspace for entrepreneurs. Given its rapid 
rise, the implications of coworking are largely unstudied. This paper takes an exploratory 
empirical approach and sheds light into what coworking is, how it works, and what implications 
it might have for entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship research. By so doing, I provide an initial 
foundation for studying the coworking movement, the conditions under which it may improve 
entrepreneurial outcomes, and the various research streams it can enrich. Overall, the data 
suggest that coworking spaces are providing unprecedented ways for entrepreneurs to form 
communities with each other and thus interact with, learn from, and mimic their peers.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Without founders, organizations would not exist. Founders’ early choices leave an 
imprint on the procedures, policies, and culture of the organizations throughout the duration of 
its lifetime. Thus, as the original architects of their organizations, founders have a 
disproportionate influence on the structure and strategy of organizations (Nelson, 2003), and as 
such they have been an important focus of research in strategy, entrepreneurship, and 
organization theory.  
 Less studied, however, are other actors who work closely with the founder and play 
supporting roles throughout the entrepreneurial process. Yet, my data and analysis suggest that 
there is often a constellation of people surrounding the founder and co-creating the venture along 
with them. These hidden figures, which are rarely observed in entrepreneurial data, seldom 
receive the same recognition, credit, or glory as founders for creating the organization, despite 
playing an outsize role in venture success. Yet, they may very account for much of the 
unexplained differences between successful and unsuccessful ventures. 
 The three essays included in this dissertation address several of these supporting actors. 
The first essay examines the important (yet understudied) differences between solo-founded 
ventures and co-founded ventures. I find that although solo founders face many challenges by 
not having cofounders, they can overcome these challenges through “co-creators” such as 
alliance partners, employees, benefactors, and an emotional support network. The implications 
are that although cofounders are beneficial, they are not necessary, and sometimes not even 
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preferred. The second essay examines the prevalence and implications of a “second-in-
command” among founder-led firms. I find that founder CEOs are much more likely to have a 
second-in-command, and benefit much more from a second-in-command relative to other, 
professional CEOs. Finally, the third essay explores the increasingly popular phenomenon of 
coworking spaces, in which communities of founders interact with, learn from, and help one 
another. The initial framework presented in this study offers a foundation upon which future 
studies in entrepreneurship, strategy, and organization theory can examine the coworking 
movement.  
Though these essays shed light on several actors supporting founders, many others 
remain underexplored and offer opportunities for future research. For example, past research 
suggests that many entrepreneurs rely on a network of individual mentors or advisors (Ozgen & 
Baron, 2007; Saxton et al., 2016; Burton et al., 2009), but little is still known about how and 
when they impact ideation, new venture creation, and performance outcomes. Similarly, other 
entrepreneurial support organizations are becoming more common such as accelerators (Cohen 
et al., 2019b; Hallen et al., 2020), pitch competitions (Kanze et al., 2018), and foundations 
awarding grants (Spigel, 2017), and there are many unanswered questions around how these 
organizations impact venture processes and outcomes. In particular, one concept emerging from 
this dissertation – the concept of benefactors – requires additional examination. Though Essay 1 
provides some examples of benefactors and the types of resources they provide, there are likely 
many other potential types of benefactors in practice. For example, benefactors can also come in 
the form of friends, family members, acquaintances, or anyone else who freely gives of their 
time, expertise, and resources to entrepreneurs. Future work should more fully explore this 
phenomenon and its impact on venture outcomes. More broadly, future work should examine 
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other important questions such as why do some founders seek the help of others, while others do 
not? What type of support is best for different types of founders? How does the support differ 
depending on the relationship between founder and supporter (e.g., family member, friend, 
acquaintance, or stranger)? 
In addition, there is still much to be done to understand the impact of coworking spaces 
on founders and entrepreneurial ecosystems at large. Many industry leaders expect that 
coworking will continue to grow exponentially in popularity and importance for new ventures 
(GCUC, 2017). Even at their current level, the implications of coworking should be of interest to 
many theories in management, entrepreneurship, and organizations. For example, social capital 
theory has long identified the importance of network effects in entrepreneurship (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Coworking spaces provide a unique source of social 
capital, in which a community of entrepreneurs is engaged in helping each other succeed by 
providing referrals and introductions to key stakeholders (customers, investors, employees, etc.). 
More work is required to understand how this type of social capital may interact with or 
substitute for other types of social capital in relation to new venture performance. In addition, 
past research in organizational design has addressed the importance of geographic and spatial 
proximity to innovation, knowledge spillovers, and collaboration (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Jaffe et al., 1993). Coworking spaces offer an interesting context to study and extend these 
theories, as new ventures in these spaces are often physically located next to other ventures with 
whom they either collaborate or compete. In addition, the organizational and physical boundaries 
of new ventures diverge in coworking spaces, because some teams from the same organization 
are split into different physical locations, whereas in others there are teams from several 
organizations in the same co-working space. This could allow future scholars to tease apart the 
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effects of organizational identity and spatial proximity on outcomes such as innovation and 







CHARTS, TABLES, AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Factors that Trigger Destructive Conflict in Founding Teams 




Conflict arises when one co-founder is more committed 
to the venture than the other. The more committed co-
founder usually becomes frustrated that the other co-
founders are not pulling their weight. 
+1 if one founder was full-




“As the business was growing, [my cofounders] started to do less and 
less. Less involvement in the business...there were some failures to 




Conflict can arise when there is no clear leader to make 
decisions. When founders split decision rights equally, it 
often leads to gridlock and resentment as founders 
debate every decision that must be made.  
+1 if the founders split 




“We want to operate collaboratively and have the four of us on equal 
terms and equal decision making... But it's hard to run a business that 
way. It sounds great in theory, but at some point you need someone 
to make an executive decision and move on… Without having that 
defined person… it's been hard to actually get decisions made and 




When co-founders have prior shared working 
experience, they are more likely to know how each other 
works, thus reducing chances for conflict. 
+1 if none of the founders 
previously worked together   
+0.5 if some founders 
worked together previously, 
but not all  
Shah et al., 
2019; Zheng 
(2012) 
“Neither [my first cofounder] nor I had worked directly with [my 
second cofounder] before… and it just didn't work. It was clash of 




Although prior shared work experience can be helpful, 
co-founding a startup together is still very different from 
being co-workers. Founders must have difficult 
conversations about roles, equity, personal finances, and 
other issues unique to co-founding relationships. 
+1 if the founders had not 
previously founded a 





“We had to have the difficult conversation of who would actually be 
CEO… we had to start talking about equity splits, and that was the 
first time that we were on different sides of the table rather than 
allies. We had to compete for something or split something… those 
were definitely awkward.” 
Idea before 
team 
Conflict is less likely to occur when the team forms the 
idea together, as opposed to one individual forming the 
idea and then assembling the team. When a team 
chooses and nurtures an idea together, the shared 
cohesion and excitement helps the team stick together 
even during difficult times. 
+1 if the team did not 
develop the idea together 
Guericke 
(2017) 
“So we basically decided [on the idea] together…I don't think we've 
ever had major tensions. Or even strategic disagreements about the 





Conflict is harder to resolve when cofounders are not 
located in the same geographic area. Communication is 
much easier when cofounders are co-located and can 
resolve disagreements face-to-face. 
+1 if the founders did not 






“We just completely disagreed … we were having a lot of video 
conferences… and we were just not getting through to one another. 
And it took us a really long time to realize we need to be in the same 
room to work through this problem, and so we drove midway 
point… and just locked ourselves in a team room and really hashed it 
out…but it took us a while to realize we need to just actually be in 
the room. Video's not gonna cut it for a problem this big.” 
Faultlines The teams literature finds many predictors of team 
conflict, with one of the most important being 
demographic faultlines. When team members differ 
across a range of characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race), 
conflict is more likely to occur 
+0.33 if the founders were 
not all the same gender 
+0.33 if the founders were 
not all the same race 
+0.33 if the age difference 




“I'm not as close with [my other co-founder]. He's German, so he 
doesn't get our humor. ..We have to lay out, like, very detailed 
instructions, even the slightest thing that doesn't get communicated 
properly can turn out like <expletive>” 
Note: Table 1 summarizes the seven factors used to create the “conflict index,” which is discussed in more detail in the methods section. To develop this list, I first reviewed prior 
literature to assess which factors were deemed to be associated with relationship conflict (i.e., destructive conflict) within founding teams. I then reviewed my interview evidence 























0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 7 0.900 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 0.898 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 0.909 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0.879 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0.849 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.124 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0.305 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0.462 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 0.507 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0.412 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.500 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.398 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.153 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.789 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.788 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.746 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.549 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.495 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.490 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.431 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.333 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.262 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.000 
 







Table 3: Configurations Leading to High and Low Performance 
 
Panel A: Simplified Depiction of Results 
 Pathways Leading to High Performance 
Condition Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 
Co-Founders     
Alliance partner     
Employees     
Benefactor     
Emotional support network     
Serial founder     
Product expertise     
Conflict triggers X X X X 
Note: For ease of interpretation, Panel A of Table 3 provides a simplified depiction of my results. Green checks indicate the condition must be present, and red X’s indicate the condition must be absent. 
Blank spaces indicate the condition is not relevant to that particular configuration (i.e., it may be either present or absent). For a more detailed overview of my results, refer to Panel B of Table 3.  
 
Panel B: Detailed Version of Results 
 Configurations leading to high performance  Configurations leading to not high performance 
Explanatory conditions 1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 5 
Co-Founders     
  
     
Alliance partner     
  
     
Employees     
  
     
Benefactor     
  
     
Emotional support network     
  
     
Serial founder     
  
     
Product expertise     
  
     
Conflict triggers     
  
     
 
           
Consistency 0.825 0.906 1.000 0.898   0.862 0.929 0.883 0.913 0.878 
Raw coverage 0.302 0.124 0.124 0.183   0.275 0.219 0.110 0.275 0.425 
Unique coverage 0.271 0.081 0.074 0.162   0.071 0.022 0.013 0.039 0.190 
 Solution consistency: 0.877 
Solution coverage: 0.660 
    Solution consistency: 0.862 
   Solution coverage: 0.789 
Note: Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, and open circles indicate its absence. Blank spaces without a circle indicate that the condition is not relevant to that particular configuration (i.e., 
it may be either present or absent). Following Ragin & Fiss (2008), we display the intermediate solutions with larger circles representing “core” conditions, and smaller circles indicating “periphery” or 
contributing conditions. Table 3 reports measures of consistency and coverage for each configuration. Consistency refers to the degree to which cases in that configuration exhibit the outcome. Raw 
coverage shows the total percentage of cases that are members of that particular configuration. Given that some cases can be members of multiple configurations, we also show unique coverage which 
represents the percentage of cases that are exclusively a member of that particular configuration. The overall solution that explains high performance has a consistency of 0.877, and the solution that 
explains low performance has an overall consistency of 0.862. These are above the 0.80 consistency threshold that past research deems acceptable (Fiss, 2011). Coverage, which measures the extent to 







Table 4: Analyasis of Necessary Conditions 
Condition or configuration Consistency z-score 
Co-Founders 0.47 -5.90 
Alliance partners 0.17 -11.09 
Employees 0.20 -10.57 
Benefactors 0.29 -9.01 
Support network 0.66 -1.57 
Serial founder 0.22 -10.23 
Product expertise 0.81 0.34 
~Conflict triggers 0.89 1.38* 
Co-Founder OR Alliances OR Employees OR Benefactor 0.93 2.07** 
Co-Founder OR Emotional Support Network OR Serial Founder 0.90 1.55* 
 
Note: The symbol ~ indicates the absence of the condition (e.g., “~conflict” refers to the absence of conflict). The z-scores were calculated using the formula found in Ragin 
(2000): z = ((c – b) – 1 / 2n) / sqrt((b*(1-b))/n), where c is the observed consistency, b is the benchmark consistency (0.8 in this case), and n is the number of cases that have 
nonzero membership in the outcome. This z-score assesses the probability that the observed consistency is greater than the benchmark consistency. Conditions or configurations 
that are significantly above the 0.8 benchmark (frequently used in past studies – Ragin, 2000) are considered “almost always necessary” for performance. Using a standard normal 











Table 5: Comparing Co-Founders and Co-Creators 
 
    Co-Creators  
Category Co-founders Employees Alliances Benefactors Emotional support 
Compensation Large portions of equity and 
voting rights, and sometimes 
small salary 
Salary, benefits, and 
sometimes a small 
portion of equity 
Royalties, portion of 





“Spousal” (a very close 
relationship that resembles 
more of a marriage than 
anything else) 
“Professional” (a more 
hierarchal relationship 
where the employee is 
subordinate to the 
founder) 
“Contractual” (terms 
of relationship are 
written down and 
formalized in a 
contract) 
“Personal” (typically 
individuals who have a 
personal interest in 
helping the founder 
succeed)  
“Personal” (typically a 
spouse, peer founders, 
or mentors/advisors) 
Degree of control High Low Low Very low Very low 
Resources 
provided 




sometimes social capital 
Can contribute human, 
social, or financial 
capital, depending on 
type of alliance 
Can contribute human, 
social, or financial 
capital, depending on 




Medium to high (depends on 
prior shared experience, with 
less prior shared experience 
meaning more coordination) 
High (usually require 
more monitoring than 
co-founders, as they are 




boundaries can add 
additional costs and 
complexities) 
Low (benefactors tend 
to give the resource 
freely, with little or no 
coordination required) 






High (co-founders have 
shared experiences and 
challenges, allowing them to 
understand each other better 
than anyone else) 
Medium to low (depends 
on relationship, but 




Low (nonexistent, as 




Low (none – they 
provide resources 
rather than emotional/ 
psychological support) 
Medium to high 
(usually not a perfect 
substitute for co-





High (the long-term and 
high-stakes nature of co-
founding relationships makes 
them prone to conflict) 
Medium to low (conflict 
can arise, but when it 
does, it is much easier to 
remove the individual) 
Medium to low 
(conflict can arise, but 
when it does, it is 
much easier to end the 
relationship) 
Low (conflict can arise, 
but when it does, the 
benefactor has no claim 
on the firm) 
Low (conflict can arise, 
but when it does, the 
individuals have no 
claim on the firm) 
 





Table 6: Motivations for Choosing to be a Solo Founder or Co-Founder 
 
Reason Explanation Representative quotations from interviews 




The more founders 
there are, the more 
opportunities there 
are for conflict to 
arise. Many 
founders go solo to 
avoid this conflict.  
 "I've heard such horror stories about having bad co-founders. I am 
really leery about [it]...It's a long process to find someone and ...I hear 
horror stories. And I don't want to get caught with something like that." 
 "I've heard the horror stories. It's just like having a coworker you don't 
like and y'all have to work on a project...It's that scenario that scares 
me" 
 "If [I had a co-founder who] had something that they didn't want to 
focus on that I felt really passionate that I needed to, that would've 
really thrown me off. That was actually one of my fears, which is why I 
don't have a co-founder. I just didn't want to have to consider 





are very interested 
in the non-
pecuniary benefits 
of control. Solo 
founders enjoy a 
great deal of 
control. 
 "I would say that my personality... I tend to just want to do things my 
own way. I really just want to have my own business [and be] a solo 
founder making the decisions... " 
 "In terms of control of the company, I prefer to maintain that because I 
do have a vision of where it wants to grow and take it...In terms of the 
technology stack control, that's something I intend to maintain control 
of no matter what." 
 “As a sole founder you have a lot of leeway to take things in the 
direction that you see the best fit.” 




like being solo 
founders not 
because it helps 
their business, but 
because it helps 
them grow and 
develop personally. 
They enjoy 
learning new things 
and wearing all 
hats. 
 "[Being a solo founder] has been incredibly revelatory for me in terms 
of growth and development as a person, as a father, as a husband, as a 
partner. I realized now a lot more things about myself than I ever did, 
and that's been invaluable and truly that's priceless…I don't think you 
get that just kinda going through it with a group because the blame 
instinct is just that, it's an instinct, you won't take as critical a look at 
yourself." 
 "It's forcing me to work in areas I have zero exposure to, which I love 
to learn, it's exciting to kind of put on some of those other hats and 
learn about teachability and a marketing plan and how to create viral 
content... It's just something I haven't explored before, it's really cool." 
 "I think that I have a lot of different skills besides the software 
development and I want to be using them, and I think having my own 
business allows me to do that." 
Why would founders still choose co-founders, even if they have access to co-creators? 





prefer to have 
someone “in the 
trenches” with 
them day-to-day. 
 “I think starting a business without a partner…is insane…I would just 
go nuts without having someone to bounce everything off of, and to 
decide critical decisions with.”  
 “I also wanted to have a fully operating co-founder from the beginning 
who was in the trenches with me 24/7, working around the clock 
without getting paid. I would much rather start a company that way.” 




simply for the 
emotional/ 
psychological 
benefits   
  “The first company I tried to start was solo. That was hard. It was 
really hard. The low points are extra low, because you’re the only one 
who has to really deal with it. Going at it alone is really, really hard.” 
 “The loneliness is definitely a real thing…” 
 
Note: Table 6 provides an overview of the primary motivations (as identified in my interviews) for going solo or finding co-






Table 7: The Implications of a Second-in-Command 
 
What past literature says Why different for founders 















Beneficial Running a contemporary firm is 
too much for one person to 
handle. By delegating internal 
operational matters to the second-
in-command, the CEO is 
prevented from being spread too 
thin and doing all aspects of the 




Founder capabilities: Founders possess 
the entrepreneurial capabilities needed to 
discover and exploit opportunities, but 
lack the operational and managerial 
capabilities needed to run a large, 
complex firm. Thus, delegating internal 





Detrimental A second-in-command violates 
the unity of command principle, 
as confusions arise about who is 
actually in charge. This 
complicates and restricts the flow 
of information and can lead to 





Founder power/authority: Founders 
hold a more solid grip on control of their 
firms leading to less confusion around 
“who’s in charge,” as those working in 
and with the firm will be more likely to 
recognize and accept their authority. 
Thus, founders are more likely to avoid 







Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Note: N = 2,098. Table 8 provides Pearson correlation coefficients for each variable, with each variable being measured at the time of the firm’s IPO. For 
variable definitions, please refer to the Methods section of my paper.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Mean S.D. Q1 Med Q3
Second_In_Command 1 1.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
BHAR 2 -0.04 1.00 -0.04 2.14 -0.80 -0.52 0.17
Founder 3 0.13 -0.02 1.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
CEO_No_Ops_Background 4 0.08 -0.01 0.23 1.00 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
CEO_Power 5 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.19 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.00 1.00 2.00
CEO_New 6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.32 -0.11 -0.18 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Startup 7 -0.07 -0.02 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
MVE 8 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 0.17 -0.39 1.00 5.82 1.05 5.13 5.76 6.43
ROA 9 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 -0.44 0.19 1.00 -0.24 0.50 -0.38 -0.05 0.04
AbsROA 10 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.40 -0.22 -0.95 1.00 0.31 0.45 0.04 0.14 0.41
BTM 11 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.21 -0.06 0.28 -0.28 1.00 0.16 0.24 0.04 0.13 0.27
R&D_Intensity 12 -0.13 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.09 0.38 -0.18 -0.66 0.67 -0.33 1.00 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.23
Leverage 13 0.05 0.04 -0.23 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.58 0.22 0.20 -0.21 -0.03 -0.25 1.00 0.37 0.27 0.14 0.31 0.54
VC 14 -0.10 0.00 0.16 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.43 -0.07 -0.27 0.23 -0.37 0.37 -0.45 1.00 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Dual_Class_Shares 15 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.19 0.27 0.10 -0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.16 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00






Table 9: Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by Firms with and without Founder CEOs 
 
 
Note: Table 9 presents descriptive statistics partitioned by firms with and without founder CEOs. The left hand side of Table 9 includes statistics for each subset 
and the difference between the subsets for the full sample of firms, as well as p-values from two-tailed t-tests. The right hand side of Table 9 presents statistics 
for each subset after reweighting the subset of non-founder firms as specified by the entropy balancing process. I do not provide differences and associated t-tests 
for the matched sample as they are insignificant by definition. Note I also include Fama-French industry classification and IPO year indicator variables as 
variables in the entropy balancing process. Thus, the covariate balance is not limited to these firm-specific variables but also extends to industry classification 
and the timing of the IPO. For variable definitions, please refer to the Methods section of my paper. 
Variable n Mean S.D. Skew n Mean S.D. Skew Value P-value Mean S.D. Skew Mean S.D. Skew
CEO_No_Ops_Background 856 0.72 0.45 -1.00 1,242 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.23 0.000 0.72 0.45 -1.00 0.72 0.45 -1.00
CEO_Power 856 1.38 0.99 0.27 1,242 0.84 0.89 0.78 0.53 0.000 1.38 0.99 0.27 1.38 0.98 0.26
CEO_New 856 0.34 0.47 0.69 1,242 0.66 0.47 -0.68 -0.32 0.000 0.34 0.47 0.69 0.34 0.47 0.69
Startup 856 0.67 0.47 -0.74 1,242 0.48 0.50 0.06 0.19 0.000 0.67 0.47 -0.74 0.67 0.47 -0.74
MVE 856 5.67 0.99 0.34 1,242 5.92 1.07 0.32 -0.26 0.000 5.67 0.99 0.34 5.67 1.04 0.44
ROA 856 -0.27 0.51 -2.20 1,242 -0.22 0.48 -2.67 -0.05 0.021 -0.27 0.51 -2.20 -0.27 0.52 -2.29
AbsROA 856 0.35 0.46 2.74 1,242 0.29 0.44 3.10 0.06 0.002 0.35 0.46 2.74 0.35 0.47 2.90
BTM 856 0.15 0.20 0.38 1,242 0.17 0.27 0.45 -0.02 0.021 0.15 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.22 0.12
R&D_Intensity 856 0.17 0.25 2.39 1,242 0.15 0.25 2.63 0.02 0.099 0.17 0.25 2.39 0.17 0.22 2.18
Leverage 856 0.29 0.23 1.07 1,242 0.42 0.29 0.72 -0.13 0.000 0.29 0.23 1.07 0.29 0.23 1.33
VC 856 0.64 0.48 -0.58 1,242 0.48 0.50 0.09 0.16 0.000 0.64 0.48 -0.58 0.64 0.48 -0.58
Dual_Class_Shares 856 0.07 0.26 3.33 1,242 0.08 0.28 3.01 -0.01 0.297 0.07 0.26 3.33 0.07 0.26 3.33
Board_Size 856 4.76 1.96 0.19 1,242 5.61 2.05 0.07 -0.01 0.000 4.76 1.96 0.19 4.72 2.01 -0.17
Full Sample Entropy Balancing Matched Sample




Table 10: Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
  
Note: N = 2,098. Table 10 presents the results from estimating Equation 1, with Column 2 using the reweighted data 
resulting from the entropy balancing process determined in Table 9. I include P-values from two-tailed tests 
underneath each coefficient. The dependent variable is Second_in_Command. For variable definitions, please refer 
to the Methods section of my paper. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable Name (1) (2)




























First-stage entropy balance None
Founder 
(Table 3)
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included













Note: Panel A of Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for founder-led firms, partitioned by firms with and without 
a second-in-command. Panel B of Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for non-founder-led firms, partitioned by 
firms with and without a second-in-command. In both panels, the left hand side includes statistics for each subset 
and the difference between the subsets, as well as p-values from two-tailed t-tests. The right hand side presents 
statistics for each subset after reweighting the subset of control firms as specified by the entropy balancing process. I 
do not provide differences and associated t-tests for the matched sample as they are insignificant by definition. Note 
I also include Fama-French industry classification and IPO year indicator variables as variables in the entropy 
balancing process. Thus, the covariate balance is not limited to these firm-specific variables but also extends to 







Variable n Mean S.D. Skew n Mean S.D. Skew Value P-value Mean S.D. Skew Mean S.D. Skew
CEO_No_Ops_Background 416 0.75 0.44 -1.13 440 0.70 0.46 -0.90 0.04 0.184 0.75 0.44 -1.13 0.75 0.44 -1.13
CEO_Power 416 1.36 0.91 0.06 440 1.25 0.93 0.19 0.12 0.068 1.36 0.91 0.06 1.36 0.97 0.08
CEO_New 416 0.36 0.48 0.57 440 0.31 0.46 0.80 0.05 0.127 0.36 0.48 0.57 0.36 0.48 0.57
Startup 416 0.61 0.49 -0.43 440 0.74 0.44 -1.07 -0.13 0.000 0.61 0.49 -0.43 0.61 0.49 -0.43
MVE 416 5.76 1.05 0.31 440 5.57 0.93 0.31 0.19 0.005 5.76 1.05 0.31 5.76 1.12 0.46
ROA 416 -0.23 0.49 -2.21 440 -0.31 0.54 -2.18 0.07 0.036 -0.23 0.49 -2.21 -0.23 0.49 -2.46
AbsROA 416 0.32 0.43 2.75 440 0.38 0.49 2.70 -0.06 0.056 0.32 0.43 2.75 0.32 0.44 3.09
BTM 416 0.15 0.21 0.19 440 0.15 0.19 0.62 0.00 0.980 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.28
R&D_Intensity 416 0.13 0.22 2.77 440 0.21 0.28 2.14 -0.09 0.000 0.13 0.22 2.77 0.13 0.19 2.64
Leverage 416 0.32 0.24 1.01 440 0.27 0.21 1.05 0.05 0.001 0.32 0.24 1.01 0.32 0.23 0.67
VC 416 0.57 0.50 -0.29 440 0.70 0.46 -0.88 -0.13 0.000 0.57 0.50 -0.29 0.57 0.50 -0.29
Dual_Class_Shares 416 0.11 0.31 2.48 440 0.03 0.18 5.14 0.08 0.000 0.11 0.31 2.48 0.11 0.31 2.48
Board_Size 416 4.72 2.17 0.15 440 4.79 1.74 0.28 -0.06 0.627 4.72 2.17 0.15 4.72 1.79 0.24
Variable n Mean S.D. Skew n Mean S.D. Skew Value P-value Mean S.D. Skew Mean S.D. Skew
CEO_No_Ops_Background 443 0.53 0.50 -0.12 799 0.48 0.50 0.08 0.05 0.084 0.53 0.50 -0.12 0.53 0.50 -0.12
CEO_Power 443 0.91 0.91 0.57 799 0.67 0.77 0.93 0.24 0.000 0.91 0.91 0.57 0.91 0.86 0.58
CEO_New 433 0.67 0.47 -0.74 799 0.66 0.48 -0.66 0.02 0.548 0.67 0.47 -0.74 0.67 0.47 -0.74
Startup 433 0.43 0.50 0.27 799 0.51 0.50 -0.05 -0.08 0.008 0.43 0.50 0.27 0.43 0.50 0.27
MVE 443 6.07 1.12 0.22 799 5.84 1.04 0.35 0.23 0.000 6.07 1.12 0.22 6.07 1.11 0.29
ROA 443 -0.20 0.49 -2.99 799 -0.23 0.48 -2.49 0.03 0.273 -0.20 0.49 -2.99 -0.20 0.47 -2.87
AbsROA 443 0.26 0.45 3.35 799 0.30 0.44 2.95 -0.04 0.163 0.26 0.45 3.35 0.26 0.43 3.27
BTM 443 0.20 0.28 0.70 799 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.05 0.002 0.20 0.28 0.70 0.20 0.27 0.44
R&D_Intensity 443 0.11 0.23 3.40 799 0.18 0.26 2.35 -0.06 0.000 0.11 0.23 3.40 0.11 0.20 2.79
Leverage 443 0.45 0.30 0.62 799 0.41 0.29 0.78 0.04 0.027 0.45 0.30 0.62 0.45 0.29 0.56
VC 443 0.40 0.49 0.40 799 0.52 0.50 -0.07 -0.12 0.000 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.40
Dual_Class_Shares 443 0.12 0.33 2.28 799 0.06 0.24 3.66 0.06 0.000 0.12 0.33 2.28 0.12 0.33 2.28
Board_Size 433 5.70 2.24 0.01 799 5.57 1.93 0.10 0.13 0.295 5.70 2.24 0.01 5.70 2.06 0.09
Panel B: Non-founder firms
Non-founder-only sample Entropy Balancing Matched Sample
Firms with second-in- Firms without second-in- Diff in Means Firms with second-in- Firms without second-
Panel A: Founder firms












Table 12: Results for Hypothesis 2 
 
  
Note: Column 1 restricts the sample to only founder-led firms (N=856) and uses the reweighted data resulting from 
the entropy balancing process determined in Panel A of Table 11. Column 2 restricts the sample to only non-
founder-led firms (N=1,242) and uses the reweighted data resulting from the entropy balancing process determined 
in Panel B of Table 11. I include P-values from two-tailed tests underneath each coefficient. The dependent 
variables is BHAR. For variable definitions, please refer to the Methods section of my paper. *, **, and *** indicate 





Variable Name (1) (2)
Second_in_Command Founders: H2+ 0.1355* -0.2856***



































Industry Fixed Effects Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included








Table 13: Supplemental Analysis: Testing the Mechanisms 
 
 
Note: Column 1 restricts the sample to only founder-led firms (N=856) and uses the reweighted data resulting from 
the entropy balancing process determined in Panel A of Table 11. I include P-values from two-tailed tests 
underneath each coefficient. The dependent variables is BHAR. For variable definitions, please refer to the Methods 
section of my paper. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Name (1) (2) (3)
Second_in_Command -0.1377 -0.2272 -0.4267*
(0.312) (0.244) (0.085)
Second_in_Command * CEO_No_Ops_Background + 0.3666*** 0.3001***
(0.002) (0.007)
Second_in_Command * CEO_Power + 0.2662** 0.2484*
(0.048) (0.063)
CEO_No_Ops_Background -0.0910 0.0991 -0.0529
(0.350) (0.264) (0.578)
CEO_Power 0.0506 -0.0774 -0.0683
(0.616) (0.495) (0.549)
CEO_New 0.1144 0.1133 0.1077
(0.466) (0.472) (0.505)
Startup 0.1069 0.0856 0.0947
(0.390) (0.437) (0.424)
MVE 0.1060 0.0977 0.1031
(0.342) (0.383) (0.358)
ROA -0.2419 -0.2396 -0.2748
(0.504) (0.532) (0.460)
AbsROA -0.3107* -0.3237 -0.3559*
(0.092) (0.110) (0.071)
BTM 0.6122* 0.5674* 0.5847*
(0.069) (0.080) (0.079)
R&D_Intensity 1.0176*** 1.0141*** 1.0117***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.3821 0.3633 0.3714
(0.241) (0.251) (0.227)
VC -0.0041 -0.0077 -0.0172
(0.973) (0.946) (0.882)
Dual_Class_Shares -0.3685** -0.4160** -0.4124**
(0.049) (0.023) (0.025)












Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Sample restrictions Founder=1 Founder=1 Founder=1
Observations 856 856 856











Table 14: Survey Response Rates 
 Survey year 
 2017 2018 2019 
Individual response rate 336 / 884 = 38% 233 / 781 = 30% 178 / 612 = 29% 

















Note: See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Mean S.D. Min Mdn Max
Sense_of_Community 1 1.00 5.05 1.04 1.33 5.00 7.00
Engagement_in_Community 2 0.58 1.00 4.08 1.32 1.00 4.00 7.00
Importance_of_Community 3 0.40 0.37 1.00 5.92 0.92 2.33 6.00 7.00
Investors_from_Community 4 0.11 0.16 0.16 1.00 1.39 0.84 1.00 1.00 5.00
Solo 5 0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.18 1.00 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Founder 6 0.13 0.25 0.10 -0.08 0.47 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Minority 7 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.02 1.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
No_Startup_Exp 8 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00
Market_Logic 9 -0.14 -0.22 -0.16 -0.21 -0.07 -0.12 -0.18 0.05 1.00 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age 10 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 -0.21 0.21 0.36 -0.12 0.01 0.03 1.00 35.27 8.10 19.00 34.00 52.00
Female 11 -0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.18 -0.12 -0.32 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.29 1.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Full_Time 12 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.18 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 0.04 -0.13 -0.06 1.00 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 1.00
Moved 13 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 1.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00




Table 16: What is Driving the Changing Nature of Work? 
 
Driver Explanation 
Technology Though finding nonstandard work has historically been difficult, recent 
technological advances make it much easier. This includes social media, 
online ads or job boards, sharing economy websites or apps (Uber, Airbnb, 
etc.), or online freelance marketplaces or platforms (Upwork, Freelancer, 
99designs, etc.). For example, the Oxford Internet Institute found that the 
number of projects that corporations were sourcing from these platforms 
increased 26% from 2016 to 2017, with popular categories being software 
development, creative and design, and writing (Corporaal and Lehdonvirta, 
2017).  
Demographics Compared to prior generations, Millennials prefer more autonomy, career 
flexibility, casual and fun work environments, flexible hours, and “results-
only” work policies in which they are free to choose how, when, and where to 
go about their work as long as they meet certain criteria (Alsop, 2008). All of 
these factors are driving more Millennials to nonstandard work – in fact, the 
Freelancing in America (2017) survey found that 47% of 18-34 year-olds do 
some form of nonstandard work at least part-time, compared to only 27% of 
people over 45.  
Nonwage 
benefits 
Many people opt for standard employment for nonwage benefits, with health 
insurance being the most notable. However, in recent decades, the number of 
employers providing these benefits has been steadily declining (Farber and 
Levy, 2000; Pierce, 2001). Recently, the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) in the United States making it even more costly for employers to offer 
benefits to standard workers, as well as making it easier for nonstandard 
workers to obtain access to health insurance. This creates incentives for firms 
to use more contractor work and outsourcing (Bidwell et al., 2013).  
Stigma In the past, a negative stigma surrounded non-standard workers, viewing 
them as marginalized people in peripheral jobs (Ashford et al., 2007). In 
recent years, however, this stigma is beginning to dissipate as more 
“supertemps” (e.g., top managers and professionals such as lawyers, CFOs, 
and consultants) enter nontraditional work (Miller and Miller, 2012). This has 
helped add legitimacy and even prestige to nonstandard work. This same 
sentiment is also evident in the Freelancing in America (2017) survey, in 
which 70.0% of respondents agreed that perceptions of nonstandard careers 







Table 17: Design Choices for Coworking Spaces 
 
Design dimension Explanation 
Private offices vs. 
open space 
Coworking spaces vary on the type of space they offer. Most 
coworking spaces have large, open areas with desks, tables, chairs, 
and couches, where seating is “first come first serve.” However, some 
coworking spaces (approximately 25%, according to Deskmag, 2018) 
also have private offices available for rent.  
Rent/leases Coworking spaces charge a monthly rent to tenants. The amount of 
rent depends on the size of the space being rented, with private offices 
being more expensive than open coworking. Most leases are month-
to-month, allowing tenants the flexibility to cancel at any time.  
Amenities Coworking spaces generally offer a variety of amenities, which could 
include office furnishings (desks, tables, chairs, couches, etc.), access 
to conference rooms, WiFi, printing, exercise equipment, and free 
food and beverages. WeWork, for example, is known for its free-
flowing alcohol available to all tenants.  
Aesthetics/ambiance Although some coworking spaces are designed to look and feel like 
traditional offices, the vast majority attempt to create a different type 
of atmosphere and ambiance. The spaces are designed to encourage 
interaction, creativity, and innovation.  
Members Some coworking spaces will allow anyone to work at their space as 
long as they are able to pay the rent, resulting in a mix of startup 
companies, small businesses, remote workers, freelancers, and 
independent contractors. Other coworking spaces choose to focus, 
perhaps on a particular group (e.g., startups or freelancers) or on a 
particular industry (e.g., media, software, FinTech, etc.).  
Sponsors/partners Deskmag (2018) estimated that only about 40% of all coworking 
spaces were profitable in 2017. Many coworking spaces do not collect 
enough rent to cover their expenses, and thus seek out funding from 
sponsorships by local governments, universities, and corporations. In 
addition, many coworking spaces partner with other members of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem (accelerators, incubators, etc.) to 
coordinate events and initiatives. 
Events/trainings Many coworking spaces offer many events, ranging from professional 
networking opportunities to more social interaction (game nights, 
watching sports, etc.). Many spaces also offer optional trainings or 
workshops on topics that are of interest to their tenants, such as how 
to fundraise, how to acquire customers, how to find health insurance 








Table 18: Comparing Accelerators, Incubators, and Coworking Spaces 
 
Dimension  Accelerators Incubators Coworking spaces Maker spaces 
Participants  High-growth startups Startups Startups, small businesses, 
freelancers, independent 
workers, remote workers 
 









 Yes Yes No No 
Limited time?  Yes (program lasts 3-6 
months) 
Yes (typically stay 6-
12 months) 
No (tenants stay as long as 
they can pay rent) 
 
No (individuals come and 
go as they please) 
Payment required 
 
 Takes portion of equity Fee for service 
(sometimes equity) 
Monthly rent Often free for certain 
community, but sometimes 
a membership fee 
 
Purpose  Rapid growth Nurturing 
development 
 




 High (seed capital, 
intensive mentoring/ 





Low (space, amenities, 
and occasional events) 
Medium (provide 
hardware and software 






Table 19: The Benefits of the Coworking Space 
 
Category Explanation Representative quotations 
Efficiency Tenants generally pay more per 
square foot at a coworking 
space than they would in a 
traditional office space, but they 
are essentially buying 
convenience. They spend less 
time worrying about utilities, 
internet, etc., and more time 
focused on their company. In 
addition, the price per square 
foot is often misleading because 
all tenants have access to 
conference rooms, shared 
workspaces, free amenities, and 
other resources that 
entrepreneurs are often not able 
to afford by themselves. 
 "It was really nice to come in and just not have to 
worry about a lot of that practical stuff. And just be 
able to come in and really focus on trying to grow 
our business and reach towards our purpose in the 
company." 
 "I don't have to worry about anything. It's just a 
monthly rent and everything is taken care of...I 
don't have to worry about maintenance or worrying 
about when the Wi‐Fi goes out." 
 "I wasted so much time at my first two 
companies... designing these super cool offices. I 
shudder to think how much money I wasted on 
that, and more importantly time. So inefficient…" 
 "The price per square foot is higher, but the 
difference is convenience. I can walk in and start 
working without having to worry about utilities, 
internet, cleaning, etc… it's worth it." 
Flexibility Traditional office spaces often 
require tenants to sign multi-
year leases, but entrepreneurs 
are hesitant to do this because 
they do not know how quickly 
they will grow and need to 
move, or whether they will 
even be in business in a few 
months. Coworking provides a 
solution by offering month-to-
month leases and flexible 
arrangements 
 "In traditional office spaces, the lease you have to 
sign is typically like a three year lease at least, 
usually five or ten years. Here, you come in, it's 
month to month, you know? If you need more 
space you just call whoever, and next thing you 
know you've got two rooms instead of one." 
 "It's so modular and flexible, right? If you need 
more space, you add a new office. If you need to 
shrink, you get rid of one of your offices." 
 "When we first moved in we were like, oh, month 
to month lease. If we can't get clients, we'll drop 
it." 
Legitimacy Coworking spaces help new 
ventures appear bigger or more 
legitimate than they really are. 
For example, when companies 
host potential clients, investors, 
or hires, they are able to hold 
these meetings in a conference 
room in a professional setting, 
rather than a home office or a 
coffee shop. 
 "I don't know where we'd be if we didn't work 
here... Honestly, it would have really constrained 
our growth potential because we couldn't have 
taken our client meetings at a home office or in a 
garage or at a coffee shop." 
 "The space was huge for recruiting. So when we 
were bringing people in and selling them on this 
vision like 'our company is gonna be huge 
someday. You wanna be part of it and this is really 
a cool place to work.' That was huge." 
 "We're always having folks come like partners, 
come visit us, and it's just so nice to have, be like, 






Table 20: The Benefits of the Coworking Community 
 
Category Explanation Representative quotations 
Connections Coworking spaces offer 
unprecedented opportunities 
for networking just by being 
in physical proximity to other 
startups, and through events 
and other formal activities 
offered. These interactions 
often lead to referrals for new 
clients, employees, investors, 
service providers, etc. 
 "With fundraising, we've gotten to know people who 
know people, and then we can reach out to them." 
 "I think just the physical proximity to other people who 
are doing what you're doing... nothing will ever 
compare to those spontaneous connections you make in 
the kitchen, or walking in the hall... it's just been great 
networking, just by physical proximity." 
 "It's helped us as a company get a lot of connections. 
We have been able to network quite a bit through 
[coworking central] and get opportunities we probably 
would never have gotten. It's a huge resource." 
Solutions Entrepreneurs, especially 
first-time entrepreneurs, often 
do not have the experience or 
knowledge to navigate the 
complexities of starting a new 
venture. As such, many 
entrepreneurs rely on help 
from other members of the 
community to solve problems 
and answer questions.   
 "If you don't know how to do this or you don't know 
how to do that, there's somebody around here who has 
an idea and people are super generous with their time. 
It's truly a community..." 
 "It's great, because if I have a development problem, I 
can go ask other developers like, 'Hey, can you look at 
this?'" 
 "The community is big…I feel that you can reach out to 
anybody here, if you need to know something, learn 
something, and that's huge when you're a startup." 
Energy/ 
motivation 
Being surrounded by other 
entrepreneurs is often 
energizing and motivating. 
The passion and intensity with 
which most entrepreneurs go 
about their work is usually 
contagious. Thus, many of the 
entrepreneurs considered one 
main advantage to be the 
environment, or the "vibe" 
that existed within the space.  
 "Getting to come to a place like this, where there is a 
buzz about it is something that I think helps motivate 
our people. I think that's really important." 
 "You kind of see the same people all the time and see 
them progress. It pushes you too...We get energized by 
what's going on and the other community members." 
 "It's inspiring. It's nice to see so many people also so 
passionate about what they're doing. That's the common 
thread. It doesn't matter what it is they're doing, they're 
just passionate about it. And that feels good." 
 "That feeling like I'm a part of this movement, and this 
larger community is just tremendous" 
Social 
support 
Entrepreneurial work can 
sometimes be isolating and 
lonely. The friendships 
developed between 
entrepreneurs at coworking 
spaces can alleviate some of 
these downsides. These 
friendships are important, as 
they provide social support 
when times get tough, or 
simply make the 
entrepreneurs' work more 
enjoyable. 
 "For me, it's really the social support... having other 
people to vent to if you have a project that's really 
frustrating or a client that's giving you trouble, or I'm 
just mad at my cofounder for some reason." 
 "When I've been able to sit down and have 
conversations with other entrepreneurs… you could say 
it's a little bit like a therapy session, talking about all the 
ups and downs" 
 "Community is important. It's like some of us went out 
for beers the other night and it's just really nice to be 





Table 21: OLS Regression Using Coworking Central Survey Data 
 
 
Note: For variable definitions, please refer to Appendix A. Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 22 provide results at the 
individual level of analysis, with each observation representing a respondent to the survey (the observations in 
Column 3 are lower because data on Importance_of_Community was not collected in the 2017 survey). Column 4 of 
Table 22 provides results for founders only, as they are the only respondents to fill out company-level information 
including Investors_from_Community. I include P-values from two-tailed tests underneath each coefficient. *, **, 










Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4)
Solo -0.2093* -0.0695 -0.1318 -0.4362***
(0.067) (0.619) (0.335) (0.000)
Founder 0.2648*** 0.6183*** 0.2584**
(0.005) (0.000) (0.019)
Minority 0.3561*** 0.3448*** 0.3266*** 0.3306***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
No_Startup_Experience 0.4176** 0.4707** 0.2810 0.0021
(0.022) (0.035) (0.154) (0.997)
Market_Logic -0.2240*** -0.4529*** -0.2380** -0.2390**
(0.004) (0.000) (0.011) (0.040)
Age -0.0046 0.0102* -0.0062 -0.0160**
(0.357) (0.091) (0.297) (0.029)
Female -0.0975 0.1376 0.1746* 0.2381*
(0.233) (0.167) (0.078) (0.076)
Full_Time -0.1144 -0.1565 -0.0578 -0.2866*
(0.305) (0.250) (0.665) (0.063)
Moved 0.0503 0.1098 0.2147* 0.0152
(0.613) (0.366) (0.083) (0.911)
HQ 0.0671 0.1630 0.0801 0.3746







Year dummy variables Included Included Included Included
Observations 747 747 412 242

























Figure 2: A Summary of Prior Literature 
 
Benefits of co-founders Costs of co-founders 
Resources (human, social, and financial 
capital) 
- Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Aldrich 
& Kim, 2007; Cooper et al., 
1994; Aldrich et al., 2004 
 
Social/psychological support (improve 
decision-making, cope with loneliness) 
- De Dreu, 2006; De Jong et al., 
2013; Wasserman, 2012 
 
 
Coordination/monitoring costs (it 
takes time to manage group efforts) 
- Deichmann and Jensen, 2018; 
Marks et al., 2001; Cohen and 
Bailey, 1997 
 
Conflict (highly likely in a founding 
team) 
- Wasserman, 2012; Jung et al., 

































Does the founder have 
access to co-creators? 
 Enough financial capital to hire 
employees? 
 Enough social capital to use 
alliances or benefactors? 
 Specific type of human capital 
(i.e., product expertise)? 
 
See Table 3, Table 5  
 
Does the founder prefer: 
 Avoiding conflict 




 Working closely with others 
 Coping with loneliness 
 
See Table 6 
Can the founder find 
compatible co-founders? 
 Complementary skillsets 
 Low number of conflict 















Figure 4: Sensitivity of Firm Performance to the Presence of a Second-in-Command 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the marginal effect of the presence of a second-in-command on firm performance by founder CEO classification. The solid line 
represents the results for founder-led firms, as documented in Column 1 of Table 12, whereas the dashed line represents the results for non-founder-led firms as 




















Figure 5: Global Number of Coworking Spaces by Year 
 
 











Figure 6: Number of Members per Coworking Space by Year 
 





APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 AbsROA – The absolute value of ROA, as defined below 
 Age – The individual’s age (in years) at the time of the survey 
 BHAR – The firm’s gross buy and hold returns over the three years subsequent to the firm’s 
IPO and subtracting the CRSP value-weighted buy and-hold return during that same period 
of time 
 Board_Size – The number of external board members. 
 BTM – The firm’s book value of assets divided by the firm’s market value of equity at time 
of IPO 
 CEO_New – A binary variable indicating whether the CEO was in their first three years of 
tenure as CEO  
 CEO_Ops – A binary variable that takes the value of one if the CEO has a background in 
operations 
 CEO_Power – An index variable ranging from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating a more 
powerful CEO and thus less confusion around unity of command. Refer to the methods 
section for a detailed overview of the construction of this variable 
 Company_Age – The company’s age (in years) at the time of the survey 
 Dual_Class_Shr – A binary variable indicating whether the firm has two or more different 
classes of common shares at time of IPO 
 Engagement_in_Community – Measures the extent to which the individual is engaged in 
the coworking community. This measure is calculated by taking the average rating from a 
three-item scale (see question 18 in Appendix B) 
 Female – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is female, and 0 otherwise 
 Founder – A binary variable indicating whether the firm has a founder CEO at time of IPO  
 Founder – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is a founder 
 Full_Time – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual reported they were 
working on their venture full-time at the time of the survey, and 0 otherwise 
 Funded – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the company has received outside funding 
from VCs or angels, and 0 otherwise 
 HQ – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the company is headquartered at the 
coworking space, and 0 otherwise 
 Importance_of_Community – Measures the extent to which a sense of community is 
important to the respondent. I asked respondents to rate how important different aspects of 
the community were to them (see question 17 in Appendix B). This measure was calculated 




 Investors_from_Community – Measures the extent to which the coworking community has 
helped the company find investors, with a higher rating indicating that the space has helped 
them find more investors (see question 6 in Appendix B) 
 Leverage – The ratio of total liabilities to total assets at time of IPO 
 Market_Logic – Measures the extent to the entrepreneur is motivated by making money. I 
asked respondents to rate how much they were motivated by a variety of factors (see 
question 21 in Appendix B). I then averaged the rating for these two items: “To develop a 
highly profitable company; To make money.” If the average of these items was higher than 
the ratings for all other factors, I coded this condition as 1, and 0 otherwise 
 Minority – Binary variable taking the value of 0 if the individual reports their race as 
White/Caucasian, and 1 otherwise 
 Moved – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the entrepreneur moved to the area from 
another city to start their business, and 0 otherwise 
 MVE – The natural log of a firm’s market value of equity plus one at time of IPO 
 No_Startup_Experience – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual reported 
having zero years of startup experience prior to entering their current position, and zero 
otherwise. 
 R&D_Intensity – The ratio of each firm’s research and development expenses to its book 
value of assets at time of IPO 
 ROA – The firm’s return on assets over the twelve months prior to the initial public offering 
 Second_in_Command – An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) or a non-CEO executive who holds the title of “President” 
at time of IPO, per the firm’s IPO registration statement  
 Sense_of_Community – Measures the extent to which the individual feels a sense of 
community in the coworking space. This measure is calculated by taking the average rating 
from a three-item scale (see question 19 in Appendix B). 
 Solo – Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is the only person from his/her 
company who works at the coworking space, and 0 otherwise 
 Startup – A binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s revenues for the year 
preceding the IPO were under $50 million  
 Total_ft_employees – Total number of full-time employees reported by the company at the 
time of the survey 
 VC – A binary variable indicating whether the firm has venture capital funding prior to its 





APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
1. Please select which role best describes you: 
a. Founder/co-founder 
b. Site Leader (for co's not headquartered in Coworking Central) 
c. Employee 
 
2. Are you currently searching (or expecting to search in the future) for another co-founder? 
(Yes/No/Maybe) 
 
3. Please select the following that best describes your company's growth plans: 
a. Don't intend to grow any larger 
b. Intend to grow somewhat larger, but not much 
c. Intend to grow much larger 
d. Other ________________________________________________ 
 
4. Please select the following that best describes your company (For-profit/not-for-profit) 
 
5. In the history of your company, have you ever raised or used capital from the following 
sources? (check all that apply): Bank Loans, Personal Investment, Friends and family, Angel 
Investors, Venture Capital, Crowdfunding, Accelerator, Grants, Other 
 
6. Of all your investors/other capital providers, how many did the Coworking Central 
community help you find? 
a. None 
b. A small percentage of my investors/capital providers 
c. A moderate percentage of my investors/capital providers 
d. A significant percentage of my investors/capital providers 
e. All of my investors/capital providers 
 
7. In the last year, how much capital did your business raise? ______________ 
 
8. As of September 30, 2018, please indicate the total number of employees in the following 
categories: (Full-time, Part-time, Contractors) 
 
9. In the past year, how many net positions did your company create in the following 
categories? (Full-time, Part-time, Contractors) 
 
10. Out of all your employees, how many has the Coworking Central community helped you 
find/hire? 
a. None 
b. A small percentage of my employees 
c. A moderate percentage of my employees 
d. A significant percentage of my employees 
e. All of my employees 
 





12. Approximate the annual revenue of your company: 
a. Under $10,000 
b. $10,000 to $50,000 
c. $50,000 to $100,000 
d. $100,000 to $500,000 
e. $500,000 to $1 Million 
f. $1 Million to $10 Million 
g. $10 Million to $50 Million 
h. $50 Million+ 
i. Don't know 
j. Prefer not to answer 
 
13. Out of all your customers, how many has the Coworking Central community helped you 
find? 
a. None 
b. A small percentage of my customers 
c. A moderate percentage of my customers 
d. A significant percentage of my customers 
e. All of my customers 
 
14. As of September 30, 2018, is your company cash flow positive? (Yes/No) 
 
15. How long have you been working with your company? _______ 
 
16. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate the degree to which they agreed that 
Coworking Central performs well on these dimensions: Opportunities to gain publicity, 
Opportunities to learn, Opportunities for mentorship, Opportunities for professional 
networking, Opportunities for social networking,  Connections to potential customers, 
Connections to potential investors, Connections to potential employees, Social 
support/friendship, New ideas, Feedback on my ideas, Improvements to my company's 
product/service, Solutions to specific problems, Referrals to others who can assist, 
Somewhere to work besides home, Dedicated space to work, Monthly cost, The aesthetics of 
the space, The amenities of the space, An innovative environment, A sense of 
professionalism, A sense of energy, A sense of collegiality, A sense of community 
 
17. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I also asked respondents to rate how important the items in 
question 16 were to them. 
 
18. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate the degree to which they agree with 
the following statements:  
a. I actively try to meet other people at Coworking Central 
b. I actively seek out advice from others at Coworking Central 





19. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate the degree to which they agree with 
the following statements:  
a. I feel connected to the Coworking Central community 
b. I feel accepted by others in the Coworking Central community 
c. People at Coworking Central are good at influencing each other 
 
20. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate the degree to which they agree with 
the following statements:  
a. Being a part of the Coworking Central community energizes me 
b. Being at Coworking Central gives my company more legitimacy 
c. Working at Coworking Central is more cost effective than other alternatives 
d. Overall, I would recommend working at Coworking Central to a friend 
e. The Triangle entrepreneurial community (at large) has positively impacted my 
business' current and/or future success. 
 
21. Using a 7-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with the following statements as motivations for why they are working on their particular 
company: 
a. To develop a highly profitable company 
b. To make new connections in the entrepreneurial community 
c. To work with people I like 
d. To make the world a better place 
e. To work on something I'm passionate about 
f. To gain new skills 
g. To work in an innovative environment 
h. To gain entrepreneurial experience 
i. To have fun 
j. To have greater flexibility for my personal life 
k. To make money 
l. To help others 
m. To control my own time 
n. To develop a cool/important product 
o. To avoid working in a big company 
p. To provide financial security for me and/or my family 
 
22. Using a 5-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate how much they agreed with the 
following: 
a. My team and I agree on the strategic goals of the company 
b. My team and I agree on the short-term business objectives that should be considered 
the most important 
c. My team and I agree on the best ways to ensure the company's survival 
 
23. Using a 5-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate how much they agreed with the 
following: 
a. Team members have a close relationship with each other 




c. Team members consider themselves personal friends 
 
24. Using a 5-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate how much they agreed with the 
following: 
a. I feel connected to my company 
b. I feel accepted by others in my company 
c. People at my company are good at influencing each other 
 
25. Are you currently working full-time with your Coworking Central company? (Yes/No) 
 
26. On average, how many hours per week do you spend working on your Coworking Central 
company? _______ 
 
27. How many of those hours are spent working at an Coworking Central location?__________ 
 
28. Using a 5-point Likert scale, I asked respondents to rate how often they were at Coworking 
Central in the morning, afternoon, and evening 
 
29. Before coming to Coworking Central, where did you work on your company? (select all that 
apply) 
a. Home 
b. Other rented office space 
c. Other coworking space 
d. Public place (coffee shop, library, university, etc.) 
e. Other ________________________________________________ 
 
30. What is your job title?__________________ 
 
31. Please self-describe your gender (Male/Female) 
 
32. Please self-identify your race/ethnicity (select all that apply) 
 
33. In what year were you born? (again, this will remain confidential) _____________ 
 
34. Total number of years you have worked in/with startup companies:_____________ 
 
35. Is this the first company you have founded? (Yes/No) 
 
36. When was your Coworking Central company founded? (if no official founding date, when 
did you begin actively working on the business?) 
 
37. How many people founded your company? 
 





APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Date:_______________________________ Respondent:_____________________________ 
    
Researcher 1:_________________________ Title:___________________________________  
 
Researcher 2:_________________________ Company:_______________________________ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION (2 minutes) 
 
A. Provide background of interviewer. 
 
B. Discuss information privacy: All information will remain confidential. Information 
gained from respondents at one interview will not be shared with respondents at another. 
Further, in the write-up, all corporate and individual names will be changed to mask 
identities.  
 
C. Ask permission to begin recording the interview. Recording interviews helps us capture 
all relevant points that we might miss. People, places, and figures are anonymized so 
identities are safe. Only researchers see data.  
 
D. Outline the flow of the interview. The interview consists of these sections: 
 
a. First, I will ask you general background questions about your company.  
b. Second, I will ask you about your founding history. 
c. Finally, I will ask you questions about what it is like working at Coworking 
Central.  
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND QUESTIONS (10 minutes) 
 
TRANSITION: First, I would like to ask a few questions about the company.  
 
1. Can you give me a quick overview of your company? 
Prompts:  Products/services provided: 
 
 Current stage of development: 
 
 Strategy or business model (customer painpoint, differentiated 
solution, profit formula, technology and operations strategy, market 
plan) 
 
 Traction (do you have customers, etc.?) 
 






SECTION 2: COMPANY HISTORY (20 minutes) 
2. TRANSITION: Thank you for providing that information. Now, I would like to ask several 
questions so I can better understand the history of your team. On the business bestseller list, 
there are books written about the important businesses (e.g., Google, Apple, Amazon, etc.). 
Pretend you are telling such a story about your company. Please focus chronologically on how 
your team was formed and how your company has evolved. I may interrupt you to clarify. 
SECTION 3: COWORKING QUESTIONS (20-30 minutes) 
 
TRANSITION: Thank you. I want to transition now to a final set of questions. Specifically, I’m 
interested in knowing more about your experience working out of Coworking Central. 
 
3. Why did you choose to work at Coworking Central? What where the most important 
considerations? [Prompt: Financial concerns, making connections, productivity of 
employees, etc.] 
 
4. What were your alternatives to working at Coworking Central, and why did you not 
choose those? 
 
5. Hypothetically, if Coworking Central were to no longer exist, where would you 
work? 
 
6. What (if any) are the advantages of working out of Coworking Central? 
Prompts: 1. Connections (customers, investors, employees, mentors, 
collaborators) 
2. New ideas 
3. Feedback on ideas 
4. Social support/friendship 
5. Opportunities to gain publicity 
6. Energy 
 
7. What (if any) are the disadvantages of working out of Coworking Central? 
Prompts: 1. Are you afraid about other companies stealing ideas, customers, 
employees, etc? 
2. What (if any) types of distractions are at Coworking Central? 
[Prompt: Do you spend too much time socializing with others, going 
to events, etc.?] 




8. How different vs. similar are you to the other companies at Coworking Central, in 
terms of industry, stage of development, etc.? 






9. Have you collaborated with any other companies at Coworking Central? If so, how? 
 
10. Has working at Coworking Central changed the culture of your company? If so, how?  
 
11. What are people's reactions when you tell them you work at Coworking Central? 
Investors? Employees? Clients/customers? Overall, does working at Coworking 
Central help or hurt your image?  
 
12. What would it take for your or your company to leave Coworking Central? 
 






14. Did we miss anything? What other advice would you give to future entrepreneurs?  
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